Chapter 4. Government and Politics



Casa Rosada, the presidential palace

POLITICAL PARTIES, PERSONAL FACTIONS, labor unions, military factions, and business groups were among the numerous actors in Argentina's political system—all competing for control of the presidency, for the power to determine government policy, and for the authority to distribute the patronage that such control brought. Each actor tended to seek exclusive control of the government and, once successful, to use that control to harm its competitors. As a result, virtually all government decisions were determined by weighing their potential impact on the alignment of political forces supporting or opposing the government.

The political competition was not limited by the formal Constitution and laws of the country, which were typically cited by those actors who benefited from them and ignored by those who did not. Real political power was not based on laws but on the control of political resources, such as the ability to call a general strike, to withhold investment capital, or to take over the government through force of arms.

The political resources that brought victory in the competition varied with the circumstances at any particular time. At one point, force of arms might bring control of the government, but at another it might not be enough. Similarly, winning elections might bring the presidency, but keeping it depended on being able simultaneously to reward supporters with patronage and policies that benefited them and to prevent opponents from coalescing in an alliance that could overthrow the government or prevent it from making policy.

The actors in the system tended to change positions rapidly, aligning themselves in complex constellations of factions in support of particular policy questions while producing a completely different alignment on other policy questions. Thus, it was often difficult to determine who supported the government and who opposed it, for the patterns shifted as the issues changed.

This pattern of continuously shifting coalitions was the dominant pattern not only of the system as a whole but also of the institutional actors within it. Virtually all of the organizations that competed in the system—the military, the political parties, the business associations, and the labor unions—were divided into factions. Just as each group in the system sought to use the resources in its possession against its competititors, so

internal factions within the groups also fought for control of those same resources.

The constantly shifting pattern of political alignment in the system produced frequent changes of government as well as frequent changes in forms of government. At times the dominant coalition favored liberal democratic institutions because those institutions made the resources in their possession important. At other times the dominant coalition favored authoritarian institutions for much the same reason. The competition, however, was not over forms of government which were means to an end, and were to be manipulated or discarded as the political situation decreased their utility. Rather, the competition was over the ability to determine government policy and thereby to manipulate that policy to benefit supporters and punish opponents.

The complexity of the system, in which alliances of factions within some organizations formed alliances with factions within other organizations in pursuit of relatively short-term political gain, produced a marked tendency toward stalemate in the system, rendering the government unable to take any action when confronted with an array of forces aligned against it. In such situations the competition sometimes became violent as groups abandoned legal political competition for civil war. Since the 1920s, however, violence was limited, only becoming the dominant pattern of political struggle in the 1970s.

The transformation of the political system in 1983 from an authoritarian one based on military rule to a liberal-democratic system based on elected civilians did not change these fundamental political patterns. Raúl Alfonsín confronted the same shifting pattern of support and opposition as did his predecessors. Just as the inability of the preceding military governments to solve the economic problems facing the country led to the transition to civilian rule, so the survival of constitutional government depended largely on Alfonsín's ability successfully to manipulate the forces in the system to stay in power while solving similar economic problems. Whether or not he succeeded depended little on ideology and even less on observing the niceties of liberal democracy. Rather, it depended on his ability to marshal the support of more factions and to sustain that support.

Institutional Structure

Constitutional Background

The 1853 Constitution, which was still in effect in 1985, was written and promulgated in the midst of the period of intermittent civil war between Unitarians and Federalists that marked the country's first half-century of independence (see The Dictatorship of Rosas, 1829-52, ch. 1). Several earlier constitutions had been promulgated as part of the conflict, most notably the strictly centralist 1826 constitution, followed by the 1831 Federal Pact that sanctioned the autonomy of the interior provinces. The centralist rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1829-52) provoked a strong reaction in the interior provinces, and following his overthrow in 1852, the governors of most provinces agreed to a new constitution, promulgated in 1853. The province of Buenos Aires, however, boycotted the constitutional convention and maintained a separate existence. Civil wars between Buenos Aires and the other provinces followed in 1858 and 1861. Buenos Aires gained a decisive victory in 1861, under the leadership of Bartolomé Mitre, and then agreed to join the other provinces, after securing some amendments to the 1853 Constitution.

The 1853 Constitution provides for a federal system of representative government. The provinces have the right to establish their own governments, and all powers not specifically accorded to the national government are reserved for the provinces. Provincial autonomy is limited, however, by a provision allowing the national government to intervene in the provinces whenever it deems such action necessary. The structure of the national government is based on the principle of the separation of powers into three coequal branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. The president, who serves as both chief of state and head of government, is to be elected to a six-year term by an electoral college, whose members are to be chosen by popular vote. The legislative branch is to consist of a bicameral Congress—the upper house elected by the legislatures of the provinces and the lower house by popular election. The judiciary is to be nominated by the president and confirmed by the upper house of the legislature. The Constitution may be amended only by a convention summoned for that purpose by a two-thirds vote of members of Congress. Amending conventions met in 1880, 1890, 1898, 1949, 1957, and 1972.

The 1853 Constitution remained the formal institutional

framework until 1949, when a constitutional convention convened by President Juan Domingo Perón (1946-55) made substantial amendments to it. Although technically the 1949 constitution was merely an amendment to the 1853 Constitution, it was treated as an entirely new constitution because it substantially altered the institutional arrangements outlined in 1853. The power of the executive was greatly increased, the provision of the 1853 document prohibiting immediate reelection of a sitting president was abolished, and the rights of labor unions to organize, strike, and participate in the government were included in the 1949 constitution (see Perón's First Presidency, 1946-51, ch. 1).

After Perón's overthrow in 1955, the military government of Pedro E. Aramburu (1955-58) issued an executive decree in 1956 to return the country to the 1853 document, including all amendments except those of 1949. The following year the Aramburu government called a constitutional convention to consider a number of proposed amendments, but that convention failed in its efforts to write a new constitution and disbanded. The convention succeeded only in approving the insertion of an amendment to Article 14 that referred to the rights of workers (including the right to strike) and to social security.

The civilian governments of Arturo Frondizi (1958-62) and Arturo Illia (1963-66) governed under the 1853 Constitution. The military government of Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-70) subordinated the 1853 Constitution to its Act of the Argentine Revolution. The act was repealed in 1972 by the military government of Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, and the 1853 Constitution remained in force until 1976, when the military government of Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-81) subordinated it to the Statute for the National Reorganization Process (see The Liberating Revolution, 1956-66, ch. 1).

The Videla government promulgated two basic laws. The government's guiding philosophy and objectives were stated in the Act for the National Reorganization Process, issued on the day of the coup. Pursuant to this act, the military established a three-man junta composed of the commanders in chief of the army, navy, and air force to assume the "political power of the Republic." The act declared the terms of office of the president, vice president, governors, and vice governors to be null and void. It dissolved Congress, the provincial legislatures, the House of Representatives of the city of Buenos Aires, and the municipal councils. It removed and replaced all members of

the Supreme Court with military officials and dismissed the attorney general and members of the higher provincial courts. Military officers took over most key ministerial posts and filled all nine positions on a newly established Legislative Advisory Committee—empowered to intervene in the drafting and approval of laws—with three men from each branch of the armed forces.

The Statute for the National Reorganization Process, adopted on March 26, 1976, reiterated what had been established by the Act for the National Reorganization Process. Although the fundamental text of the 1853 Constitution remained in effect, the military government amended it by a series of decrees with the force of law and subordinated it to the Statute for the National Reorganization Process. With respect to those provisions of the 1853 Constitution not amended by the military, the Constitution was invoked and applied, providing it did not contradict the basic objectives declared in the Act for the National Reorganization Process (see The Military in Power, ch. 1).

Both the Act and the Statute for the National Reorganization Process were repealed by the Congress that took office in 1983. The 1853 Constitution, as it had been worded in 1975, again became the highest law of the land.

Executive

Under the 1853 Constitution, the executive branch consists of the president, the vice president, and the cabinet. Executive power is vested in the "President of the Argentine Nation," who is elected by a popularly elected electoral college for a six-year term. A president may not be reelected immediately but may be elected again after a six-year interval. He must be native-born or the child of native-born parents. Both the president and the vice president must profess the Roman Catholic faith and be at least 30 years old. The vice president is elected at the same time as the president and may succeed him "in case of his illness, absence from the capital, death, resignation, or removal from office." If the vice president is also incapacitated, the line of succession goes to the president pro tempore of the Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, and the president of the Supreme Court. If the presidency is filled by anyone other than the vice president, however, the 1853 Constitution requires that a new election be held within 30 days.

The 1853 Constitution endows the president with extensive powers, including the general administration of the country, execution of its laws, broad powers of appointment, the conduct of foreign affairs, and the power to approve or veto all legislative acts of Congress. The president's broad legislative powers enable him, in the majority of cases, to introduce legislation to Congress. He nominates the bishops of the Roman Catholic Church from a list of three names submitted by the Senate and—with the exception of judges and members of the diplomatic corps, who must be confirmed by the Senate—is the sole judge of the qualifications of his appointees. The president is the commander in chief of the armed forces and as such is responsible for appointing military officers (with the consent of the Senate in the case of general officers) and for the placement of troops. He also serves as the head of the Federal District.

In addition to these powers, the 1853 Constitution empowers the president to declare a state of siege under which most civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are suspended. The president may declare a state of siege with the concurrence of the Senate in the event of foreign attack or upon the request of Congress in the event of internal disorder. If Congress is in recess, the president may act unilaterally, but the state of siege must be approved by Congress when it reconvenes.

The powers granted to the president are so extensive that the office is the center of the political system; it is the prize for which all political actors compete. Once in office, the president is not legally required to seek wide backing for his policies. The limits on presidential power are political, not legal, and consequently presidents rarely share power with political parties, whether they be their own or other parties.

The vice president presides over the Senate and generally assists the president. However, vice presidents have no independent power. The office is typically not occupied during periods of military rule.

Under the 1853 Constitution, the president is assisted by a nine-member cabinet consisting of the ministers responsible for the eight ministries plus the secretary general of the presidency. The cabinet must countersign all presidential decrees, and the ministers are both individually and collectively responsible for the actions of the administration. Members of the cabinet are selected by the president and may not be members of Congress. The offices of the state administration under the

cabinet are divided into eight ministries: defense, economy, education and justice, foreign relations and worship, interior, labor and social security, public health and social action, and public works and services. The ministries are further divided into varying numbers of secretariats and undersecretariats headed by secretaries of state and undersecretaries of state, respectively.

Generally, secretaries and undersecretaries are responsible to their respective ministers. However, the president has the power to decide how the administration will operate internally. In 1983 President Alfonsín increased the power of the secretaries of state, allowing them to bypass their ministers and deal directly with the president.

Legislature

Under the 1853 Constitution, the legislative branch consists of a Congress (Congreso Nacional) composed of two chambers: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The approval of both bodies is required to pass legislation.

In 1985 the Senate consisted of 46 members, two for each of the 22 provinces and the Federal District (Capital Federal). Senators representing the provinces were elected by their respective provincial legislatures, while those representing the Federal District were elected directly by citizens. The 1853 Constitution requires that senators be at least 30 years old, that they have been citizens for six years, and that they either be natives of the province from which they were elected or have resided there during the two preceding years. Senators serve nine-year terms; one-third of the seats are up for election every three years. Because the entire Senate was elected in 1983, it was expected in 1985 that those senators who would run in elections scheduled for October 1985 would be selected by lottery.

The Chamber of Deputies was composed of 254 deputies elected directly by the citizenry. Apportionment was based on population, each province receiving one deputy for each 85,000 inhabitants. Deputies represented the entire province. The seats for each province and the Federal District were divided among the political parties based on a proportional representation system that included all parties receiving at least 4 percent of the vote. The 1853 Constitution requires that deputies be 25 years old, that they have been citizens for at least four years, and that they have resided for at least two

years in the province in which they seek election. Deputies serve four-year terms, one-half of the Chamber ran for elections every two years. The deputies who would have to stand for reelection in October 1985, like their Senate counterparts, were expected to be selected by lottery.

Members of Congress enjoyed immunity from arrest, which could only be removed by a two-thirds majority vote of the member's chamber. The Chamber of Deputies had the exclusive right to impeach the president, vice president, ministers, and members of the Supreme Court; the Senate would thereafter sit in judgment of those charges.

Both houses met in regular session from September 30 to May 1 of each year. The president, however, had the power to call Congress into special sessions that dealt solely with matters specified in the call. Each house was responsible for its own internal organization, and each was divided into a number of standing committees that dealt with legislation in their respective areas of competence. Bills could be introduced in either house, with the exceptions of bills to raise taxes or recruit troops, which originated only in the Chamber. Having been introduced, bills were then sent to the appropriate standing committees for consideration and amendment before returning to the house floor for debate and final vote. Bills required approval of a simple majority of both houses to become law. A presidential veto could be overridden by a two-thirds majority in both houses.

Historically, Congress generally did not serve as a check on the power of the executive. The most important function of Congress was to provide a national forum for the expression of constituent interests, and it therefore spent most of its time debating the president's program and then passing a large number of bills (some 200 in its 1984 session) in the last few days of its sessions. Its weakness was attributed to the growth of the executive branch after 1930 as the state undertook an increasingly active role in the economy, to the frequent periods of authoritarian rule during which Congress was closed, and to the general weakness of the party system (see Political Parties, this ch.).

Judiciary

Under the 1853 Constitution, the judiciary functioned as a separate and independent branch of government. The judicial system was divided into federal courts and provincial courts.

The federal system had a Supreme Court at the peak of the system, with chambers of appeal and federal section courts below it. The Supreme Court was responsible for its own internal administration as well as the administration of the lower federal courts. The performance of judges in the lower courts was reviewed by the Supreme Court, and it had the power to discipline lower judges who violated its regulations. Cases of recurrent abuses and serious negligence were referred to Congress, which held impeachment proceedings. The number of lower federal courts was fixed by Congress.

Constitutionally, federal judges were appointed by the president and served for life unless impeached by Congress. Few judges, however, served beyond the term of office of the government that appointed them. Traditionally, such appointments were made on political criteria, and little attempt was made to develop a professional judiciary. Military governments, in particular, generally replaced large numbers of federal judges when coming to office, but civilian governments often did this as well.

The Supreme Court had six members, as did the federal appellate courts. The chief justice of both courts was selected by his colleagues to serve a three-year term. For most cases the Supreme Court and the appellate courts did not meet as a plenum; each member of the court heard cases individually. In unusual circumstances, however, such as the trial of the members of the military governments of the late 1970s and early 1980s that began in 1984, the federal courts met as a plenum (see The Radical Government of Raúl Alfonsín, this ch.). The federal section courts had only one judge.

The federal courts had jurisdiction over treaties with foreign countries; cases involving the federal government or its agencies (except when the latter act in their capacity as private parties); cases concerning foreign ambassadors and consuls; litigation between two or more provinces or between a province and residents in another province, and cases involving the enforcement of federal laws, such as laws on citizenship and naturalization, military service, patents, trademarks and copyright, maritime concerns, and federal taxation. Cases were read rather than heard, with testimony, arguments, and decisions presented in writing.

Although provided for in the 1853 Constitution, the power of judicial review was not used extensively. When the Supreme Court declared a law unconstitutional, it did not invalidate the law but merely refused to apply it. Once a

constitutional issue was decided in the Supreme Court, the lower courts were generally bound by its decision. The courts did not typically challenge the authority of the executive. Cases that the courts felt would lead to a confrontation with the executive were typically defined as political questions not falling under the purview of the judiciary. Since the 1930s the Supreme Court has recognized governments that have come to power via extraconstitutional means as legitimate governments de facto. On several occasions—most notably in 1946, 1955, 1966, and 1976—the judiciary was purged, either through congressional impeachment or executive decree.

Each province had its own judicial system, including courts of first instance and appellate courts. The city of Buenos Aires had its own courts, which, although mandated by the national Congress, did not belong to the federal judicial system. The local courts had jurisdiction over all matters not falling under the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In addition to the provincial laws, however, they enforced the civil, commercial, criminal, and mining codes enacted by the national Congress.

Local Government

The 1853 Constitution divides power between the federal government and the 22 provinces, the Federal District, and one national territory, stipulating that the provinces "retain all power not delegated by the national constitution to the federal government." Each province had its own constitution and generally elected its own governors and legislatures. These provincial authorities, however, were described in the 1853 Constitution as "regents of the federal government for the exercise of the constitution and law of the nation."

The provincial executive was the governor, who served a four-year term and could not be reelected to a second consecutive term. A majority of provinces elected governors in direct elections; a few, however, used directly elected electoral colleges to select the governor. Governors enjoyed wide powers of appointment and removal, and they could call their respective legislatures into special session, introduce legislation, veto bills passed by their legislatures, and issue executive decrees. Their primary responsibility was the enforcement of federal laws within the province.

Most provincial legislatures were unicameral, and members were elected every four years. Provinces with populations

greater than 500,000 had bicameral legislatures, with the lower house elected every four years and the upper house every six years. Legislative sessions generally lasted from four to five months.

Provincial governments had limited responsibilities. They could not legislate on financial, jurisdictional, or military matters. The federal government dictated policies on national expenditures, foreign relations, and national economics, as well as on social priorities. Provincial governments did not have the power of taxation but depended on the federal government for revenues. They did, however, allocate their own budgets.

The greatest limit on provincial autonomy was the federal government's power of intervention. Under Article 6 of the 1853 Constitution, the federal government "may intervene in the territory of a province in order to guarantee the republican form of government." Because the federal government had the power to define the meaning of republicanism, it could assume control of a province at virtually any time. This power of the federal government was widely used by both military and civilian governments to ensure acquiescence to national policy. Federal appointees responsible only to the president, known as intervenors, replaced elected governors throughout the country during the military governments of 1966-1973 and 1976-1983. Provinces again elected their own officials in October 1983.

In most provinces the governor appointed city mayors. In larger cities and towns the mayor headed an elected council; in smaller communities the mayor was assisted by a three to five-person commission also appointed by the governor. The mayor of Buenos Aires and the governor of the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego were appointed by the president with the approval of the Senate. The city of Buenos Aires also had an elected House of Representatives.

Elections

Although regular elections were provided for in the 1853 Constitution, they have been held irregularly and, when held, have often been marked by fraud and the disenfranchisement of large sectors of the population. A series of electoral reforms, collectively known as the Sáenz Peña Law after President Roque Sáenz Peña (1910-14), under whose administration they were passed, provided for secret, obligatory, and universal male suffrage, as well as permanent voter registration. In

addition, the law ensured minority representation in the national government by requiring that one-third of each province's representatives in the Chamber of Deputies be members of the party that finished second in the most recent election.

In 1963 the Sáenz Peña Law was replaced with a new electoral code that retained its provisions on mandatory voting and the secret ballot but incorporated the provisions of subsequent legislation, including the 1947 extension of suffrage to women. The system of proportional representation was changed at that time to include representation in the Chamber of Deputies of all parties that received at least 3 percent of the vote in a province.

In preparation for the 1983 elections, the military government of President Reynaldo B. Bignone (1982-83) enacted the National Election Code of 1983 and the Organic Law of the Political Parties of 1982, which remained in effect in mid-1985. Under these laws, voting was mandatory for all citizens between the ages of 18 and 70, excluding the mentally incompetent and military conscripts. Identity documents required of all citizens indicated that a person either had voted or had been excused for an acceptable reason, such as ill health. Failure to vote was punishable by a fine of 60 pesos (for value of the peso—see Glossary). The government provided transportation within the country for those requiring it, but absentee voting was not allowed. In 1983 this provision disenfranchised an estimated 300,000 persons who were out of the country for political reasons.

Voting took place on Sundays. Each province and the Federal District were treated as a single electoral district but for voting purposes were divided into precincts encompassing a maximum of 250 voters, except for those located in cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants, where 300 was the maximum number. The Electoral Department of the Ministry of Interior appointed a federal judge, known as an "electoral judge," and an electoral board to administer elections. The electoral judge was responsible for the registration list and the eligibility and actions of political parties. The electoral board named polling-place officials and settled any disputes arising on voting.

In presidential elections the electoral colleges consisted of persons selected by the political parties and pledged to individual candidates. The total number of electors was 600. Each province and the Federal District chose a college equal in number to twice its congressional representation. If a slate of electors was pledged to a candidate and received more than 50

percent of the vote in a province, that candidate then received all the electoral votes for that province. If no candidate's slate received a majority, the votes for that province were distributed among all the candidates in proportion to their percentage of the popular vote. The electoral colleges sent their votes in sealed boxes to the newly chosen national Congress, where they were opened publicly and the ballots counted. A candidate receiving 301 votes was proclaimed the winner. If no candidate received the required majority, members of Congress then moved to elect the president. An absolute majority of congressional votes and the participation of at least 75 percent of the total congressional membership were required for victory in such an election. Throughout the entire process the president and the vice president were elected separately.

In accordance with the 1982 Organic Law of the Political Parties, candidates were nominated by recognized political parties. In 1983 all political parties were required to apply to the electoral judge for recognition. Each party was required to provide the judge with copies of the party's constitution, platform, list of officials, charter, address, and list of members. A party was recognized if its membership equaled 0.4 percent of the total registered voters of the corresponding district. In 1983 some 31 percent of the registered voters nationwide declared themselves members of political parties. The government gave the parties six months to register the minimum number of members required for recognition. Once a party had been recognized, it was required to elect new party officials.

Parties that received 3 percent of the total vote cast could obtain funds from the federal government to help defray campaign expenses. All parties could also conduct fundraising activities, but they were not allowed to receive contributions from anonymous contributors, foreign businesses, labor or professional groups, employees forced by superiors or employers to give contributions, or companies that provided federal or provincial public works or services.

Elections were held irregularly between 1930 and 1983. This was a result of the large number of military governments during that period (see The Military as a Political Force, this ch.). In addition, however, political party leaders also played a role. Historically, those who lost elections seldom accepted their defeat as definitive. Opposition parties traditionally turned to other means of attaining power, most often by attempting to provoke a military coup. If the leaders of the

armed forces could be persuaded to overthrow the government, the opposition parties might be able to gain power in the newly installed government or, failing this, might fare better in new elections—especially if the former government party were denied participation at the polls. All of the extraconstitutional governments since 1930 were supported, at least initially, by most of the major parties that had formed the opposition to the deposed government. In most cases, opposition parties were also active in the conspiracies that led to military interventions.

Political Mentalities

To a great extent, political conflict since the 1890s has been motivated by competing visions of what the country should be and how it should fit into the world economic system. Historically, these differing sets of ideas were expressed by changing coalitions of parties and interest groups, each of which sought exclusive control of the country in order to impose its vision of Argentina on the others. Analysts described these sets of ideas as political mentalities rather than as ideologies because, with few exceptions, they were not based on formal written political theory.

Conservatism

Conservatives dominated the country from the middle of the nineteenth century through 1916 (see The Oligarchy, 1880-1916, ch. 1). Convinced that only the upper class was capable of governing, they saw restricted suffrage and/or fraudulent elections as necessary evils, for otherwise the uninformed masses might gain political power and ruin the nation. After the passage of the Sáenz Peña Law, however, they were no longer able to ensure their political dominance via elections. Since their loss to Hipólito Yrigoyen in 1916, Conservative parties have won national elections only through fraud, although they have scored bona fide electoral victories in a few interior provinces.

Traditionally, Conservatives stressed free trade, export-led growth, openness to foreign investment, and a further integration into the global trade and monetary system. Their vision was of a country that lived off its agricultural wealth, exporting

produce and importing manufactured products. They generally eschewed any government intervention in the economy, trusting market forces to determine the allocation of economic resources. Conservatives were generally uninterested in developing industries oriented toward the domestic market.

The cattle ranchers were the staunchest defenders of conservative policies and were joined by major domestic industrialists involved in processing agricultural products for export, domestic and foreign industrialists involved in supplying manufactured goods to the primary sector, and domestic and foreign financial interests. At times these interests were joined by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, the armed forces, and a large, heterogeneous part of the middle class. Although this coalition was inherently unstable, some members supporting and others opposing the specific policies of any particular government, it was united when faced with any challenge presented by the working class, the political left, or populism (see Peronism, this ch.).

No longer able to secure office in free elections after 1916, Conservatives resorted to fraudulent elections to maintain power from 1933 to 1942 (see Conservative Restoration, 1930-43, ch. 1). After the mobilization of the working class under the Perón government during the late 1940s and early 1950s, Conservatives encouraged military governments as the best means of ensuring that their ideas became government policy. Although Conservative political parties were weak and unstable, individual Conservatives were prominent participants in the military governments led by Juan Carlos Onganía (1966-70), Jorge Rafael Videla (1976-81), and Roberto Viola (1981). In 1985 the major organizations espousing Conservative ideas were the Union of the Democratic Center (Unión del Centro Democrático—UCD), the Argentine Rural Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina—SRA), and part of the Argentine Industrial Union (Unión Industrial Argentina—UIA). Conservative ideas were also prevalent among some military officers (see Political Parties; Business Groups; The Military as a Political Force, this ch.; table B).

Radicalism

When the Conservatives lost control of the country after 1916, they lost it to a new force that had emerged during the 1890s to challenge oligarchical rule. In 1890, as the country plunged into a short but severe economic crisis, an organiza-

tion led by Bartolomé Mitre, called the Civic Union, tried to overthrow the Conservative government. The revolt ended when Mitre reached an agreement with the government and joined forces with the Conservative Julio Argentino Roca for the 1891 elections. A dissident faction within the Civic Union refused to support the alliance and established the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical—UCR) under the leadership of Leandro N. Alem in 1891. The UCR dedicated itself to a nationwide campaign to secure the universal secret ballot for male citizens by all available means, including revolution (see The Road to Popular Democracy, ch. 1).

The UCR instigated rebellions in 1893 and again in 1905. When these proved unsuccessful, the party, under the leadership of Yrigoyen, assumed a position of intransigence in relation to the Conservatives. Convinced that UCR participation in elections supervised by the Conservatives would only place the party's stamp of approval on inevitable electoral fraud, Yrigoyen saw to it that the Radicals boycotted all elections before 1912. After the passage of the Sáenz Peña Law, the UCR ran candidates, electing Yrigoyen president in 1916 (see The Oligarchy, 1880-1916, ch. 1).

Through the period of intransigence, Radicalism produced no platforms or proposals save general denunciations of the oligarchic nature of Conservative governments and calls for an undefined "national renovation" led by the UCR. In power from 1916 to 1930, Radicalism proved to be considerably less "radical" than the English translation of its name implied.

Before 1912 Radicalism's major difference with Conservatism was that its leaders could not come to power in the absence of free and honest elections. After 1916 it pursued policies that were not markedly different from those the Conservatives had pursued. Radicalism wanted a limited institutional change that would maintain the political power of the landed groups while providing wider opportunities for the middle class. This meant not so much a change in the economic structure as wider access for the middle-class groups to professional and bureaucratic positions.

Radicalism accepted the basic emphasis on export-led economic growth espoused by the Conservatives but modified the notion of a free-market economy to include reforms of the economic system that would distribute the benefits of economic growth to the middle class. It called for an overall increase in the government's role, both in providing basic services to citizens, such as education and public health, and as an economic

actor in the public interest. In 1919 Yrigoyen issued an executive decree nationalizing all petroleum deposits, and three years later he founded the National Petroleum Company. In 1920 Yrigoyen expressed Radicalism's view of the role of the state in the economy: "The state ought to acquire a preponderant position in the industrial activities of the nation in order to respond to the need for services, and in some areas these activities ought to be substituted for the application of private capital." This was a substantial innovation in Argentine political history.

During the first period of Perón's rule (1946-55), Radicalism returned to its emphasis on democratic norms, opposing the Peronist reforms and participating in his overthrow in 1955. Although Radicalism supported the rights of labor unions to organize workers and to strike, it did not envision labor as an integral part of a unified society until the 1960s. Under the leadership of Frondizi, one current of Radicalism rejected the traditional emphasis on relying on agricultural exports as the main engine of economic growth and sought an alliance of labor and domestic industrialists in an effort to industrialize the country. Another, more traditional, wing of Radicalism, under the leadership of Illia, opposed Frondizi's efforts to wed labor to Radicalism and continued its emphasis on the rural sector and the urban middle class. During this period Radicalism continued its emphasis on an increased economic role for the state, not only as an economic partner of domestic industry but also as a promoter of exports. A third group, objecting to the electoral proscription of Peronism by the military, emphasized Radicalism's traditional demand for free and honest elections and refused to participate in public life until that restriction was removed (see The Liberating Revolution, 1955-66, ch. 1).

The original supporters of Radicalism were the middle class of Buenos Aires, who identified with the export-import industry and state employment, and medium-sized ranchers in the upper Littoral region. It eventually encompassed the new middle class groups, drawn mainly from the descendants of Spanish and Italian immigrants, professionals, clerks, and small shopkeepers. By the 1960s Radicalism was supported by most merchants and professionals, as well as by some industrialists producing for the domestic market. In 1985 the major groups espousing Radical ideas were the UCR, the Movement for Integration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y

Desarrollo—MID), and the Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente—PI) (see Political Parties, this ch.).

Nationalism

During the 1920s the prevailing consensus on economic liberalism and export-led growth provoked the development of Nationalism as a political force. There were two main currents of Nationalist thought. The first, dating from the 1920s, grew among militant Roman Catholics concerned about what they described as "the lack of a divinely inspired moral foundation for the governing institutions of society." Although they participated in all governments after 1930, Catholic Nationalists were most prominent during the military governments of the early 1940s, the short-lived government of Eduardo Lonardi in 1955, and the Onganía government of 1966-70.

Originally loath to form political parties, in 1956 the Catholic Nationalists formed the Christian Democratic Federal Union (Unión Federal Demócrata Cristiana—UFDC). When the UFDC received only 2 percent of the vote in the 1957 elections, most of its leaders supported Frondizi in 1958. Many of them were rewarded with posts in the Frondizi administration (1958-62). Forty-six Catholic Nationalists formed the Atheneum (Ateneo) of the Republic in 1962 to serve as a study and pressure group. Many of its members were prominent participants in the Frondizi and Onganía administrations.

The most prominent view expressed by the Catholic Nationalists was their opposition to the political forms of liberal democracy, particularly Congress and the political parties. Their preference was for an authoritarian state organized along corporatist lines, which would incorporate all the various sectors of society into a single, integrated, and peaceful national unity under clerical-military leadership. Organized labor, they felt, should be incorporated under state tutelage as Perón had done, but without Perón.

The Nationalism of the Ateneo emphasized traditional Roman Catholic social values, with a prominent place in social and political affairs reserved for the church; the need for a strong government and an activist state organized along corporatist lines; and its ideological affinity with the Spanish government of Francisco Franco, which it found to be the "highest expression of Hispanic cultural values." Its adherents called for the dissolution of political parties, hierarchical and authoritarian government, the closing of Congress, and a preeminent role

for the armed forces and the church in the administration of public affairs.

The second main current of Nationalism dated from the 1930s and grew among military officers and middle-class intellectuals concerned about the prominent place of foreign, particularly British, companies in the economy and the weakness of the export-dependent economy in the face of the world economic crisis. These Economic Nationalists questioned the country's role in the international division of wealth and labor. They favored a diversification of trade patterns as a supplement to agricultural exports, the expansion of state control over vital sectors of the economy, close supervision of foreign investment, and local industrialization based on the protection of domestic industry from foreign competition. Some Economic Nationalists also pressed for stronger ties with other Latin American countries, regional integration, and a foreign policy of nonalignment. Economic Nationalists were most prominent during the first Perón administration and the Frondizi administration.

A more extreme form of Nationalism, which evolved during the 1970s, drew on neo-Marxist thought. It was more overtly anti-imperialist, often overtly anti-United States, and sought basic structural changes in global trade and monetary relations. It also promoted a nonaligned foreign policy and emphasized Argentina's natural identification with the Third World.

In 1985 the major proponents of Nationalist thought included some factions within the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista—PJ), the UCR, the MID, and part of the UIA. Economic Nationalism's most prominent proponent, however, was the MID, but its views were also reflected among some factions of the UCR and among some air force officers. The principal proponents of extreme Economic Nationalism were a faction of the PJ, led by Vicente Leonidas Saadi, called the Intransigence and Mobilization Movement (Movimiento de Intransigencia y Movilización—MIM), the PI, and a number of Marxist parties (see Political Parties; Business Groups; and The Military as a Political Force; this ch.).

Peronism

In 1943, when Generals Arturo J. Rawson and Pedro Pablo Ramírez overthrew president Ramón S. Castillo, one of the officers who supported the coup was Colonel Juan Domingo

Perón. Later in 1943, when Ramírez replaced Rawson as president, Perón again supported the coup and received the relatively minor post of secretary of labor and social welfare. From that office Perón, with the help of his future wife Eva Duarte, organized a powerful political machine based on organized labor that catapulted him to the presidency in 1946. The movement created by Perón and the policies pursued by his government from 1946 until his overthrow by the military in 1955 produced perhaps the most fundamental cleavage in the country's history, dividing Argentines into those who were strong supporters of Peronism and those who were implacably opposed to it.

Despite this fundamental cleavage between Peronism and anti-Peronism, there was little agreement among analysts or among Argentines about what Peronism was. All agreed that it was a mass movement, but few could agree on its exact nature. For some it was a working-class movement seeking social justice; for others it was a multiclass alliance seeking industrialization or a revolutionary movement seeking a transformation of the economy and society toward socialism; and for still others it was a political machine designed to further the personal political and financial ambitions of Perón. Regardless of its true nature, however, it was clear that from 1943 through the 1970s Peronism was supported by a clear majority of the population. The movement won every free election in which it was allowed to run between 1946 and 1976. The first time it lost an election was in 1983, when it was defeated by the UCR's Alfonsín.

Expressed in the doctrine of Justicialismo (Fairness), Peronism incorporated several preexisting strains of political thought and added some new ones. Fundamental to Peronism was an emphasis on the conciliation of the country's social classes. Perón was concerned that unorganized workers could exacerbate societal conflicts to the point of revolution. Thus the Peronist approach was to organize the working class in order to preclude its independence and simultaneously to provide social justice to alleviate its most pressing grievances. During Perón's first period of rule, this was accomplished by making all associations of labor and capital dependent on the state. During his second administration (1973-74) this was to be accomplished by getting business and labor groups to agree to a "social pact for national reconstruction" negotiated under government sponsorship.

Peronism created a corporatist state in which each of the

interests in society was to be represented by a single, state-sponsored, and state-controlled association. Toward that end, Perón created the General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General de Trabajo—CGT) to represent the unions; the General Economic Confederation (Confederación General Económica—CGE) to represent businessmen; the General Confederation of Professionals (Confederación General de Profesionales—CGP); the General University Confederation (Confederación General Universitaria—CGU) to represent students, faculty, and administrators; and even a corporate organization of high school students, the Union of Secondary Students (Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios—UES).

Peronism also advocated the building of a self-reliant economy based on domestic production for domestic markets. This involved providing credit for the manufacturing industry at the expense of the agricultural sector, restricting imports, and protecting domestic industry with high tariffs. This approach also involved trying to reduce the role of foreign investors by restricting their activity, purchasing foreign-owned companies, and nationalizing basic economic resources.

The original support for Peronism came from a number of disparate groups: new industrialist groups that had emerged as a result of the de facto economic protection caused by the trade disruptions accompanying World War II and that were threatened by the probable return to export-based policies at the end of the war; parts of the military interested in industrialization as an aspect of national power; a new working class of migrants from the interior provinces who came to work in the industrial centers of Rosario, Córdoba and, most important, Buenos Aires and its suburbs; and the middle class of the less developed interior provinces. With Perón in power from 1946 until 1955, virtually all of the old working class of the export industries deserted their socialist leadership and rallied behind Perón. Owing to the efforts of Eva Duarte de Perón, women rallied behind Perón following their enfranchisement in 1947. Finally, with the expansion of state, a large group of white-collar government workers was added to the coalition.

After 1955 much of Peronism's middle-class and industrialist following joined Illia's Intransigent Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, Intransigente—UCRI) and Frondizi's People's Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo—UCRP), leaving Peronism a more purely working-class movement. It retained the support of important middle-class groups, however, particularly that of white-collar government

workers in Buenos Aires, some industrial groups that had profited from the economic protection measures employed by Peronism, and much of the provincial middle class.

During the 1960s a division emerged within Peronism between the union leadership, who demanded the return of Perón from exile, and a group of neo-Peronist leaders in several of the interior provinces, who were more willing to reach an agreement with the governments of Frondizi and Illia. The neo-Peronists even spoke of a "Peronism without Perón."

After the 1969 riots in the interior city of Córdoba (commonly known as the Cordobazo) against the military government of Ongania, a more basic cleavage emerged within Peronism between the union sector of the movement and the increasingly radical youth sector. A number of urban guerrilla movements were formed in the late 1960s and early 1970s—some within Peronism, such as the Montoneros and the Peronist Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas—FAP), and others outside of it, such as the People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP). In the early 1970s the guerrilla left changed its tactics, ceasing its struggle to replace Peronism and instead seeking to take over the Peronist movement. For the guerrilla left, infiltrating Peronism meant inclusion in the Peronist coalition but rejection of the Peronist orientation toward class conciliation. In addition, the Peronist Youth (Juventud Peronista—JP) was formed in 1972, largely out of the university-oriented Argentine Youth for National Emancipation (Juventud Argentina por la Emancipación Nacional—JAEN). To the union leaders, a Peronist election victory was first a means of attaining greater political power and, second, a means of raising the standard of living of their union members. To the JP, the Montoneros, the FAP, and the ERP, Perón's election was to be the beginning of a socialist revolution (see The Argentine Revolution, 1966-72, ch. 1).

With Perón's return to power in 1973, Peronism tried to reincorporate the elements of the old coalition and include new revolutionary elements as well as military leaders and businessmen interested in stability. After Perón's death in 1974, maintaining this coalition proved an impossible task for his successor, María Estela (Isabel) Martínez de Perón, as the country sank into a multisided guerrilla war. Under the military governments that followed, Peronism retained the support of most organized labor but lost that of most of the middle class and the military. The guerrilla threat was largely eliminated by the military between 1976 and 1978. In 1985 Peronism was

represented primarily by the CGT and the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista—PJ), both of which were risen with internal factions (see Political Parties; Labor Groups, this ch.). Nevertheless, Peronists clung to their traditional belief that they were the country's only legitimate rulers.

Institutional Actors

Political Parties

The political party system was unstable and unable to serve as a major support for the consolidation of liberal democracy. The dominant characteristics of most parties were factionalism and personalism. Cohesion and effectiveness depended on a strong leader, in the absence of which local and personal political organizations were often stronger than the national party. Individual parties almost always had the province, not the nation, as their fundamental reference point. By and large, the major parties did not have distinctive policies, and divisions between the parties and among intraparty factions were based on personalities as much as or more than on ideology.

The organizational instability of the party system was reflected in the fact that although some seven to 10 parties typically contested national elections prior to the early 1950s, at least 150 separate parties took part in the elections held between 1955 and 1965. At the time of the 1966 coup, there were three separate Radical parties, four Socialist parties, at least a dozen Peronist and neo-Peronist parties, and perhaps 20 Conservative parties. Although nine parties and coalitions contested the 1972 elections, only the UCR and the PJ had a formal organization in every province. Fifteen parties contested the 1983 elections, 13 of which ran presidential candidates.

The fluid nature of the political parties contributed to the weakness of liberal democratic institutions. Most parties were little more than electoral machines designed to further the political ambitions of their leaders. Their goal was to gain control of the executive branch; once that was accomplished, parties served little purpose. Only rarely did a government party play an important role in policy formation. There was little incentive for opposition parties to support the government because patronage and participation in policymaking came solely from control of the executive branch. Therefore, weak-

ening the president as much as possible was the major preoccupation of opposition parties. By impeding the president's program, opposition parties could hope to precipitate a political crisis, which might increase their chances of acquiring the presidency either in new elections or perhaps as the result of military intervention. Even the strongest parties, the UCR and the PJ, were sufficiently strong to win elections but not strong enough to find solutions to political crises such as those of 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966, and 1975-76, all of which were resolved through military intervention.

Parties were suspended and party activity banned after the 1976 military coup. After President Videla announced in 1979 that political parties would soon be allowed to function again, the parties gradually reconstituted themselves. In 1982 the Bignone government promulgated the Organic Law of the Political Parties, which still governed the organization and recognition of political parties in 1985 (see Elections, this ch.).

The Right

Although they uniformly referred to themselves as centrist parties, a large number of small parties representing traditional Conservative views were clearly on the right of the party system (see Conservatism, this ch.). In the 1983 elections the right was grouped in two coalitions: the Union of the Democratic Center (Unión del Centro Democrático—UCD) and the Federal Alliance (Alianza Federal—AF).

The UCD was formed in 1982, bringing together the two old-line Conservative parties, the Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata—PD) and the Federalist Party of the Center (Partido Federalista del Centro—PFC), with the Republican Union (Unión Republicana—UR), a personal vehicle for Álvaro Alsogaray that had been formed earlier in 1982. Alsogaray became the presidential candidate of the UCD in the 1983 elections.

The UCD was tiny, not having officially registered members, but was disproportionately powerful, particularly in international banking circles. It attracted the support of many among the upper middle-class and Conservative intellectuals and functioned primarily as a vehicle for spreading Alsogaray's monetarist views. It was committed to dismantling state intervention in the economy, preferring the free market as the best mechanism for distributing resources.

The AF was an electoral alliance formed in 1983 among the Federal Party of Francisco Manrique, the Autonomist Par-

ty, the Popular Line movement, the Popular Federalist Force, and the Democratic Concentration, a Tucumán-based group that was itself a coalition of nine other parties. Most of the leaders of these parties had also been involved in an attempt to unite the large number of federalist parties into a coalition called the Federal Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Federalista—APF), which had run Manrique for president in 1973.

The AF shared the UCD's antistate bias but was considerably less doctrinaire in its commitment to the free market, wanting government aid to the provinces to assist in increasing the living standard of the provincial middle class. Its hallmark, however, was its call for an increase in the autonomy of the provinces in relation to the federal government.

Winning only 80,000 votes in the 1983 elections, the AF virtually disappeared from public view after the defection of the Democratic Concentration. Many of its constituent parties, however, remained important in several interior provinces.

The Center

Five main parties composed the center of the party system—the Movement for Integration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo—MID), the Democratic Socialist Alliance (Alianza Demócrata Socialista—ADS), the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical—UCR), the Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista—PJ), and the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC). The MID and the ADS were generally more conservative than either the UCR or the PJ. By accepting an activist state in the economy, however, both were clearly closer to the centrist parties than to the Conservative right. The PDC occupied a position slightly to the left of both the UCD and the PJ.

The ADS was the product of an alliance between the Progressive Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Progresista—PDP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrática—PSD). The PDP was a moderate, somewhat anticlerical party that had long sought to represent the interests of small farmers in the interior provinces and was strongest among intellectuals and professionals in Santa Fe Province. The PSD was a 1959 offshoot of the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS). Despite its origins, the PSD was a comparatively conservative party. Both the PDP and the PSD had participated in several coalitions with the right during their history, and several of their leaders occupied positions in the 1976-

83 military governments. The ADS polled some 92,000 votes in the 1983 elections.

The MID was largely a personalist party devoted to the ambitions of former President Arturo Frondizi, originally a member of the UCR. When the UCR nominated Frondizi for president in 1956, a faction led by Ricardo Balbín, objecting to Frondizi's desire to form an alliance with the Peronists, broke away from the UCR and formed the UCRP. Frondizi reconstituted the remaining Radicals as the UCRI and went on to win the 1958 elections. After his overthrow in 1962, Frondizi continued his alliance with the Peronists, but when Perón designated a mediocre candidate for the alliance in 1963, a faction of the UCRI broke away from the alliance under the leadership of Oscar Alende, who ran for the presidency himself. As a result of a court decision, the Alende faction was permitted to retain the name Intransigent, forming the Intransigent Party in 1963. Frondizi regrouped his followers as the MID.

In addition to the reintegration of Peronism into political life, the MID traditionally pressed for total industrialization based on the creation of heavy industry. Its proposals included free convertibility of the currency, loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), and the welcoming of foreign investment, particularly in petroleum development. The party attracted many young professionals; it had approximately 140,000 members in 1983.

The PJ, together with the unions, formed the organizational basis of the Peronist movement (see Peronism; Labor Groups, this ch.). Formed to contest the 1973 elections, which returned Perón to power, the party was the successor to a large number of parties that grew within Peronism between 1955 and 1973. Between the 1976 coup and the election of new party officers at the party's July 1983 convention, the PJ was directed by a national committee made up of legislators and cabinet members who had served in the 1973 government. Beneath the party's national committee, however, its membership was divided into several factions: an official and traditional group of political leaders loyal to Isabel de Perón and led by Deolindo Bittel, with the support of Italo Luder, Federico Robledo, and Raúl Matera; a smaller group of provincial leaders; two union groups led by Lorenzo Miguel and Saúl Ubaldini; and a social democratic group emphasizing intransigence toward the military government and linked to the Peronist Youth (Juventud Peronista—JP), led by Vicente Saadi.

As the process of liberalization leading to the elections of

1983 proceeded, the various factions within the PJ competed for control of the party. The union leadership was concerned about preserving the political power of the unions within the broader Peronist movement. They, together with other leaders loyal to Isabel de Perón—known as the "verticalists"—tried to establish their control over the party at the expense of the more moderate "antiverticalists," many of whom were from interior provinces and wanted to democratize and institutionalize the internal functioning of the party.

The verticalists gained control of the party apparatus in internal party elections in July 1983, which enabled them to control the selection of the party's leadership and candidates for the 1983 elections. At the party congress in September 1983, prominent verticalists, such as Herminio Iglesias, the party leader in Buenos Aires Province; Miguel, the leader of the 62 Peronist Organizations (the political wing of the verticalist union leaders); and Luder, the former president of the Senate during the 1973 government, were confirmed as the party's leadership. Isabel de Perón was confirmed as the titular head of the party, and Miguel became the party's first vice president. The leadership decided on Luder as presidential candidate with Antonio Cafiero as his running mate. The union leadership, however, refused to accept Cafiero and replaced him with Iglesias. Many of the party's candidates for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies also came from Miguel's 62 Organizations. As a result, the PJ went into the 1983 elections as a divided party.

The PJ's defeat in the 1983 elections caused a major reexamination of the role of the party. The verticalists moved to strengthen the unions, preferring to adopt a position of intransigence toward the Alfonsín government, while the antiverticalists preferred to play the role of a loyal opposition. Ironically, the antiverticalists were strengthened by the party's defeat. The poor showing of the PJ in the traditional Peronist base of support in the industrial areas of Buenos Aires Province was balanced by its victory in 11 interior provinces, where the antiverticalists were stronger. These results gave the antiverticalists a strong voice in the PJ's congressional delegation as well as in the provincial party organizations.

When the party suffered a second defeat by failing to gain sufficient support for its position in the referendum on a proposed treaty with Chile in November 1984, the antiverticalists decided to try to replace the party's trade union leadership. At the party's 1984 congress, held in the Odeón Theater in Bue-

nos Aires, the verticalists packed the hall with their supporters, refusing to seat many antiverticalist delegates—particularly union leaders opposed to Miguel and representatives of student groups. The verticalists then confirmed Isabel as party president, Iglesias as secretary general, and Miguel as first vice president. More than 400 of the 640 delegates, including 10 governors, 20 of the party's 21 senators, and 79 of its 111 deputies, walked out in protest and held their own congress in Río Hondo, where they voted to expel Iglesias and Miguel.

The two factions, known as the Odeón faction and the Río Hondo faction, took their dispute to the courts to contend for the legal leadership of the party. The Odeón faction, in particular, requested that the electoral courts order a new congress to decide the issue. When it refused to intervene, the case was appealed. Meanwhile, Miguel shored up his position by broadening the support of the 62 Organizations within the labor movement, and Iglesias and Oraldo Britos, the leader of the Río Hondo faction, began discussions mediated by Saadi of the party's left wing. In May 1985 the two factions agreed to continue discussions based on not calling a third congress, accepting whatever decision was made by the courts, and holding internal party elections in all districts where they had not yet been held. This dispute severely weakened the party's ability to present a coherent opposition to the Alfonsín government. In July 1985, however, the party leadership downplayed their dispute to present a united front in the elections scheduled for November 1985 (see The Radical Government of Raúl Alfonsín, this ch.).

The UCR succeeded the old UCRP formed by Ricardo Balbín, who had opposed Frondizi's attempt to forge an electoral alliance with the Peronists in the 1958 elections. Although Frondizi's UCRI won the 1956 elections with Peronist support, the UCRP remained staunchly opposed to an accommodation with Perón and elected Illia president in 1963 with only 26 percent of the popular vote. After Illia's overthrow by Onganía in 1966, the UCRP continued its opposition to Perón and thus, in effect, supported Onganía. In the 1973 elections the party, having changed its name to the UCR, participated with several right-wing parties in an electoral alliance known as the Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Allianza Revolucionaria Popular—ARP). The ARP's presidential candidate was Balbín, who was roundly defeated by Perón.

Balbín remained opposed to Perón after 1973 and ultimately supported the 1976 military coup. In the early 1980s

Balbín resisted joining with other parties in a group known as the Multiparty Commission (Multipartidaria), which sought to coordinate opposition to military rule and lobbied for a return to civilian rule via elections, preferring to try to make a separate arrangement between the UCR and the military. After Balbín's death in September 1981, the UCR's internal factions competed for control of the party.

The three main national-level factions within the UCR were the National Line (Línea Nacional—LN), led by Carlos R. Contín, Juan Carlos Pugliese, and Fernando de la Rua, which controlled the party machinery; the Yrigoyenist Affirmation Movement (Movimiento de Afirmación Yrigoyenista—MAY), led by Luis León; and the Movement of Renovation and Change (Movimiento de Renovación y Cambio—MRC), led by Raúl Alfonsín. There were also a number of provincial factions.

The MRC had long been the principal alternative within the UCR to the Balbín group. Seeking to project a younger, more dynamic image, Alfonsín unsuccessfully challenged Balbín for the UCR leadership in 1972, and he and the MRC were subsequently ostracized from party affairs. After Balbín's death, Alfonsín again tried to take over the party, unsuccessfully proposing Illia for the party presidency in opposition to Contín of the LN at the UCR's 1982 congress.

As the 1983 elections approached, Alfonsín formed an alliance with Víctor Martínez, leader of the UCR organization in Córdoba, and ran in a series of primaries in several provinces. After several victories it became clear that Alfonsín would gain the UCR presidential nomination. The LN, unsuccessful at the polls, tried to convince Alfonsín to accept de la Rua as his running mate, but he refused. The Alfonsín/Martínez ticket won the 1983 elections with 52 percent of the popular vote and 317 electoral votes after a campaign that emphasized firm opposition to the military government and verbal attacks on the trade union leadership of the PJ.

Despite Alfonsín's victory, the UCR remained divided internally. Although supporting Alfonsín's policies, many in the party were concerned about what they perceived as the growing influence of the Radical Youth (Juventud Radicalista), which urged Alfonsín to greatly increase the role of the state by nationalizing basic industries and banking. In addition, many LN and MAY leaders were concerned about the effects of Alfonsín's efforts to deal with the country's economic crisis (see The Radical Government of Raúl Alfonsín, this ch.).

Another centrist party, the PDC, was formed in 1983 from

the remnants of the Christian Democratic Party that had been founded in 1956 by a group of progressive Roman Catholics who wanted to break with the conservatism of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the old Catholic Nationalists. During the 1960s the first Christian Democratic Party never received more than 5 percent of the vote, but it did elect a few deputies in 1963 and 1965. Most of its votes came from upper and upper middle-class women. The party initially supported the Onganía government (1966-70), providing several officials at both the national and the provincial levels. Six months after Onganía took office, however, the party broke with the government over its economic policies, and the party virtually disintegrated. In 1973 several of the original members formed two separate parties: the Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC), which joined the coalition that elected Perón, and the Christian Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cristiano—PRC), which joined a more leftist alliance. Both the PPC and the PRC disappeared after the military coup of 1976. In 1983 the PDC had some 68,000 members and elected one deputy to the Chamber of Deputies.

The Center-Left

Three parties were considered to be center-left: the Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente—PI), the Argentine Communist Party (Partido Comunista Argentina—PCA), and the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP). None did well in the 1983 elections, but many analysts suggested that they might do better in subsequent elections, owing to their large following among university students.

The PI was formed in 1963 when the UCRI split. Its leader, Alende, finished second in the 1963 presidential elections, with some 17 percent of the popular vote. In the 1973 elections, however, it received only 7 percent in the first round and then joined the PRC in forming the Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Popular—ARP) for the second round. After 1976 the party moved to the left, defining itself as a social democratic, non-Marxist movement. In the 1983 elections the PI won 2.5 percent of the vote, electing three deputies on a platform that called for restrictions on multinational corporations and the nationalization of banking. In 1985 it was reported to be gaining support in Buenos Aires Province, particularly among university students and within the journalists' union.

The PCA was formed as a breakaway from the old Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS) in 1918. The PCA was revolutionary during the 1920s, when it gained a considerable following among labor unions. As a result, it was outlawed and its leadership repressed. During the 1940s and early 1950s, the PCA lost the labor unions to the Peronists but retained some following among intellectuals and other members of the middle class who were attracted by its wide network of social and cultural institutions. In 1966 the party was declared illegal by the Onganía government, and most of its institutions were destroyed. The PCA emerged again in 1972 and joined the ARP for the 1973 elections. During this period it evolved into a reformist party, which particularly condemned the guerrilla activity of the 1970s. As a result, the PCA was allowed to function during the military governments of 1976 to 1983. In the 1983 elections its 76,000 members supported the PJ's presidential and gubernatorial tickets but ran their own candidates for the Chamber of Deputies and municipal councils. They received less than 2 percent of the vote.

The PSP was founded in 1978 and unsuccessfully proposed the creation of a national front with the PJ. It called itself a "popular, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist" party but did not appear to have many adherents outside intellectual circles. In 1985 it had some 60,500 members.

The Left

In 1985 there were about 13 parties on the left of the party system, most of them formed after 1982. The repression of the late 1970s decimated the ranks of the revolutionary left, leaving the party in a state of disarray from which it had not recovered in mid-1985. With few exceptions, the parties of the left had small memberships and little influence outside intellectual circles.

Three leftist parties participated in the 1983 elections. The Popular Left Front (Frente de Izquierda Popular—FIP), formed in 1973, was vaguely Trotskyist in orientation but supported most of the policy proposals of the PJ. It was one of the few parties that openly advocated a second attempt to recover the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by armed attack. Despite its Trotskyist rhetoric, the FIP did not accept the doctrine of class struggle and did not advocate the socialization of the means of production. In the 1983 elections the FIP endorsed the PJ's candidate, Luder, for the presidency but ran its own candi-

dates for other offices. It received less than 0.1 percent of the popular vote.

The Workers' Party (Partido Obrero—PO) was the political wing of the Workers' Politics (Política Obrera), a Trotskyist organization formed in 1968. In 1983 it claimed some 70,000 members who advocated replacing the existing armed forces by a people's militia that would enjoy full trade union rights. In addition, the PO advocated total socialization of the means of production. Although it received less than 1 percent of the vote in 1983, the party remained active, particularly on the fringes of the labor movement, and was reportedly influential among autoworkers.

The Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS) grew out of the Socialist Workers' Party, which had been formed in 1971. In 1983 the party claimed a membership of 55,000 but received less than half that many votes in the 1983 elections. Reportedly, it was also active among dissident trade unions, particularly in the transport unions. In 1985 the MAS attracted attention by holding several rallies to denounce the economic policy of the Alfonsín administration and by opposing the Peronist labor union bureaucracy, accusing both of being in the hands of "North American imperialism."

Business Groups

The Argentine Rural Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina—SRA) was the most influential agricultural group. Founded by cattle ranchers in 1866, it controlled most aspects of government economic policy well into the 1930s (see The Oligarchy, 1880-1916, ch. 1). Always considered an exclusive organization, its membership included only some 10,000 members in 1985. The SRA, representing the country's largest and wealthiest producers, favored an economic policy based on free trade and the promotion of exports and opposed all industrial development and an activist state role in the economy.

The Argentine Rural Confederation (Confederación Rural Argentina—CRA) was organized in 1943 to represent the interest of cattle breeders. CRA membership was larger than that of the SRA but was not as influential. The CRA generally promoted free trade policies and increased agricultural exports but also demanded government aid to small and medium-sized farmers and ranchers. Although the CRA often disagreed with some of the specific policy proposals of the SRA, the differ-

ences between the two organizations generally appeared insignificant outside the cattle industry.

From 1979 through 1985, both the SRA and the CRA were vocal critics of government economic policies, particularly that of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate and failing to control inflation. In 1985 the CRA organized protests among farmers and ranchers against government economic policies, including that of withholding grain shipments to Buenos Aires.

There were a large number of industrial and commercial groups. In 1985 the most important industrial group was the Argentine Industrial Union (Unión Industrial Argentina—UIA), which was formed under military tutelage in 1977 as the successor to the original UIA and encompassed the old General Economic Confederation (Confederación General Económica—CGE). The original UIA was founded in 1887 and had represented most industrialists until it was closed by Perón in 1946. Perón favored the CGE, making it the official representative of business interests. The UIA was legalized again in 1955 and competed with the CGE for power and influence until 1976.

The UIA traditionally represented larger domestic firms, primarily those oriented toward the international economy, and many local subsidiaries of multinational corporations. It favored restrained fiscal and monetary management, deregulation, and the use of government authority to make labor more subservient to management. Denouncing the CGE as "an authoritarian organization that naively advocated the ruinous subsidization of inefficient domestic industries," the UIA joined other groups in 1960 to form the Coordinating Action of Free Business Institutions (Acción Coordinadora de Instituciones de Empresa Libre—ACIEL), an anti-Peronist coalition that campaigned vigorously against government acceptance of CGE policy proposals. The SRA and the Argentine Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Argentina de Comercio—CAC), the umbrella organization for a large number of local chambers of commerce, were also members of the ACIEL.

The CGE was founded in 1951 to represent smaller firms. Its membership included the vast majority of firms, most of which were oriented toward the domestic market and had prospered under the de facto economic protection that accompanied World War II. It favored state promotion of economic growth through expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and high tariffs to protect domestic industry from foreign competi-

tion. It was particularly opposed to IMF stabilization measures, which it felt led to economic recession, the bankruptcy of many firms, and the takeover of domestic industry by foreign investors. The CGE also pressed for the direct involvement of business and labor in an economic and social council that would participate in economic policymaking.

The CGE was most influential during the first Perón government. After 1955 it suffered a dramatic decline in power until 1973, when it became the official representative of the business community. Both the UIA and the CGE were placed under military administration in 1976. The military reorganized the UIA in 1977 and took over the assets of the CGE the following year. Although the reconstituted UIA included virtually all firms in its membership, the conflict between the two groups of industrialists was expressed within two of its subsidiary organizations, the Argentine Industrial Movement (Movimiento Industrial Argentino—MIA) and the National Industrial Movement (Movimiento Industrial Nacional—MIN). The MIA represented most of the constituency of the original UIA, while the MIN included most of the membership of the old CGE.

Labor Groups

The first labor organizations were mutual aid societies established along ethnic lines by Italian and Spanish immigrants in the early 1850s. The first formal labor union, the Buenos Aires Printers' Society (Sociedad Tipográfica Bonaerense), was established in 1857. During the 1870s and 1880s a number of anarchists and socialists came to the country from Europe and soon formed a number of labor organizations that expressed a wide—often competing—variety of ideological currents (see The Road to Popular Democracy, ch. 1).

The Argentine Regional Federation of Workers (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina—FORA) was formed in 1890 by socialists but was taken over by anarchists in 1901. The revolutionary socialists then founded the General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT), while the reform socialists formed the Argentine Workers' Confederation (Confederación Obrera Argentina—COA). The Argentine Syndicalist Union (Unión Sindical Argentina—USA) was founded by syndicalists in 1905. In 1909 the UGT was subsumed in a new socialist organization, the Regional Confedera-

tion of Argentine Workers (Confederación Obrera Regional Argentina—CORA).

The anarchist FORA was the major federation during this early period, but after 1910, largely owing to government repression, the anarchists lost the labor movement to the syndicalists. At its ninth congress in 1915, FORA split into two factions, reflecting the division between anarchists and syndicalists. One faction renounced anarchism and joined with CORA to form FORA-IX, taking its name from FORA's ninth congress. The other faction, remaining loyal to the anarchist resolutions of FORA's fifth congress, called itself FORA-V.

The syndicalists remained in control of the labor movement until the mid-1930s. In 1930 the USA and COA merged to form the General Confederation of Labor (Conferación General de Trabajo—CGT). In 1935 socialists and communists took over the CGT, and many of the syndicalist leaders reconstituted the USA. Few unions joined them, however. After 1935 the socialists and the communists competed for control of the CGT, leading to its bifurcation in 1942. The socialist CGT, known as CGT No. 1, sought to use the Socialist Party as the political vehicle for the CGT. The communist CGT, known as CGT No. 2, however, preferred to form an independent party to represent the unions. After the 1943 military coup, the CGT No. 2 was dissolved by government decree and its leadership arrested. In 1945 the unions that had been affiliated with it were reincorporated under government auspices into CGT No. 1, which reverted to its original name, the CGT.

Under Perón's sponsorship, first from his position as secretary of labor and social welfare from 1943 to 1945 and then as president from 1946 to 1955, the socialists and the communists were largely eliminated from the CGT leadership, and the CGT became the only officially recognized labor confederation. Under the 1945 Law of Professional Associations, government recognition was required for a union to have the right to bargain collectively, to strike, or to appeal to a labor court. In addition, the law recognized only one union per industry and one national labor confederation. Union membership was greatly expanded, from 529,000 in 1945 to over 2.2 million in 1954, and wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions improved appreciably. As a result, the CGT became a principal support base for Peronism (see National Revolution, 1943-46; Argentina under Perón, 1946-55, ch. 1).

After Perón's fall in 1955, the military intervened in the CGT and its constituent unions, replacing Peronist leaders

with military officers. When internal union elections were held in 1956, a number of tendencies emerged that became known by the number of union elections they won. The 62 Organizations, which included most of the blue-collar unions, was led by the Peronists; the Group of 19 was led by communists; and the 32 Democratic Unions, made up mostly of white-collar unions, was led by noncommunist but anti-Peronist social democrats and Radicals. In 1960 the Group of 19, which by then had been reduced to only six small unions, reconstituted itself as the Movement of Labor Unity and Coordination (Movimiento de Unidad y Coordinación Sindical—MUCS). That same year most of the constituent unions of the 32 Democratic Unions joined a newly formed sector known as the Independents.

The CGT was reconstituted in 1963 with the Commission of 20 (equally divided between representatives of the 62 Organizations and the Independents) as its leadership. Neither the MUCS nor what remained of the 32 Democratic Unions was represented. The leadership of the 62 assumed effective control of the CGT but soon became divided over the position that the Peronist unions should adopt toward the government. An orthodox faction, led by José Alonso, violently opposed the Frondizi, José M. Guido, and Illia administrations and demanded the immediate return of Perón from exile. A participationist faction, led by Augusto Vandor, favored negotiation with the government while publicly maintaining loyalty to Perón.

In 1964 the CGT, under Alonso's leadership, launched a series of violent strikes designed to force Perón's return. As a result, the Independents withdrew from the CGT. Two years later Vandor gained control of the CGT, and the orthodox faction withdrew. Later, in 1966, both the Independents and the orthodox faction returned to the CGT, but the organization remained under the control of the participationists. At the time of the 1966 coup, roughly 70 percent of the organized labor force belonged to the Peronist unions. Some 15 percent of these were nonaligned, and most of the rest were evenly divided between Vandor's 62 and Alonso's orthodox factions. The MUCS had three or four small unions with perhaps 2 percent of the CGT membership. The remaining members were Independents.

The CGT split again after the 1966 coup. The participationist CGT—now named the CGT-Azopardo after the street on which its headquarters was located, though still led by Vandor—favored at least some cooperation with the govern-

ment. The oppositionist CGT reconstituted itself in 1968 as the CGT of the Argentines (also now named the CGT-Paseo Colón after the street on which its headquarters was located) under the leadership of Raimundo Ongaro. The Onganía government recognized the CGT-Azopardo and appointed government officials to run the CGT of the Argentines, although it continued to operate independently. In May 1969, rioting, largely organized by members of the CGT of the Argentines, broke out in Córdoba and soon spread to other cities. The conflict within the labor movement became increasingly violent. Vandor was murdered in June 1969, and Onganía quickly replaced the leadership of the entire CGT. The violence continued, however, leading to Ongaro's murder in 1970.

The CGT again reunited following the inauguration of Perón in 1973. After a short honeymoon between the CGT and Perón, strikes broke out again. In September more murders among the CGT leadership caused a general strike, government repression, and open warfare between the Peronist right and left.

After the 1976 coup the leader of the CGT and the major unions were arrested, and new officials were appointed by the government. Many union leaders "disappeared" in the repression that followed the coup. However, most unions reorganized under new leadership. By 1978 three major groups had emerged within the labor movement: the National Labor Commission (Comisión Nacional de Trabajo—CNT), consisting of unions seeking an accommodation with the military; the Committee of 25, made up of Peronist unions whose leadership survived the military purge; and the CGT, cleansed of its former leadership and operating illegally. A fourth group, the Labor Action Committee (Comité Gestión y Trabajo—CGYT), although part of the CNT, operated independently of its leadership on many issues. Finally, the Group of 20, a collection of independent unions, was formed.

In 1979, following the government's announcement that it would soon promulgate a new labor law, labor leaders began jockeying for position within the labor movement. The CNT and the Committee of 25 joined to form the Only Vehicle of the Argentine Workers (Conducción Unica de los Trabajadores Argentinos—CUTA), although the CNT and the Committee of 25, which then became known as the Group of 25, continued as separate organizations within the CUTA. The CNT began to lose member unions that were dissatisfied with the leadership's preference for negotiations with the government to more com-

bative associations. The CUTA's leadership continued to press the government for recognition.

In December 1979 the military promulgated its labor law. National union confederations were declared illegal, although factory and regional-level organizations were permitted. The law also required that union officials be elected by their membership to three-year terms that could only be renewed once. The social services that the unions had administered prior to 1976 would be retained by the state, and the closed shop was abolished. Unions were also barred from taking part in political activity.

Another series of reorganizations within the labor movement followed the promulgation of the labor law, which the government moved to implement in selected unions. In 1980 the CUTA broke up, with the CNT joining the independent Group of 20 to form the CNT-20 and the Peronist Group of 25 reconstituting itself as the CGT-Brasil under the leadership of Miguel. The remnants of the former CGT then became known as the CGT-Azopardo.

In 1983, as the country moved toward civilian rule, a unified labor movement was reestablished. The CGT-Brasil and the CNT-20 merged to form the General Confederation of Labor of the Argentine Republic (Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina—CGT-RA); the Group of 25, the Group of 20, the CGYT, and a collection of unions that called itself the Nonaligned faction operated within it. In October 1983 the CGT-Azopardo joined the CGT-RA in reestablishing the CGT, which at that time had five internal factions: the Group of 20, the Group of 25, the CGYT, the Nonaligned, and a non-Peronist group that called itself the Independents.

After the inauguration of Alfonsín in December 1983, relations between the CGT and the government were difficult. In 1984 the Alfonsín government made an unsuccessful attempt to reorganize the labor movement, and there were numerous strikes and demonstrations organized by many of the constituent organizations of the CGT against the government's economic policies. In June 1985 the government recognized the CGT for the first time since 1976 and allowed it to return to its national headquarters building (see The Radical Government of Raúl Alfonsín, this ch.).

The Military as a Political Force

The first military government in the twentieth century

ruled the country from 1930, when Hipólito Yrigoyen was overthrown by a military conspiracy led by General José F. Uriburu, until 1932, when Uriburu oversaw fraudulent elections that were won by General Agustín P. Justo. Since then the military has played a major role in politics, acting, for most of the period from 1930 through 1983, like a political party with guns. In those 53 years six civilian governments were overthrown by the military (see Conservative Restoration, 1930-46; "Revolutionary" Argentina, 1955-72, ch. 1).

The military was not normally a political actor that intervened in politics only in times of national emergency. Rather, it was an integral part of the political system. Just as all governments since 1945 have had to deal with the power of organized labor, all governments since 1930 have had to deal with the power of the military. All parties sought military allies either to support their governments or to overturn others, and the military, often with its own ideas on policy and the design of political institutions, sought allies among civilian politicians.

The military, however, was not a unified actor. Like all the other political forces in the country, it was riven by internal factions that competed for power and influence and divided on the fundamental questions facing the country since 1945: the place of Peronism in the political system and the appropriate economic model to be followed. The military was especially divided in its response to Peronism. The military had been a crucial support for Perón, but after his overthrow in 1955, most Peronists among the senior officer corps were retired. The remaining officers became divided during the Aramburu government (1955-58). Those officers who had participated in the 1955 coup were opposed to the persection of the Peronists. Another group, more influential in the Aramburu government, felt that Peronism should be eradicated from the country. Finally, a third faction emerged that was relatively neutral on Peronism but felt that the military should not attempt to govern the country for an extended period. In 1958 these groups were divided on the questions surrounding elections. The so-called *quedantistas* (from the verb *quedar*, to remain) wanted the military government to continue until the last vestiges of Peronism were eliminated. The so-called *continuistas* favored holding elections but wanted to ensure that the winner would be sympathetic to military goals. The so-called fair play group wished to hold elections without the participation of the Peronists and to respect whatever the re-

sults were. "Fair play" opinion prevailed, and Frondizi won the 1958 elections.

Opinions within the officer corps hardened further under Frondizi. By 1962 there were two main factions, known as the *colorados* (reds) and the *azules* (blues). The *colorados* were hardline anti–Peronists, often confusing Peronism with communism. Given the electorate's obvious preference for Peronism, they concluded that the country was not ready for democracy. They demanded that the military rule until Peronism was destroyed. In economic matters, they believed that the conservative economic model of an economy based on the export of primary products was the most appropriate for the country. In 1962 the entire upper echelon of the navy, as well as the infantry and the engineers within the army, were *colorados.*

The *azules*, also known as legalists or *blandos*, thought the military should stay out of the political process unless the alternative was chaos or a return to Peronism. Their main objection to Peronism, however, was Perón himself. They were Nationalist in orientation, supporting an economic policy of Economic Nationalism in order to industrialize the country. The *azules* were prominent in the cavalry units of the army, including most of the mechanized forces.

In 1962 the *colorados* deposed Frondizi and opposed his constitutional successor, Guido (1962-63), wishing to establish a military government. The *azules* supported Guido. The intramilitary conflict became increasingly violent throughout 1962, leading to virtual civil war in the streets of Buenos Aires in September 1962. The *azules* won the battle, and the military supported the election of Illia in 1963.

The Onganía government (1966-70) marked a major change in the military's political role. Before 1966 the officers had generally served as arbiters of conflicts among competing groups of civilian politicians. In 1966, however, the military attempted to act as the agent of fundamental social and political change. Virtually all the organized groups of the country—labor unions, political parties, and interest groups—were disbanded as Onganía tried to establish a new corporatist system under military direction (see The National Security Doctrine, ch. 5). Many officers, however, did not support this effort. Some were concerned about Onganía's corporatism and others by the prominent place of Catholic Nationalists in his government. When violent demonstrations broke out after the 1969 riots in Córdoba and terrorism became the dominant mode of

political conflict, the military turned to Perón (see The Argentine Revolution, 1966-72, ch. 1).

In 1976 the military government of Jorge Rafael Videla aimed to eliminate the political influence of the Peronists, the unions, and all left-wing groups. Virtually the entire upper ranks of the officer corps supported this effort, which was pursued by fighting a guerrilla war against all groups and individuals identified as "subversive." Estimates of the number of people killed during the so-called dirty war range as high as 30,000 (see The National Reorganization Process, 1976-83, ch. 1; The War Against Subversion, ch. 5).

Although united in its desire to eradicate the left, the officer corps remained divided on other questions, particularly on economic policy and, ultimately, on the design of the political system it wished to create once the guerrillas had been eliminated. These questions dominated military politics after 1978. Videla's minister of economy, José Martínez de Hoz, pursued a policy of opening the economy to imports and foreign investment. Nationalists, particularly those in the navy and the cavalry units, opposed these policies, arguing that they would lead to the destruction of Argentine industry. The army commander, General Roberto Viola, was particularly vocal in his criticism. Junior officers expressed concern for the falling living standards among the working class, which they felt could lead to a new explosion of violence. In December 1980 many Nationalists were promoted, increasing their voice among the upper ranks of the officer corps.

The military was also divided, largely along service lines, over their plans for the political future of the country, particularly over the role civilians were to play in making those plans. The air force and the navy felt that the military should design the new political system and impose it, while the army preferred at least some consultation with civilians. The conflicts within the officer corps led to Videla's removal in March 1981 and to the beginning of the transition to civilian rule (see The End of Military Rule, this ch.).

Mass Media

Generally, the media were independent of the major political forces in the country, including the political parties, and were generally conservative in tone. After the restrictions placed on the media during the 1970s were removed in 1983, a large number of sensationalist tabloids appeared, and artistic

expression recovered from the general absence of controversy and innovation that prevailed under military rule.

The major national newspapers were published in Buenos Aires. *La Nación*, *La Prensa*, and the *Clarín* were the most influential newspapers. *La Nación* and *La Prensa* were generally conservative but not linked to any political party. The *Clarín* was linked to the MID, whose 1983 presidential candidate, Rogelio Frigerio, was its major stockholder. The evening daily, *Crónica*, generally followed a Peronist line, as did *La Voz*. The major English-language newspaper was the *Buenos Aires Herald*. It was known especially for its coverage of human rights violations in defiance of government censorship during the military governments of 1976-83.

The government owned Radio Nacional, which operated 26 stations throughout the country, as well as Radiodifusión Argentina al Exterior (RAE), the government's international service. The government also operated four television channels in Buenos Aires, one in Mar del Plata, one in Mendoza, and 26 other relay stations in several interior cities. The electronic media operated under licenses granted by the Federal Broadcast Committee (Comité Federal de Radiodifusión—COMFER), a division of the Secretariat of Public Information (Secretaria de Información Pública—SIP). Under the 1976-83 military governments, COMFER issued periodic bulletins that banned certain musical themes and performers from the airwaves.

The SIP had responsibility for monitoring the print media. During the military governments, the SIP acted as the government's censor, issuing vaguely worded instructions to editors about prohibited subjects, leaving the editors and reporters to censor themselves. Through the SIP the government maintained a climate of uncertainty and intimidation among editors and reporters by prosecuting those who the SIP felt had transgressed acceptable bounds. The SIP also operated Telam, the official news agency, which, together with the privately owned Noticias Argentinas (Argentine News), supplied most of the news items used by both the electronic and the print media.

Most restrictions on the media were removed on return to civilian government in December 1983. Nevertheless, a highly obtuse, indirect style of reporting, in which events were hinted at rather than described, remained the norm.

The Politics of Democratic Restoration

The End of Military Rule

In March 1976, when the armed forces deposed Isabel de Perón, the move was supported by almost the entire upper class, large sectors of the middle and lower classes, and even some Peronist leaders. With inflation running at some 450 percent and guerrillas fighting each other in the streets, most felt that the country was in complete chaos. Only the military seemed capable of extricating the country from the crisis (see The Peronist Restoration, 1973-76, ch. 1).

The military established an institutional government in which the commanders of the three services collectively served as the head of government, choosing the president and filling the entire state apparatus with military officers. Videla was named president (see The Military in Power, ch. 1).

The military established two goals for its government—the eradication of "terrorism" and the restoration of economic stability. To accomplish its first goal, Videla's government directed the military and police forces to win the civil war, placing no restrictions on how that was to be accomplished. Victory was achieved after three years of limited open fighting and a stream of kidnappings, "disappearances," bombings, and killings that brought a total breakdown of due process for those suspected of being connected with the guerrillas. By June 1978 the guerrillas were all but eliminated, and the military declared victory. By 1980 the last vestiges of the terrorist groups had died out, and the disappearances had stopped.

The Videla government was initially supported in its efforts by an apparent majority of the population. Most of the political parties welcomed the end of the political violence and economic chaos that had threatened their lives and livelihoods in 1975 and 1976. Many business and financial leaders participated as advisers to the government, as did some prominent individuals from the more conservative political parties. A second line of "critical supporters" included sectors of the major agricultural and industrial groups, major newspapers such as *La Prensa* and *La Nación*, and the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church. Participation by civilians was not limited to the right, however. In 1979 a government intelligence study revealed that 52 percent of the country's 1,697 sitting mayors were what it described as "political activists." Of these, it identified about 33 percent as members of the UCR and over 20 percent as members of the PJ. Despite the concern abroad,

concern for human rights inside the country remained a minor sideshow, confined to small groups and to the several hundred relatives of the disappeared who marched each Thursday in the Plaza de Mayo in downtown Buenos Aires.

The Videla government placed Minister of Economy Martínez de Hoz in charge of restoring economic stability. He sought to do this by opening the highly protected economy to foreign competition, reducing state intervention in the marketplace, and transferring most state production activities to the private sector. His policies seemed to work in the short run. Foreign reserves jumped from US$20 million in 1976 to US$10 billion by mid-1980. Farm output also grew, paced by a 52-percent rise in wheat production during the 1978-79 season over the previous harvest.

Despite the apparent economic success and the victory over the guerrillas, the military was divided over its future course. As early as 1978 the air force commander proposed that a process leading to a return to civilian rule be initiated. The military became divided into hard-liners and moderates. The hard-liners wanted to continue the high level of repression they called "an ideological war of national purification." The moderates, including Videla and the army commander, Viola, wanted to reach an agreement with civilian political and social forces. A third group, led by Admiral Emilio Massera, sought to forge an alliance with the more conservative elements among the Peronists.

While the military leaders debated their future course, the political parties were unable to agree on a common strategy to push for elections. In April 1979 an ideologically diverse group of political parties issued a statement calling for unrestricted political activity and elections. The Radicals, preferring to seek a separate pact with the military, refused to participate. In August several parties issued statements critical of the government's economic policy and calling for elections, but the MID, although agreeing to call for changes in economic policy, refused to join the call for elections, and the Radicals refused to participate at all.

The economy worsened during 1979 and a large number of domestic industrial firms declared bankruptcy. A chorus of protests against Martínez de Hoz from wide sectors of the population failed to cause the government to alter its policies.

At the end of 1979 Videla announced that the government was ready to begin laying the foundation for the creation of a democratic government although, no schedule was set nor a

mechanism announced for the process. In March 1980 he announced that consultations to discuss the basis of a new political system with party leaders would soon begin. However, the onset of a new financial crisis interrupted the process, for several major banks collapsed following a large number of bankruptcies. In June 1980 Ricardo Balbín, leader of the UCR, indicated that the UCR was not prepared to discuss a transition to civilian rule while the country was in economic crisis. In August, however, several small, center-left parties demanded an immediate return to civilian rule. Videla responded in September 1980 by prohibiting all party gatherings. In the meantime, economic conditions worsened, and by mid-1981 the country was in a deep economic recession.

Videla retired in March 1981, and the army commander, General Viola was selected by the junta to replace him. The choice, however, was not unanimous; although the army and the airforce supported him, the navy voted against him. The navy, firm supporters of Martínez de Hoz economic policies, distrusted Viola. The SRA and the UIA urgently requested relief from the financial plight of their members and the chaotic state of the exchange and finance markets. A package of economic measures was announced on March 31. Its most important feature was a 23-percent currency devaluation, which effectively dismantled the central instrument—an overvalued peso—of Martínez de Hoz economic policy.

In addition, Viola offered to include critics from the SRA and the UIA in his cabinet and to include party leaders in discussions on the political transition. His moderation and his apparent desire to talk to the political parties were welcomed by human rights organizations but earned him the distrust of many officers, particularly his successor as army commander, General Leopoldo Galtieri, who publicly warned Viola not to seek popularity by dissociating himself from direct responsibility for the repression of the guerrillas and who criticized Viola's attempts to reach an understanding with the civilian politicians. The navy command, in contrast, seemed to support Viola by issuing a statement indicating its view that a time limit should be set on the military's exercise of governing power.

In the midst of the political uncertainty, the financial crisis continued. There were three major runs on the peso between Viola's inauguration and June 1981. As firms went bankrupt and as unemployment rose, 1.5 million workers staged general strikes in June and again in July. Meanwhile, Viola called for

resumption of the political dialogue begun by Videla on an orderly transition to civilian government.

However, the UCR and the PJ resisted entering into any agreement without a guarantee of policy concessions, ministerial positions—and, ultimately, elections. Neither would agree to a political system based on indefinite military control. In July the UCR called for the development of a common platform by the major parties and toward that end formed a group known as the Multipartidaria (Multiparty Commission), together with the PJ, the PI, the Christian Democrats, and the MID. The Multipartidaria, however, did not demand immediate elections. Rather, it demanded that the government establish a definite timetable for the transition to civilian rule. Clearly unprepared for elections at that point, the Multipartidaria indicated that an appropriate timetable would be three to four years. It called on the government to promulgate a new statute for political parties and an electoral law under which parties would compete. The agreement among the parties did not extend beyond a demand for a return to civilian rule, for they failed to agree on a set of economic policies that would restore high employment and economic growth while ensuring political stability.

The establishment of the Multipartidaria was widely seen as an attempt by the civilian politicians to support Viola against the hard-line officers who were coalescing behind Galtieri. In return for this support, the Multipartidaria expected to play a role in the choice of Viola's successor when his term expired in 1984.

In November 1981 the government issued an outline of a new political party law, requesting comments from all parties before February 1982 in order to allow preparation of a final draft in June. The law envisioned a gradual transition, beginning with local elections, but no date was set. That same month, however, the junta announced that Viola had temporarily resigned "for reasons of health." The following month it was announced that Galtieri would serve the remainder of Viola's presidential term.

The Galtieri coup marked a sidetracking of the political liberalization and a return to the monetarist economic policies of Martínez de Hoz. Galtieri appointed a cabinet that included many conservatives who had supported the policies of Martínez de Hoz under Videla. To deal with the worsening economic crises, Minister of Economy Roberto T. Alemann froze public sector wages, affecting some 1.6 million workers, and issued

a plan to sell off parts of the military industrial complex, the state banking system, and the oil and gas sector in an attempt to cut the budget deficit. The policy succeeded in reducing inflation but deepened the recession.

Politically, Galtieri continued the liberalization at a slower pace and tried to create a political force that might carry him and the conservatives he represented to elected office in 1984. Toward that end a number of civilians were appointed to provincial governorships. The draft law on parties forbade the questioning of the armed force's role in the 1976-79 repression and prohibited public meetings. Finally, the decision was made to try to rally support for Galtieri's future presidential candidacy by reviving an old navy plan to retake the Falkland/Malvinas Islands from Britain. This move assumed that Britain would protest but do nothing, that the United States would remain neutral, and that the Soviet Union would veto any strong action in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. On January 1, 1982, the formal decision was made to invade sometime between August and September 1982. Plans for the invasion were worked out during the first months of 1982 (see The South Atlantic War and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

In February and March 1982, as the economic recession deepened and unemployment rose to about 15 percent, social tension mounted. Organized labor took to the streets in protest, and the parties spoke out against the military. The timetable for the invasion was moved up and began on April 2. The move had the desired effect. The leaders of the Multipartidaria went to the Casa Rosada (the presidential palace) to congratulate Galtieri personally on his reaffirmation of sovereignty over the islands. The PJ, the UCR, the PI, the PSP, and the PCA all praised the move, and many of their leaders attended the ceremony at which General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was sworn in as governor of the islands.

After the reoccupation of the islands by British troops in June 1982, Galtieri's project collapsed. The army refused to support his desire to continue the war, and he resigned on June 17, 1982. But the military could not agree on its next step with respect to the political process. The army wished to continue the gradual liberalization, the air force preferred a rapid reopening, and the navy favored continued military rule. With the junta deadlocked, the army unilaterally appointed retired General Reynaldo B. Bignone as president. Neither the air force nor the navy would support him and withdrew from the junta, leaving the government in the hands of the army with a

clear mandate to return power to an elected civilian successor by March 1984.

Bignone appointed a cabinet with only one military minister and lifted restrictions on the parties. As the second half of 1982 began, however, the country faced a huge payment on its foreign debt of US$40 billion by the end of the year and entered into negotiations with the IMF. The government announced a policy of multiple exchange rates, firm price controls, and financial reform. Inflation continued unabated, however. Banks saw one-third of their deposits disappear by the beginning of 1983, for their monthly rate of interest was 10 percent lower than the 15 percent monthly rate of inflation. Inflation in 1982 reached some 209 percent. In July the government suspended payment on both the interest and the principal on its foreign debt and called for a rescheduling. Drastic wage cuts gave rise to strikes and demonstrations, culminating in general strikes in December 1982 and March 1983. The Multipartidaria called for the prompt initiation of a phased plan for national elections and a Nationalist-expansionist-oriented economic policy that included tariff protection for industry, lower interest rates, liberalized credit, and substantial real wage increases.

Internally, the military agreed on four lines of action: a political retreat to allow elections, the transfer of government to the parties winning a majority, a reforging of the cohesion of the armed forces shattered in the wake of the South Atlantic War, and a substantial increase in the military capability of all three services. The junta was reestablished in September 1982.

The military established as conditions for the return to civilian rule that the parties would have to agree not to pursue investigations of corruption, economic mismanagement, human rights abuses, or the conduct of the war. All parties would also have to agree to new laws regulating elections and union organization and would have to guarantee the jurisdiction of the armed forces over all investigations of military conduct. In an attempt to prevent investigations by civilian courts, the military declared in April 1983 that all military actions during the "dirty war" were carried out in the line of duty on orders from the high command.

In March 1983 it was announced that elections would be held on October 30, with the transfer of power scheduled for January 10, 1984. As the campaign got under way, the Peronists were divided, but the Radicals quickly settled on Alfon-

sín as their nominee (see Political Parties, this ch.). Alfonsín based his campaign on an attack of the military and the unions, accusing the Peronists of forming an electoral pact with the former at the behest of the latter. There was little difference, however, between Alfonsín's proposed economic policy and that of Italo Luder of the Peronist PJ. Both proposed reducing inflation and unemployment by expanding the economy and renegotiating the foreign debt. Both also emphasized their commitment to a mixed economy with an expanded role for the state in economic planning. When the military decreed a law giving itself amnesty in September, both Luder and Alfonsín vowed to repeal it.

The Radical Government of Raúl Alfonsín

Raúl Alfonsín of the UCR won the 1983 elections with 52 percent of the popular vote; Italo Luder of the PJ received about 42 percent. It appeared that Alfonsín benefited from a strong anti-Peronist sentiment, especially among voters in the more populous provinces around Buenos Aires. In particular, many voters were thought to have been frightened by Herminio Iglesias, the PJ candidate for vice president, who threatened violence against members of the UCR at a PJ rally on national television during the closing days of the campaign.

The election, however, was not a clean sweep for the UCR. Although it emerged from the elections with a majority of the 254 deputies (129 for the UCR, 111 for the PJ, three for the PI, one for the PDC, and 10 divided among other parties), it did not receive a majority of the 46 senators (18 for the UCR, 21 for the PJ, one for the MID, and six divided among three provincial parties). Nevertheless, Alfonsín and the UCR gave every indication that they interpreted the results as a clear mandate to transform the political system by destroying the political power of both the military and the unions.

In keeping with tradition, Alfonsín made no overtures to the other parties in the days leading up to his inauguration on December 10, 1983. Once in office, he named a cabinet composed of individuals who had been associated with him for years as personal advisers. Most of his appointees were veterans of his Renovation and Change faction within the UCR. His one concession to party unity was the naming of Antonio Tróccoli, a leader of the National Line faction, as minister of interior.

Alfonsín's initial policy program called for a number of

changes in the political system as well as a program for dealing with the economic crisis. He announced that his government would make the military subordinate to civilian authority and would reduce its role in the economy. He further announced that he would reduce the role of organized labor in the political system, in particular by weakening labor leaders whom he accused of having collaborated with the military governments. Finally, he promised to reactivate the economy by channeling investment capital into industry and by renegotiating the foreign debt.

Days after taking office, Alfonsín moved to restrict the power of the military (see The Organization of the Armed Forces, ch. 5). He reached down into the officer corps to appoint relatively junior officers to the highest-ranking positions in all three services, forcing the retirement of 25 army generals, 12 admirals, and 12 air force brigadier generals. In addition, he proposed military reforms that altered the command structure and gave the minister of defense control over military promotions, the details of military policy, troop deployment, and the military industrial complex.

He quickly disciplined any officers who commented on these moves publicly. Junior officers seemed to feel that the traditional political involvement of the armed forces had seriously harmed its fighting ability during the South Atlantic War. In early 1984 he announced further changes, cutting the defense budget from 5 percent of gross national product (GNP—See Glossary) to 2.7 percent. Some members of the UCR proposed cutting the size of the army by half.

In February 1984 Alfonsín appointed civilian directors over the General Directorate of Military Manufacturers, the main holding company for the many industrial firms controlled by the military. Before taking office he had sought agreement from the military to transfer the nonmilitary factories that the armed forces had acquired over the years to civilian ownership but had encountered fierce resistance. This interim step, however, was accepted.

The question of military responsibility for the "disappeared" (*desaparecidos*—those killed in the dirty war), however, proved troublesome. On December 13, 1983, Alfonsín issued a decree ordering the prosecution of nine former members of the military juntas for offenses allegedly committed in the 1976-79 dirty war against terrorism. Seven leaders of various guerrilla factions of the period were also indicted (see The War Against Subversion, ch. 5).

During the 1983 electoral campaign, Alfonsín drew a distinction between the armed forces as an institution, which he defended, and those individual members of the armed forces who were responsible for violating human rights. He also made a distinction between the top officials who had given the commands and set the apparatus for human rights violations, those who had exceeded their authority in carrying out their orders, and those who merely obeyed orders. He had pledged to bring indictments against only the first two categories.

At its first meeting the new Congress annulled the amnesty law decreed by the Bignone military government, and Alfonsín announced that the members of the three juntas that governed between 1976 and 1982 would be indicated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Only the Bignone-led junta was exempted. Alfonsín asked the armed forces to form a council of retired officers who had served on active duty prior to 1976 and charged them to investigate and court martial personnel who had exceeded their authority during the dirty war. In addition, a law passed by Congress at Alfonsín's request in January 1984 enabled the results of the trial conducted by the Supreme Council to be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

Human rights groups and the public at large objected vociferously to this procedure, charging that the military could not be trusted to try its own officers. To allay the criticism, Alfonsín appointed a 12-member commission that was to determine what had happened to the *desaparecidos*. Chaired by novelist Ernesto Sábato, the commission took testimony from 5,792 witnesses over nine months before submitting its 50,000-page report to the president in September 1984. The report documented the "disappearance" of 8,961 people, many of them tortured in 340 secret prisons. It named 1,300 police and military personnel who had participated directly in the repression, most of whom were still on active duty.

This procedure was rejected by most of the human rights groups that had protested the repression. The Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Center for Legal and Social Studies, in particular, opposed the trials by military courts. They also demanded a congressional investigation in place of the Sábato Commission. After losing the congressional vote on the law that laid down the procedures for trying the members of the military juntas in January 1984, they filed some 50 civil cases against military personnel in relation to the disappearances. The most celebrated case was against General Bignone, who had been spared

prosecution by Alfonsín, who argued that Bignone had directed the return to civilian rule. Nevertheless, Bignone was indicted and arrested in a privately initiated case for covering up the disappearances of two communist draftees under his command while he headed a military college in 1976.

In August 1984 human rights organizations submitted a list of 896 officers, many of junior rank, who they claimed were involved in crimes during the dirty war. Alfonsín had sought to limit the investigations as much as possible, but this proved impossible under the pressure of the human rights organizations and the uncharacteristic independence of the judiciary. In September, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announced that its investigation found nothing objectionable in the orders and decrees of the military and that the military had only defended the nation against its enemies, Alfonsín's policy was in a shambles. The council's recalcitrance left him no choice but to begin prosecution in the federal courts, albeit slowly, of the service commanders who were members of the juntas.

Lawyers for the accused officers appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the civilian courts had no jurisdiction in the cases, but the appeal was rejected in December 1984. As the trials got under way, the chief judge in the cases announced that the officers would be tried under new legal procedures that were designed especially for these cases. The trials were open to the public, evidence would be taken verbally instead of in writing, and the normal rules of evidence were suspended to allow the judges greater leeway (see The War Against Subversion, ch. 5). The trials were expected to proceed throughout 1985.

Upon taking office, Alfonsín also moved against the Peronist leadership of the unions. In February 1984 he proposed legislation requiring that all unions hold elections for new officers under the auspices of the courts. Any union regulations that established seniority requirements for holding union office would be void, and the winners of the elections would serve three-year terms. Immediate reelection would be permitted once, after which individuals would have to sit out for a full term before again becoming eligible for reelection. The proposed law also provided for a system of proportional representation on all union councils and commissions, which would award 33 percent of the seats to any minority in the elections that received at least 25 percent of the vote.

Alfonsín's proposal had two objectives: first, to end the

tenure of individuals who had been appointed by the military government to head the unions and, second, to undermine the incumbent leadership in the Peronist unions, most of whom had been elected to their positions before 1976. This would have severely weakened the union leadership in control of the PJ and thereby might have potentially strengthened the more moderate elements within the party.

Alfonsín rushed the bill through the Chamber of Deputies, but it ran into opposition in the Senate. The PJ opposed the bill, as did several senators from small, local parties. Despite Alfonsín's arguments that the bill was nothing more than a democratic reform, many senators feared it was a middle-class attempt to destroy the unions. A few unions preempted the bill by staging their own elections without government supervision. The Peronist leadership was defeated in each election. Overall, however, the bill had the opposite effect from the one intended. In response to the threat to their positions, the leadership of the CGT factions joined forces to lobby against the bill in the Senate, where it was defeated by a narrow margin in March 1984.

Stung by this defeat, Alfonsín fired his minister of labor and social security and called for national unity talks with the opposition parties. After March 1984 he emphasized unity in a series of speeches throughout the country, urging businessmen and labor leaders to join in a system of informal consultation with the government in which all groups would be consulted on policies that might affect them. In return, he asked that the opposition temper its criticisms.

The CGT denounced Alfonsín's initiative, claiming that he wanted to divide the union leadership and seduce the rank and file. In May, Alfonsín met with Isabel de Perón, titular head of the PJ, in an attempt to enlist her support for the talks. After a brief stay in the country, however, she again departed for Spain. Labor leaders did participate in talks concerning wage and price issues throughout 1984, and there were relatively few days of national labor protest. Simultaneously, however, the labor leadership began a campaign of harassment with a series of short, local strikes in mid-1984. The CGT demanded that the government return control of the union social services funds, which had been confiscated by the military, but Alfonsín refused, insisting that the unions join business groups and the government in talks on a new "social pact" on wages and prices. The CGT refused to join the talks and demanded that Alfonsín form a coalition government with the PJ. Alfonsín

refused, and the impasse lasted until August, when talks between the government and the CGT began under the auspices of the Catholic church. Because the government continued to refuse official recognition and the return of the social services funds, the CGT called a general strike in September 1984. Millions of CGT members ignored the strike call, however, severely weakening the position of the labor leadership. In January 1985 it finally agreed to continue talks over economic policy.

Alfonsín's problems with labor were exacerbated by the steadily deteriorating state of the economy (see Growth and Structure of the Economy, ch. 3). During the 1983 election campaign, he had defined three objectives for his economic program: to reduce inflation, then running at an annual rate of some 950 percent; to reactivate the economy; and to improve real income. This was to be accomplished by cutting public spending and the budget deficit while increasing wages and reactivating the economy.

Alfonsín declared a state of economic emergency upon taking office. Controls were placed on prices and interest rates, and wage adjustments were indexed at 2 percent above the rate of inflation. In return for easier credit policies, the UIA, the SRA, and the major business groups agreed not to pass along these wage increases to consumers.

Inflation increased through 1984, however, and wage indexing was discontinued in March. Already in technical default on its US$45 billion foreign debt, the government again entered into negotiations with the IMF, seeking approval of its economic policy, as required by its creditors before they would refinance the country's debt. Negotiations broke down in June 1984 when the IMF team asked the government to institute a 20-percent decrease in real wages and limit the budget deficit to 9 percent of GDP. The government refused, proposing a 6- to 8-percent wage increase and a budget deficit of 12.5 percent.

Alfonsín appealed directly to the IMF directors in June 1984 but failed to gain their support. He was then forced to negotiate an agreement based on the original IMF proposals. In December 1984 an agreement was reached under which the country received US$1.7 billion from the IMF, US$4.2 billion in new loans from commercial banks, and the rescheduling of US$14 billion. In return, the country agreed to pay its creditors US$850 million in overdue interest payments, US$500 million of which was supplied as a bridge loan from the United

States government and US$100 million supplied by other Latin American countries.

The deal reached with the IMF caused a sudden hardening of opposition to the government. The PJ turned to obstructionist tactics in Congress, refusing to attend the sessions at which Minister of Economy Bernardo Grinspun explained the scope of the agreement. The CGT announced that "the workers are not willing to pay the external debt." Disagreement also emerged within the government as the president of the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic, Adolfo Canitrot, advocated "flexibility" and "giving in little by little" to soften the social impact of the commitments made.

In January 1985 the government announced a new economic strategy that was designed primarily to lower inflation—then running at some 776 percent annually—and to pay the foreign debt. The plan envisioned no real wage increases for 1985. The IMF, however, refused to release the first disbursement of its funds until the government implemented further austerity measures. In March Alfonsín replaced his minister of economy, appointing Juan Sourrouille in his place. The new minister announced that future wage increases would be held to 90 percent of inflation. The IMF objected, however, to even this level of wage increases and still refused to release its funds.

In the midst of these difficulties, rumors surfaced that Alfonsín was thinking of resigning and that a move was afoot to overthrow Alfonsín and replace him with Vice President Víctor Martínez. In the meantime, Sourrouille resisted the implementation of a strongly recessionary economic program, insisting that the gradualist approach be continued. Talks among business, labor, and the government on a "socio-economic pact," however, broke down in April. MID leader Frondizi then issued a statement warning that anarchy was already reigning in the country, specifically mentioning the rapidly deteriorating economic situation and the continuing trial of the leaders of the military juntas. Former president Onganía echoed these criticisms, sparking a flurry of rumors about a military coup.

On April 23 the CGT announced a series of labor demonstrations to protest declining wages, beginning on May 30, in several interior provinces that were to culminate with a general strike on May 23. In response to the uncertain situation, Alfonsín addressed the nation on television, warning of "traitors" whom he accused of planning a coup and summoning the opposition parties to a "rally in defense of democracy" in the

Plaza de Mayo. The representatives of 14 political parties signed a Document in Defense of Democracy on April 25 to pledge their support for the constitutional government. Most of the major political organizations participated in the rally the following day. Notable by their absence, however, was the leadership of the CGT and the Odeón faction of the PJ. In his address Alfonsín announced that he was putting the economy on a "war footing" by increasing taxes, transferring many state firms to private ownership, and substantially reducing public spending. These moves were designed to decrease the budget deficit and thereby reduce inflation.

The CGT proceeded with its planned protests, but the indications were that many of the union rank-and-file did not support the actions. In addition, counterrallies held by the MAS succeeded in drawing larger crowds than the CGT rallies in some cities. The CGT campaign was also opposed by the Río Hondo faction of the PJ, which while calling for a change in economic policy joined the UCR to discuss the possibility of creating a new multiparty group "in defense of democracy" and urged the resumption of talks between the government and the CGT leadership. As the CGT campaign continued, however, prominent members of the PJ's Odeón faction, particularly Saúl Ubaldini, called on the government either to change its economic policy or to resign.

The 12-hour general strike, marked by the largest antigovernment demonstrations since Alfonsín's inauguration, took place on May 23. The CGT failed, however, to completely shut down the country; trains and buses still functioned. Alfonsín quickly regained the initiative, announcing that the government had uncovered the existence of a heavily armed group of right-wing terrorists on June 1 (see The Ministry of Interior and Internal Security, ch. 5). He recognized the CGT as the "most representative" labor group and finally returned the unions' social welfare funds to the organization on June 6. The talks between labor, business, and the government reconvened soon afterward.

On June 14 the government announced sweeping economic austerity measures, which Alfonsín said were necessary for the survival of democracy. The program included an indefinite freeze on wages, prices, and public sector tariffs, the introduction of a new currency unit (the austral), and a commitment that the government would no longer print money to cover its budget deficit. The CGT initially opposed the plan, as did the leaders of most opposition parties. Indications that the public

as a whole supported the plan, however, led most leaders, including the CGT leadership, to express qualified support for it in subsequent weeks. Politically, Alfonsín staked his government on the plan's success. The congressional elections scheduled for October 1985 were expected to express the public's verdict, whether in favor of the program or opposed to it. In the meantime, however, indications were that Alfonsín had again managed to steal the initiative from his opponents, who would be blamed for opposing the plan if it did not work, while he would get the credit if it did.

Foreign Relations

Foreign policy was the responsibility of the president, who was advised by the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship. Under civilian presidents, foreign policy was generally made by the president, his or her close personal advisers, the career staff of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship, and the armed forces. Some of the leaders of the major business associations, intellectuals, executives of the major foreign investors in the country, foreign military advisers, and representatives of foreign and international aid agencies often participated in the process. The circle of participants was narrower under military presidents, the armed forces typically playing a greater role than the career foreign service.

History and General Principles

Historically, the country was most concerned with sovereignty, security, international recognition, and economic development in its foreign relations. Argentina's close economic relationship with Britain from independence until World War I led many to consider the country a Spanish-speaking appendage of the British Empire. The British built the railroads and utilities, introduced modern breeding techniques to the cattle industry, and ran the international trading system. The ruling elites represented those who supplied the beef, wool, and grains to the British companies. Thus, the country supported British investors and British interests in the region, eschewing identification with the rest of Latin America. The British influence, together with the large number of European immigrants, led to a general orientation toward Europe and a relative de-

tachment from Western Hemispheric affairs, aside from border tensions with Chile and a traditional rivalry with Brazil.

When the United States began to advance its economic and diplomatic sphere southward by means of the Pan American Union in 1889, Argentina turned its attention to the rest of South America, albeit in a limited way. It opposed United States attempts to forge hemispheric solidarity, arguing that although Central America and the Caribbean fell within the United States sphere of influence, South America should maintain its autonomy. Pursuing this policy, the country successfully blocked an attempt by the United States to create a hemispheric peacekeeping mechanism at the 1933 Montevideo Conference of the Pan American Union. At the same time, however, investors from the United States had successfully established a strong position in the country's economy during World War I.

With the rise of nationalism in the late 1930s, the country was divided in its foreign policy emphases. Conservative governments emphasized the country's traditional ties to Britain, while the military governments of the early 1940s sought to limit British influence and advocated closer ties with Germany. During World War II the country maintained its neutrality, shipping beef and grain to Britain while encouraging German investments in industry. The United States opposed this position and pressured the country to declare war on Germany by giving substantial military assistance to Brazil. In 1945, with the results of the war clear, the country declared war on Germany and Japan "in order to achieve acceptance in an Allied World."

During World War II the country joined the Inter-American System after signing the Act of Chapultepec in April 1945. It joined the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), and participated in the Inter-American Defense Board. At the same time, however, the country developed the concept of a so-called Third Position in international affairs, independent of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The policy led to closer ties with Latin America, the maintenance of a more distant, and at times hostile, attitude toward the United States, and the development of cooperative relations with other countries in Asia and Africa. This policy, with varying degrees of emphasis, was continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s. At the same time, however,

the country continued to emphasize its traditional cultural, political, and economic links with Western Europe.

Under the military governments of the late 1960s and the 1970s, the country tried to project its power on a broader scale than before. Those governments, tending to view the international system in terms of a basic conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, sought to ally the country more closely with the United States and at the same time establish regional hegemony in the Southern Cone and in the South Atlantic area. Difficult relations with the United States during the late 1970s impeded the pursuit of this project, but after their improvement in 1980, the country participated in a military coup in Bolivia, sent military advisers to assist the government of El Salvador and antigovernment guerrillas operating against the government of Nicaragua, entered into informal discussions with the United States concerning the possible location of a United States military base in Argentina, and sought the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization to join Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa in a military alliance with the United States. At the same time, however, the country developed a strong commercial relationship with the Soviet Union.

The South Atlantic War of 1982 seriously disrupted the country's foreign relations, effectively ending its traditional ties with Britain but also calling into question its relationship with the United States and its participation in the Inter-American System. To many Argentines, the role played by the United States in the war made it impossible to rely on the Rio Treaty as the primary mechanism for external defense. This also contributed to a growing climate of opinion that the country's interests would be better served by aligning itself with the developing countries, particularly on economic issues.

The foreign policy of the Alfonsín government reflected these concerns. It sought to forge stronger ties with the Nonaligned Movement and tried to negotiate a common policy on international debt payments with the other countries of Latin America. In addition, it ended the country's military involvement in Central America and distanced itself from United States policy in the area. It also tried to improve its relations with several West European countries, notably with Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and maintained its commercial relations with the Soviet Union. Finally, it sought to resolve the long-standing territorial dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel

and to resolve peacefully the country's dispute with Britain over the islands of the South Atlantic.

Relations with Britain

In mid-1985 the fundamental issue between the country and Britain remained the status of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands as well as the other islands in the South Atlantic (South Georgia/Georgia del Sur Island, South Sandwich/Sandwich del Sur Islands, South Orkney/Orcadas del Sur Islands, and South Shetland/Shetland del Sur Islands). Argentina considered these islands to be part of the country, together with a large portion of Antarctica. The Antarctic claim came under the provisions of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (see Relations with Other Countries, this ch.). The British occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, however, was viewed as a case of colonial occupation.

The Argentine claim was based on the "discovery" of the islands in 1504 by the Florentine navigator, Amerigo Vespucci. France claimed sovereignty in the seventeenth century by virtue of occupation but ceded its rights to Spain. Britain, which based its claim on the "discovery" of the islands in 1592 by Captain John Davis, agreed with Spain in the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht not to establish colonies in the southern half of the Western Hemisphere in return for Spain's agreement not to establish colonies in the northern half. Spain's claim passed to Argentina upon the latter's independence in 1816. Argentine settlements were established and a governor appointed in 1820 (see The South Atlantic War and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

In 1829 Argentine authorities on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands seized the United States whaling vessel *Harriet* for legal infractions. The United States retaliated by dispatching the U.S.S. *Lexington* to destroy the Argentine settlements in 1831, and in 1833 the United States consulate in Buenos Aires urged Britain to seize the islands and deport the Argentine inhabitants. In 1985 Argentina maintained that the British occupation of 1833 was illegal under 1946 international law. Britain maintained that its occupation had been legal under prevailing international law and was not subject to subsequent alterations of the law.

In 1965, at Argentina's request, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution urging the two countries to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty question. Secret negotiations, which began the following year, led to the so-called Agreed Position in 1967 under which Britain acceded to the

Argentine claim in principle. Domestic politics in Britain, however, prevented any further progress. Discussions began again in 1970, leading to the 1971 Buenos Aires Declaration, under which regular sea and air communications between the Argentine mainland and the islands were established, and postal, cable, and telephone connections were improved. Argentina also agreed to admit the islanders to schools and hospitals in Argentina. Britain then proposed a "lease-back" arrangement, under which Argentina would be granted formal sovereignty, although Britain would maintain administrative control until the islanders could adjust to eventual Argentine governance. The islanders refused to accept this arrangement, and the proposal was defeated in the British Parliament.

In December 1973 the UN General Assembly expressed its concern at the slow pace of the negotiations and again urged the two countries to resolve what it described as the "colonial situation." The following year, further agreements on the transportation of goods between the island and the mainland were reached, and Argentina agreed to supply the islands with fuel. In February 1976, however, a shooting incident between the Argentine destroyer *Almirante Storni* and the British naval vessel *Shackleton* about 130 kilometers from the islands led both countries to recall their ambassadors until November 1979.

New negotiations began in February 1977, with meetings in Rome, New York, Lima, and Geneva throughout 1978 and 1979. Little progress was made, however. In January 1981 the islanders' legislative council rejected the "lease-back scheme" and declared its preference for freezing the dispute for another 25 years. In March 1982 Argentina protested the slow rate of progress in the negotiations and urged monthly meetings with a fixed agenda between the two countries, alluding to possible unilateral action if Britain did not respond. In early April an Argentine force occupied the Falkland/Malvinas, South Georgia/Georgia del Sur, and South Sandwich/Sandwich del Sur islands. The islands were formally constituted as the country's twenty-third province, and a governor was appointed.

Britain protested the Argentine action, taking its case to the UN Security Council, where it obtained Resolution 502, which called for an Argentine withdrawal and the cessation of hostilities. Britain then sought and received the imposition of economic sanctions against Argentina by the Commonwealth of Nations and the European Economic Community (EEC) and

dispatched an invasion force to reoccupy the islands. Argentina sought the support of the OAS, but that organization adopted only a "resolution of concern" on April 13, offering its "friendly cooperation in the search for a peaceful settlement." After British forces appeared in the waters surrounding the islands, Argentina invoked the Rio Treaty, citing Article 3, which established that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered an attack against all American States," and requested the imposition of sanctions against Britain. Over strong objections by the United States, the foreign ministers of the 21 signatories of the Rio Treaty met in late April but merely adopted a resolution supporting the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the islands and deploring the sanctions that had been imposed against Argentina by the EEC at Britain's request. The resolution did not, however, invoke any sanctions against Britain. It called for fulfillment of Resolution 502, urged a truce between the combatants, and called on Britain to withdraw its forces.

Following the official end of United States neutrality in the conflict on April 30, both UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar and President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru tried to mediate the dispute. Although both sides made considerable concessions, neither effort was able to mediate the fundamental dispute over sovereignty. Argentina required prior assurances of its ultimate sovereignty over the islands before entering into new negotiations with Britain, and Britain insisted that the outcome of any future negotiations should not be "prejudged." On May 21, British forces landed in the islands (see The South Atlantic War, ch. 5). After the British reoccupation of the islands, the dispute returned to the diplomatic level. Despite the simultaneous lifting of financial sanctions by the two countries in September 1982, no new negotiations were begun. In November 1982 the UN General Assembly urged resumption of negotiations for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Argentina accepted the offer of the UN secretary general to arrange discussions, but Britain responded that it would not enter into negotiations until Argentina issued a formal declaration ceasing hostilities. Furthermore, it stated that the question of sovereignty was "nonnegotiable." In November 1983 the General Assembly passed a second resolution calling for negotiations over sovereignty. Argentina protested what it described as a British "military buildup" on the islands.

In December 1983 Alfonsín ruled out the renewed use of force over the islands but also refused to unilaterally issue a

formal cessation of hostilities unless Britain agreed to discuss sovereignty. Privately, Argentina and Britain exchanged notes throughout late 1983 and 1984. Argentina urged Britain to end its fortification of the islands, to lift its 200-nautical-mile exclusion zone around the islands, and to return to the prewar sovereignty negotiations. Britain, for its part, dropped its insistence on a formal cessation of hostilities but maintained its refusal to discuss sovereignty. In July 1984 representatives of the two countries met in Bern, Switzerland, under the offices of the Swiss and the Brazilians to discuss the issues between them. The discussions, however, quickly broke down over the question of whether sovereignty would be discussed. In mid-1985 Britain lifted its restrictions on trade with Argentina; Argentina, however, continued to insist on negotiations over sovereignty.

Relations with the United States

Although relations with the United States were often difficult, the country was considered an ally of the United States. Although publicly asserting its independence, the country supported most United States regional and global policies throughout the 1960s, including the economic blockade of Cuba and the 1965 military intervention in the Dominican Republic. The United States supplied Argentina with about US$247 million in grants, credits, and other forms of military aid between 1950 and 1979, when about 4,017 Argentine military personnel were trained in the United States. There were, however, serious disagreements between the two countries on a number of issues, particularly during the late 1970s.

The United States was particularly concerned about Argentina's nuclear research program. It began independent research and the production of reactors and some fuel elements in the early 1950s. During the first 20 years of the program, the United States and other countries supplied Argentina with enriched uranium on a commercial basis. However, when the country signed but did not ratify the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) and refused to sign the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States became increasingly concerned. The latter treaty required its signatories to establish safeguards in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Argentina maintained that, although it supported the goals of the two treaties

and accepted a variety of international safeguards on its research, it could not accept IAEA's prohibition on the use of peaceful nuclear explosions in that research. The country also objected that the Tlatelolco Treaty did not provide sufficient safeguards to protect its nuclear technology trade secrets. In 1978 the United States halted sales of enriched uranium to Argentina and urged other countries to do the same. Argentina then embarked on a research program designed to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle. The United States then moved to block the transfer of nuclear technology to the country, insisting that it ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty, agree with the IAEA on a number of safeguards, and agree not to reprocess nuclear fuel without international supervision. Argentina then objected that both the Tlatelolco Treaty and the NPT were attempts by the nuclear powers to prevent the country from developing its own nuclear industries by keeping it dependent on the United States for essential technology. Argentina announced in November 1983 that it had developed its own uranium enrichment technology (see Nuclear Development and Capabilities, ch. 5).

In November 1984, however, the country signed an agreement with Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden in support of world nuclear disarmament. The agreement pledged the signatories to oppose the arms race in international forums. At the same time, Argentina apparently continued its insistence on its right to detonate peaceful nuclear explosions (see Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations, ch. 5).

Relations with the United States reached a low point in 1977 and 1978. Criticizing human rights violations in Argentina, the United States restricted arms sales to the country, voted against loans to Argentina from international aid agencies, and strongly criticized it in the OAS and the UN. Rather than accept evaluation of its human rights situation by the United States Department of State and the subsequent discussion of those evaluations in the United States Congress, Argentina terminated its military assistance program with the United States. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Argentina refused to join the United States in halting grain sales to the Soviet Union. Relations improved in late 1979 and 1980, however, as a result of Argentina's improved human rights record, the importation by Argentina in 1979 of US$2 billion of United States goods, and the release by the United States of about US$980 million in loans in 1980.

Relations between the two countries improved further after Galtieri became president in 1981. In a series of meetings between officials of the two governments in late 1981 and early 1982, they discussed the role of Argentina forces in Central America, the possible location of a United States military installation in Patagonia, the possible deployment of Argentine troops as part of the peacekeeping force in the Sinai desert envisaged in the Camp David Agreements, and the country's tense relations with Chile. The United States scheduled some US$500 million in military aid for 1983.

This improvement in relations ended with the country's attempt to recover the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by armed force. Although the United States was officially neutral in the dispute and United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig tried to mediate between Argentina and Britain, press reports in the United States to the effect that the United States was, in fact, assisting Britain in its war effort caused great concern in Argentina. When the United States opposed Argentina's invocation of the Rio Treaty and then officially declared its support for Britain on April 30, 1982, many in Argentina felt the United States had betrayed them. A poll taken in Buenos Aires in June 1982 indicated that although some 30 percent of the respondents considered British prime minister Margaret Thatcher the "most hated" person in the world, some 55 percent reserved that distinction for President Ronald Reagan of the United States. The country ended its military involvement in Central America, threatened to withdraw its representatives from the Inter-American Defense Board, and sought to improve its relations with Cuba, Nicaragua, and a number of countries in the Nonaligned Movement.

Relations did not improve markedly upon the election of Alfonsín. Alfonsín was particularly angry about what he perceived as the United States preference for the PJ's candidate in the elections, Italo Luder. He was also reportedly upset by a visit of United States military officials while he was president elect, during which they met with Argentine officers but failed to pay him a courtesy call. Reportedly he felt that such direct military contact between the two countries complicated his efforts to achieve civilian control over the military.

The major issue between the two countries during the first 18 months of Alfonsín's presidency, however, concerned the country's international debt. In June 1984 representatives of 11 Latin American countries, including Argentina, met in Cartagena, Colombia, to discuss common problems concerning

their international debts. They called for an "adequate repayment and grace period," as well as a "reduction of interest rates, margins, commissions and other financial charges." In September 1984 the so-called Cartagena Consensus countries met again, at Alfonsín's invitation, in Mar del Plata. They issued a formal call for multilateral talks with industrialized countries concerning the international debt problems.

In response, the United States Department of the Treasury issued a statement that the United States opposed such a meeting, indicating its preference that any talks be conducted within established forums such as the UN, the World Bank (see Glossary), and the IMF. Arguing that United States fiscal policy contributed to high interest rates, however, Alfonsín indicated that the United States government should take steps to ease his country's debt burden. In particular, he sought the assistance of the United States in his attempt to get IMF agreement to continue his policy of economic reactivation. The United States, however, continued its insistence that the country reach an accommodation directly with the IMF.

In June 1985 the country began a new economic stabilization plan designed to halt its growing inflation rate. This policy was supported by the United States, which joined 11 other countries in supplying a bridge loan to help cover the country's external payments until IMF disbursements began.

Relations with Other Countries

In 1985 the country was continuing a trend toward improved relations with a number of countries with which it had had serious disagreements in the past. In particular, Argentina moved to settle its dispute with Chile over the Beagle Channel, continued its growing trade relationship with the Soviet Union, and moved to strengthen its ties with several countries in Western Europe.

Latin American Countries

The pattern of relations with the other countries of the region shifted markedly as the result of the South Atlantic War. The Galtieri government had sent military advisers to assist the government of El Salvador in its battle with insurgents and also sent economic and technical aid to antigovernment guerrillas fighting against Nicaragua (see Operational Command, Deployment, and Equipment, ch. 5). This effort

ended after the United States ended its official neutrality in the South Atlantic War. The Alfonsín government continued this policy of disengagement in Central America, although it did extend a US$45 million line of credit for industrial goods to Nicaragua and offered an additional US$2.5 million in food and medical aid. It also supported the efforts of the Contadora Group to mediate conflicts in the region and refused to support the effort by the United States to organize an economic boycott of Nicaragua in 1984. The country also extended a US$600 million line of credit to Cuba in 1984 and signed further agreements to export industrial machinery to Cuba in 1985.

The Alfonsín government continued the development of closer relations with Brazil begun by the military governments in the late 1970s. In 1980 the two countries signed a number of agreements covering nuclear cooperation, joint exploitation of hydroelectric resources, a permanent mechanism for political consultation, interconnection of national electrical grids, establishment of common veterinary regulations, coordination of grain exports, and scientific and technical cooperation. In 1982 Argentina unsuccessfully tried to interest Brazil in playing a more active role in the region, particularly by joining an anticommunist alliance in Central America and by joining to form a South Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Alfonsín government continued to make overtures to Brazil, giving particular emphasis to the development of a joint effort in nuclear power research. In March 1985 the two countries began discussing an agreement under which they would each open their nuclear facilities to inspection by the other.

The Alfonsín government also concluded a treaty with Chile under which it accepted Chilean sovereignty over three small islands in the Beagle Channel. The two countries had disputed control of the islands for years. Both countries were concerned primarily with the impact that control of the islands would have on their competing claims to territory in Antarctica. A 1977 arbitration award, drafted by five members on the International Court of Justice and confirmed by the British crown, awarded the islands to Chile, but Argentina rejected the award, citing technical irregularities in the court's decision. This rejection led to a strong Chilean reaction, and troops were mobilized by both countries. In December 1978 the two countries agreed to accept papal mediation of the dispute.

Little progress was made in the dispute until late 1983, when Alfonsín made a settlement with Chile a high priority. In

January 1984 the two countries signed a "Declaration of Peace and Friendship" under Vatican sponsorship and later in the year initialed a treaty that awarded the islands to Chile but limited Chilean access to the Atlantic and specifically separated the two countries' claims in Antarctica from the status of the Beagle Channel islands. In November 1984 about 73 percent of the electorate approved the treaty in an unprecedented referendum. The Senate ratified it in early 1985, thus settling the dispute (see fig. 4).

Soviet Union

Argentina has long maintained an economic relationship with the Soviet Union, exporting grain and meat to that country and importing limited quantities of industrial goods. During the early 1970s the country took a greater interest in this trade, both as a means of pursuing a foreign policy more independent of the United States and as a source of needed hard currency. Later, the Soviet Union became a limited source of nuclear technology unobtainable from the United States.

The relationship deepened as the Soviet Union refrained from criticizing the government's human rights record during the late 1970s, and in return Argentina refused to cut off its exports following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1981 the two countries signed a five-year trade agreement by which Argentina supplied grain and meat to the Soviet Union. Further contracts were signed in 1982 covering various services and nuclear supplies. Under these contracts Argentina became one of the major suppliers of grain to the Soviet Union. The trade balance between them was markedly in favor of Argentina, balancing to a great extent its negative trade balance with the United States and Western Europe. The Soviets, however, urged the country to import more from the Soviet Union in order to achieve greater balance in the relationship. The Argentines resisted doing this, causing some difficulties in renegotiating a new trade agreement in 1985.

* * *

The best English-language studies of Argentina politics

available in mid-1985 were Gary W. Wynia's *Argentina in the Postwar Era* and Lars Schoultz' *The Populist Challenge.* Neither, however, covered developments after 1982. The articles on Argentina and on the South Atlantic War published in *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record,* edited by Jack W. Hopkins, provided useful information on political and economic events, as did the articles by Wynia on Argentina published in *Current History.* Information on contemporary events was available in the *Latin America Weekly Report* and *Latin America Regional Reports: Southern Cone,* both published by Latin American Newsletters of London, and in various issues of the *Financial Times,* the *New York Times,* the *Los Angeles Times,* the *Washington Post,* the *Wall Street Journal,* and the Argentine newspapers *La Nación,* the *Clarín,* and the *Buenos Aires Herald.* A useful compendium of English-language newspaper articles on Argentina was the *Information Service on Latin America.*

The best overview of Argentina's foreign relations was Dennis R. Gordon's "Argentina's Foreign Policies in the Post-Malvinas Era" in *The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies.* (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Presidents Ronald Reagan and Raúl Alfonsín meeting at White House during President Alfonsín's visit to the United States in 1985
Courtesy The White House/ Jack Kightlinger

Casa Rosada, the presidential palace
Courtesy Organization of American States

Buenos Aires

Congress building
Photos courtesy Organization of American States

Chapter 5. National Security



Soldier of the Horse Grenadiers

BY MID-1985 THE DIFFICULT issues that had dominated Argentine society during the 1982-83 military government resurfaced as the popular exhilaration generated by the 1983 election of President Raúl Alfonsín waned. These issues included finding a long-term solution to the country's continuing economic problems; determining and punishing those responsible for the military's war against subversion, or "dirty war," during which thousands of Argentines had been murdered; and assigning blame for the armed forces' defeat by Britain in the South Atlantic War. Under the civilian government of President Alfonsín, civil-military relations continued to be redefined within the context of these issues.

The continuing financial problems provided Alfonsín the opportunity to reorganize the armed forces not only according to Argentina's economic realities but also according to his own precepts. Twice during his first 18 months in office the president made efforts to assert and maintain his constitutional authority over the armed forces institution, leading to shake-ups at the top. The first changes came in July 1984, and the second, more extensive changes, in March 1985. The principal criticisms waged against the president by the suddenly retired military officials related to drastic cuts in the military budget, which they maintained had damaged the armed forces' morale and operational capabilities, and the government's handling of investigations and other matters related to the war against subversion.

The role of the armed forces' former leadership in their defeat by the British during the 74-day South Atlantic War in 1982 was an issue taken up within the military itself. Even before the return of civilian government, numerous studies—including the authoritative Rattenbach Report—were prepared by the armed forces, which sought to assign blame, if not scapegoats, for Argentina's ignominious defeat. The courts-martial of the war's leaders by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military's highest tribunal, continued to receive testimony in mid-1985.

The legacy left by the dirty war of the late 1970s was perhaps the greatest obstacle to the consolidation of democratic government in the 1980s. In April 1985 the public civil trials of the leaders of the military juntas that ruled between 1976 and 1982 opened with much fanfare. Several of those

tried by the civil court were also under judgment by the military's Supreme Council for their actions in the South Atlantic War. Because the junta members were not being tried by their peers, the civilian government made a special effort to point out that it was the individual military leaders who were being tried before the civil court and not the institution of the armed forces.

Rumors of Alfonsín's imminent resignation, as well as military conspiracies and coups d'état, continued in 1985. A right-wing campaign to "destabilize" the government through terrorism was revealed by the Alfonsín administration shortly before the first arrests of paramilitary group members were made in May and June. By August a precarious calm seemed to have settled over the country as the Argentine press carried extensive accounts of the trials and arrests and the average Argentine citizen got on with the daily business of trying to earn a living.

Background and Traditions of the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces' Origins

Although the modern Argentine military is generally recognized as having become a consolidated national institution only around the turn of the twentieth century, its origins and official traditions date back to the years immediately preceding independence. At the time of the May 1810 revolt against Spanish colonial rule, three military bodies already existed that provided the foundation of the first Argentine army.

The first of these, the Blandengues, traced its origins to the period shortly before the creation of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata. During the early 1750s these cavalry troops, then acting under order from the viceroy of Peru, patrolled territory comprising modern Argentina and defended the newly established frontier towns against attacks by hostile Indians. The Blandengues—so named for the lack of enthusiasm with which they were said to have received a visiting representative of the Spanish crown—helped expand the territorial frontiers for settlement and trade by Spanish colonists. In many cases, duty as a frontier guard served as the training ground for those who later became the independence movement's military leaders.

By 1800 a regular colonial army, consisting only of some 2,500 Spanish soldiers, had been organized to guard Buenos

Aires, the administrative seat of the new viceroyalty. The colonial troops were divided among a regiment each of infantrymen and dragoons and four companies of a Royal Artillery Corps. The principal security concerns of the city's authorities were to protect themselves against the loss of revenue to the ubiquitous British smugglers and to defend themselves against incursions by Portuguese colonists who attempted to settle as far south as the Río de la Plata in an area that was then part of the city of Buenos Aires.

The third force, a popular militia, was hastily assembled in 1806 in the wake of Britain's invasion and occupation of Buenos Aires. Even though the viceroyalty was forewarned of the impending British invasion, it was incapable of organizing the regular colonial army to defend the city (see The Dawn of Independence, ch. 1). Instead, the armed citizens of Buenos Aires—criollos as well as Spaniards—were largely responsible for the city's recapture from the 1,500-man occupying army, an event known in Argentine history as the Reconquest. When Britain surrendered in August after controlling the city for nearly two months, the strength of the militia stood at some 1,500 to 2,000 men. By the time of Britain's second attempt on the port city in 1807, the loosely organized force already had its own elected officer corps and was receiving two hours of military training daily. It had grown to a size of some 8,000 men, roughly one-fifth of the total population of Buenos Aires, and again proved crucial in repelling the British invaders. In the Defense, as the action subsequently became known, almost two-thirds of the militia were native-born criollos.

After the second British defeat, support for the independence movement among members of *porteño* (pl., *porteños*—residents of Buenos Aires) society grew rapidly. At the same time, Spanish authorities recognized that they would be unable to contain any insurrection. The peaceful May Revolution of 1810—in which the viceroy, forced to resign, was replaced by a criollo-led junta—brought de facto independence, but only to the city of Buenos Aires. The personnel belonging to the colonial army posted at the city, depending on their loyalty to the Spanish crown, were either dismissed or were reorganized into Buenos Aires' new military units, which were given such patriotic names as the Dragoons of the Fatherland or the Artillerymen of the Fatherland. The Blandengues were renamed the Mounted Volunteers of the Fatherland. Many Blandengues, however, resisted formal organization and became models for the later romanticized figure of the gaucho.

The presence of royalist forces elsewhere in the region continued to threaten the new government's independence and prompted the creation of military units whose mission it was to drive out the colonial army and its supporters. Between 1810 and 1815 three expeditionary forces were organized and set out on numerous campaigns—all ultimately unsuccessful—to seize control of territory encompassing modern Bolivia (then known as Upper Peru), Paraguay, and Uruguay. After the 1816 Congress of Tucumán formally declared Argentine national independence from Spanish rule, the first national military, the Army of the United Provinces of South America, was created from the remnants of the expeditionary forces (see The United Provinces of South America, ch. 1).

San Martín's Legacy

Between 1816 and 1820 the final defeat of Spanish colonial forces in the southern region of the South American continent was achieved, largely through the planning and prowess of criollo general José de San Martín, the individual recognized as the national hero of Argentina as well as the liberator of Chile and Peru. As a result of San Martín's military victories, Argentina's freedom from the threat of colonial domination was guaranteed at last.

The crossing of the Andean mountain range from Argentina into territory comprising modern Chile by San Martín's Army of the Andes has been considered one of the most difficult and daring military operations ever conducted. When the army set out on its first campaign in January 1817, it counted among its regular personnel some 3,000 infantry soldiers, 700 mounted grenadiers, and at least 250 artillery troops. This force, in turn, was supported by mule drivers, armorers, and miners who were responsible for keeping the mountain passes open. A volunteer militia of 1,200 to 1,500 men—many, former Blandengues—also took part in the expedition. The army's 20-odd pieces of artillery, including howitzers, were said to have been dragged over 300 kilometers at altitudes up to 3,600 meters.

The initial invasion and attack on Spanish forces posted on the western slopes of the Andes was accomplished as San Martín divided his troops into four diversionary detachments—composed roughly of 100 men each—and two columns made up of the balance of the force. The first battle between the independence fighters and the royalists took place in mid-

February 1817 as the two main columns reunited with extraordinary precision and roundly defeated the surprised Spanish troops. The Battle of Chacabuco, as the first major confrontation became known, marked the turning point for the Spaniards' fortunes in the region. After the Battle of Maipú in April 1818, in which the colonial forces were again definitively beaten by San Martín's men, the Spanish surrendered, and the independent nation of Chile was created. After the victory, San Martín assembled a new 4,000-man army, which he named the United Liberating Army of Peru, and a naval force of some 1,600 sailors. Using Chile as his base of operations, he proceeded to drive the Spanish from Lima, their last stronghold on the continent, and secure the independence of Peru, a feat he accomplished in mid-1821.

The War with Brazil and the Creation of Uruguay

War between Argentina and the Empire of Brazil grew out of the latent colonial rivalry between Spain and Portugal over control of the Banda Oriental, territory comprising present-day Uruguay (see Unitarians and Federalists, ch. 1). Portuguese forces seized the area after the defeat in early 1817 of the army led by José Gervasio Artigas, Uruguay's erstwhile independence leader who also had participated in the struggle for Argentine independence. Relations between Argentina and Brazil remained tense over the ensuing years and deteriorated precipitously after 1824, when bilateral negotiations for the creation of an independent Uruguayan nation were broken off. The April 1825 invasion of the Banda Oriental launched from Argentine territory by a group of Uruguayan patriots, the Thirty-Three Immortals (also sometimes referred to as the Thirty-Three Easterners, or Orientals), sparked an insurgent movement in the disputed area as they were joined by several thousand supporters. Acrimonious charges were leveled by Brazil that Argentina had provided material support for the invasion.

By May 1825 war seemed imminent. The Argentine government, however, had by then neither a standing army nor a naval force at its disposal. During the years of political chaos and civil war that followed independence, both military bodies had fallen apart. On May 31 a new national army was organized, with a general staff, four infantry battalions, six cavalry regiments, an artillery battalion, and a company of engineers. Each of the nation's nine provinces was called upon to send a complement of soldiers proportionate to the size of its popula-

tion, which was to be determined by the national government. On the eve of battle a naval squadron commanded by the Irish-born Admiral Guillermo Brown was organized. Supreme command over both forces rested with Argentina's first national president, Bernardino Rivadavia.

In December 1825 Brazil declared war on Argentina for allegedly having broken its neutrality in aiding the Uruguayan insurgents, a claim denied by the Argentine government. During the first year of the conflict, most of the battles occurred at sea as the small, poorly equipped navy sought to break Brazil's blockade of the port of Buenos Aires. The army remained in a state of disarray, however. Nearly half its 8,000 troops had been forcibly recruited and were unwilling and unprepared to fight. There was also a severe shortage of weaponry. Of the 1,331 carbines reported in the Argentine arsenal in January 1826, only 54 were serviceable.

The Argentine forces were at a disadvantage in the face of the better trained and equipped Brazilian military, yet they were soon able to win many of the war's battles. Contributions collected by the national government from the Argentine population initially enabled the Argentine army and navy to equip themselves. Subsequently the Argentines were able to confiscate weapons and equipment from fallen or retreating Brazilian forces. At the Battle of Juncal in February 1827, the Argentine navy was said not only to have beaten the Brazilian naval squadron it engaged but also to have incorporated into its own fleet the defeated Brazilians' remaining ships. Later that same month the war's major land battle, the Battle of Ituzaingó, was fought and won by the Argentine army.

The conflict lasted nearly three years until its mediated settlement resulted in the creation of Uruguay as an independent buffer state between the two rival powers. Under the terms of peace agreed to in mid-1828, both countries were to withdraw their military forces over a two-month period and pledged to guarantee Uruguay's independence for the next five years. Britain, the mediator and a not wholly disinterested party to the dispute, managed to keep Argentina from annexing Uruguay and thus to prevent it from controlling the Río de la Plata estuary.

Anarchy Versus National Order

The first 20 years of Argentine independence were characterized by an almost continuous state of civil war. Political

power struggles between Buenos Aires, which had already developed into the country's major urban center, and the provinces had resulted in the emergence of numerous regional caudillos. Each caudillo had organized his own private army—composed of gauchos, Indians, and even fugitives from justice—for whom he provided weapons and lodging. The provincial caudillos regularly formed and broke alliances and warred among themselves. The government in Buenos Aires, however, usually remained their principal enemy. Even before the end of the war with Brazil, a renewal of the civil war had resulted in the desertion of Argentine army troops, who returned to fight in their home provinces and thus contributed to Rivadavia's resignation from the presidency in 1827. After the peace treaty with Brazil was signed, the national army quickly fell apart and was not reorganized until nearly a quarter-century later.

By the late 1820s Juan Manuel de Rosas had distinguished himself as one of the most powerful of the caudillos (see The Dictatorship of Rosas, 1829-52, ch. 1). In late 1829 the legislature recognized Rosas for his role in leading a militia of some 600 men against a mutinous general who had deposed and executed Buenos Aires' provincial governor the year before. The legislature named the caudillo the new governor of the province of Buenos Aires, gave him unlimited powers for a three-year term, elevated him from the rank of army colonel to that of brigadier general, and bestowed upon him the honorific title of Restorer of the Laws.

Anarchy again prevailed for three years after Rosas' first term. In 1835 the legislature reappointed Rosas governor of the country's most powerful province, and he returned from leading an expeditionary force against the Indians to restore order in the capital once more. During this term, which lasted five years, Rosas' Machiavellian pretensions were barely concealed as he managed to play the other provincial caudillos against each other and to manipulate them in his favor.

National unification, according to some accounts, was one of Rosas' main contributions to Argentine history. His "order," however, was achieved at a high social cost. Between 1840—when his third term as governor began—and his demise 12 years later, thousands of Argentines were murdered in a campaign of state-sanctioned terror designed to eliminate all opposition to Rosas' government. In addition to his well-cared-for army, which had swelled to almost 30,000 troops, Rosas relied for his security on the Mazorca, a popular support organization

that evolved into a secret police composed of spies and assassins loyal only to the dictator.

Various groups rose in opposition to the dictatorship, but lacking sufficient military strength, all were defeated until the campaign against the government that was organized and led by General Justo José de Urquiza, a former Rosas ally. Urquiza's Great Liberating Army was made up of former soldiers from Rosas' army, members of other government opposition organizations, and forces from Brazil and Uruguay which, after years of intrigue against them by the Argentine caudillo, were anxious for Rosas' defeat.

At the Battle of Caseros in February 1852, Urquiza's army of some 28,000 men confronted Rosas' troops, which by then numbered only 23,000. Almost 7,000 of Rosas' men were captured along with their arms and munitions; some who had deserted to join Rosas' army were hanged or decapitated by Urquiza's soldiers. Casualties from the conflict ran as high as 1,500 dead and wounded, of whom some 600 belonged to the Great Liberating Army. Even before the fighting ended, Rosas abandoned his command and fled to nearby Buenos Aires. Once there, he renounced his leadership before the legislature and by the following day had departed on a British warship bound for Britain.

For nearly 10 years following Rosas' defeat, two national military bodies coexisted, each with a command structure independent of, and politically opposed to, the other. The dividing issue pertained to the ever contentious relationship between Buenos Aires and the provinces. The Army of the Confederation, created under the 1853 Constitution and commanded by Urquiza, was ultimately defeated in 1861 by the Army of Buenos Aires led by Bartolomé Mitre. By 1862, when Mitre became the first president of the Argentine Republic, the soldier-statesman had incorporated into his force segments of Urquiza's army and ushered in the era during which the Argentine armed forces finally became a consolidated national institution.

The War of the Triple Alliance

The War of the Triple Alliance, also referred to as the Paraguayan War, was the longest and possibly the bloodiest international conflict in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Long-standing border disputes by Argentina and Brazil with Paraguay, political unrest in Uruguay, and the bravado of

the Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano López combined to produce the five-year conflict that began in 1865 (see The Paraguayan War, 1865-70, ch. 1).

Argentina initially sought to maintain neutrality when the first skirmishes took place in 1864 between Paraguayan and Brazilian troops. In March 1865, however, Argentina denied a Paraguayan force the right to pass through national territory on its way to wage war with Brazil. This refusal prompted Solano López to order a surprise attack on the Argentines—without publicly issuing a formal declaration of war—in which two warships anchored at the port of Corrientes were attacked by a Paraguayan naval squadron. Two months later the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, Latin America's first mutual defense pact, was signed by Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Under the terms of the treaty, the three unlikely allies pledged to wage war against Paraguay until Solano López fell.

Mitre became the commander in chief of the allied army and delegated his responsibilities as chief of state to his vice president. A Brazilian admiral held the command of the allied navy, which was composed almost entirely of Brazilian vessels. (Some historians argue that the lack of a unified command structure contributed to the war's prolongation.) Argentina still suffered from internal conflict—caused by remaining belligerent caudillos and raids by Indians—yet the government managed to assemble a force of some 22,000 men during the first few months of the war. The initial Argentine force consisted almost entirely of volunteers (*enganchados*), forced recruits (*destinados*), and members of the national guard, a civilian militia. Brazilian troops, which tolerated almost 38,000 men, made up the balance of the allied force except for a few thousand Uruguayan soldiers. In contrast, the Paraguayan army was composed of 18,000 professional troops and a 45,000–man trained reserve; a second, less-prepared reserve force of 50,000, the members of the Paraguayan militia, was also available for fighting. The Paraguayan army was then known as one of the best trained and best organized ground forces of the Western Hemisphere.

During the first year of the war, the allies repeatedly defeated Solano López's army, which had made the grave error of dividing itself to attack from two fronts. By late October 1865, only months before the final battles on Argentine territory were fought, some 17,000 Paraguayan soldiers had been captured or killed. In addition to battle-related deaths, deaths from disease, including cholera, had helped decimate the

Paraguayan force. Allied casualties were estimated at only 2,500 men.

The May 1866 Battle of Tuyutí, the first battle of the allies' Quadrilateral Campaign, stood out as one of the bloodiest confrontations in Latin American history. After only five hours of fighting, 17,000 soldiers had been killed or wounded. Only 4,000 of the casualties belonged to the triumphant allied army. The allies' fortunes shifted radically, however, at the Battle of Curupayty in September, in which 50 Paraguayan and 9,000 allied troops were killed in a poorly organized land and naval operation.

Nearly 18 months of virtual inactivity followed, during which the allies struggled to maintain their supply lines and coordinate land and naval operations in the wake of their crushing defeat. By early 1868, when Mitre passed on his command to a Brazilian, Argentine participation in the war had declined. The last great battles of the war were fought at Itaibaté (also referred to as Lomas Valentinas), Paraguay, in December 1868, during which the remaining forces of the Paraguayan army were almost completely destroyed. The following month the allies seized the Paraguayan capital of Asunción. In March 1870, when Solano López was killed in battle, the war ended.

Early Professionalization Efforts

The final three decades of the nineteenth century witnessed the beginning of the Argentine armed forces' modernization and professionalization. Formal education programs for those aspiring to military careers were incorporated into professional training; new armaments and equipment improved the armed forces' fighting capabilities and served to boost its prestige. General staff organization was modernized and institutionalized during the 1890s. By 1900 foreign military advisers, almost all former Prussian army officers, had arrived to help expand and refine the forces' capabilities.

During the presidency of Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1868-74), the Military College and the Naval Military School, the first service academies, were established for the army and the navy. Admission was open to any healthy Argentine male aged 14 to 18 who could pass an entrance examination. Graduates from the three-year program offered by the Military College became second lieutenants in either the infantry or the cavalry. Those completing the five-year program were com-

missioned as first lieutenants (*tenientes*) and assigned to the artillery corps, the engineering corps, or the General Staff. Top-ranking graduates from the three-year program were also awarded first lieutenants' commissions after 1884.

The acquisition of arms and equipment was an important component of the armed forces' modernization. In the early 1870s the Remington rifle and carbine were introduced and became standard issue for the Argentine infantry and cavalry, respectively. These weapons were said to have provided the government the decisive advantage required to put down continuing insurrections and to "pacify" the Indian population during the 1880s. The Gatling machine gun, which was first employed by the Argentine military during the War of the Triple Alliance, remained the single most important weapon for the artillery corps through the early 1890s, even though various models of the Krupp breech-loading field gun were also acquired.

The navy also benefited from the procurement and modernization program. The principal mission of the navy until the 1870s had remained the transport of troops and military supplies and, to a lesser extent, the patrolling of the country's inland waterways. During this decade the first efforts were made to develop a seagoing navy that was capable of patrolling the Patagonian coastline and the Strait of Magellan, an area that was being contested by Chile. Naval bases, such as Puerto Belgrano, and regional commands were established to facilitate the patrol of Argentina's Atlantic coast.

Modern steam-powered and iron-clad vessels were first added to the Argentine fleet in the 1870s. The ships constructed during the following two decades included monitors, torpedo boats, corvettes, and gunboats, all of which were laid down in Britain or Austria. During the 1890s friction with Chile led to a renewed effort to modernize the fleet and the consequent acquisition of armored cruisers and destroyers. The need for trained personnel to maintain the new fleet resulted in the opening of the Naval Mechanics School in 1897. By 1915 Argentina was noted for having the largest navy in Latin America.

Julio Argentino Roca, who served as president from 1880 to 1886 and again from 1898 to 1904, was the Argentine leader most responsible for the institutional development and consolidation of the armed forces. Although Roca was an army general—whose support from other senior officers had proved crucial during his first electoral bid—his tenure in office was

distinguished by his efforts to restrict the heretofore increasing participation of the military in national political life. Both military discipline and supremacy of civilian authority over the armed forces were emphasized.

The implementation of changes in the organizational structure of the military was also part of Roca's efforts to modernize and professionalize the armed forces. By 1882 four divisions, each having its own staff, had been organized as the largest troop formations in the army's force structure. Two years later the overall command of the army was reorganized, and the old General Inspectorship and Troop Command was replaced by the Permanent General Staff, which was divided into seven administrative sections. The reorganization also extended to the country's naval force when, in 1898, the functions of the Ministry of War and Navy were divided, and the Ministry of the Navy was created under the command of Commodore Martín Rivadavia, grandson of the president and the individual for whom the city of Comodoro Rivadavia was named.

German Military Influence

By the turn of the century increasingly hostile relations with Chile—and what seemed the threat of imminent war—coupled with the government's continuing desire for a modern military establishment brought into focus the need for advanced professional training. In 1899 the first foreign military advisers—all of them German—arrived in Buenos Aires. The following year the Superior War College was opened as the army's staff school. The school's first director, Colonel Alfred Arent, was a retired Prussian army officer, as were almost half its instructors during the school's early years.

The two-year program at the Superior War College initially was designed for first lieutenants and captains, young officers who had completed their training at the Military College. Approximately half the school's first class of 41 students, however, was composed of majors and lieutenant colonels. Admission requirements included a minimum of two years' military service, the recommendation of one's commanding officer, and satisfactory performance on the entrance examination. The first year of the program emphasized theory and included courses in military history and geography, international law, French, German, the natural sciences and geodesy, and courses that were directly related to service as a general

staff officer. The second year's emphasis was on practice, including the planning and execution of military exercises and field maneuvers.

The influence of the Prussian military system was by far the most dominant foreign influence in the development of the Argentine armed forces around the turn of the century. Beginning in the 1890s Germany became the almost exclusive supplier of the Argentine army's equipment and armaments. The Remington and the Gatling gun were both replaced by German weapons manufactured by such companies as Mauser and Maxim-Nordenfeldt. In the decades preceding World War I, when the German army was at the peak of its prestige, tenuous military relations between Argentina and other European countries, which included Belgium, France, and Italy, were slowly phased out.

In addition to receiving some 30 German military advisers, Argentina sent between 150 and 175 Argentine army officers to Germany for training before the outbreak of World War I. Between 1905 and 1914 these officers, including the top-ranking graduates of the Superior War College, received additional professional instruction at Germany military schools, acted as observers during field maneuvers, and occasionally served with German regiments. The same officers who had been trained abroad subsequently provided the core leadership for the Argentine armed forces during the 1920s and 1930s.

The Prussian military system also influenced the organizational structure of the Argentine armed forces. German advisers reportedly participated in drafting the 1901 organic law regulating conscription, known as the Ricchieri Law, which was named for the minister of war who sponsored it (see Conscription and the Reserves, this ch.). In 1907 the Argentine armed forces officially adopted the German war doctrine, began to use the German ground troops' field manuals, and modified the general staff organization to resemble the German model more closely.

The participation of German military officers in the development of the Argentine armed forces declined after the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Despite the German military's relative loss of prestige after its defeat, the two countries' relationship was resumed in the postwar years and continued until 1940. Speculation existed that Germany's early influence in Argentine military development had contributed to the strong support for the Axis powers evidenced by many Argentine officers throughout World War II.

The Modern Armed Forces

The 1930s marked a new phase in the armed forces' development that signaled the apparent failure of attempts to divorce the military from politics that began some 50 years before. The September 1930 coup that outsted the aged and, by most accounts, senile President Hipólito Yrigoyen was facilitated by the expansion of the force during the 1920s, when it had benefited in terms of both increased personnel—mainly because of conscription—and expenditures. The regular and often intense participation of military officers, especially army officers, in national political life became a feature of the Argentine system when some six coups d'état were launched by the armed forces between 1930 and 1980.

The involvement of army personnel in the political process led to a deep rift between it and the navy, which refrained from becoming a political actor during the 1930s, and also caused a division within the army itself as two major factions struggled for ideological ascendancy. The legalist faction, which had backed the Yrigoyen government, tended to support a market-oriented economic system and a constitutional democracy. Its members generally favored keeping the armed forces out of politics and subordinate to civilian authority. The corporatist-nationalist faction was associated with authoritarian tendencies and, modeling itself on the ideals set forth by Benito Mussolini in Italy, was contemptuous of civilian authority and wholly supported the involvement of the military in politics. Both factions continued to exist within the Argentine military institution into the 1980s, when the same fundamental issue regarding the nature of civil-military relations, though often cloaked in new semantics, continued to divide the service (see The Military as a Political Force, ch. 4).

Despite the world economic downturn, the armed forces continued to grow throughout the 1930s and 1940s. The total number of military personnel doubled from 50,000 at the time of the 1930 coup to 100,000 in 1943, when the coup led by army officers of the secret military lodge, the Unification Task Force (Grupo Obra de Unificación—GOU—see Glossary), enabled Juan Domingo Perón, then an army colonel, to reach the national political arena. In 1945 military expenditures accounted for over 50 percent of the national budget, a proportion unmatched in Argentine history. By the end of the decade, military manpower again had nearly doubled. Army personnel, including conscripts, composed about half the active-duty troops.

The organizational structure of the military also changed to keep pace with the exponential growth in manpower. The number of army divisions had increased from five in 1920 to nine in 1945. In addition to the military regions established for ground forces in 1905, the First Army Command and the Second Army Command were created in 1938 to better coordinate divisional operations. The Military Aviation Service, organized under the army's command in 1912, became the Argentine Air Force in 1945 and was given its own independent command.

During World War II the Argentine government maintained a position of official neutrality until it became apparent that the Axis powers would be defeated. In March 1945 Argentina joined the Allies, declared war on Germany and Japan, and the following month signed the Act of Chapultepec (see Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations, this ch.). Because of its reluctance to support the Allied cause, Argentina became the only Latin American country that did not receive United States Lend-Lease Aid. The war in Europe also had cut off the country from its traditional military suppliers. The realization of Argentine dependence on foreign suppliers sped up the development of a domestic military industry under the direction of the armed forces' General Directorate of Military Manufactures (Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares—DGFM), which had been established in 1941. By the end of the decade, the DGFM's military industries had developed a submachine gun, a 75mm infantry gun, and a medium tank similar to the Sherman and was constructing minesweepers as well as smaller vessels at local shipyards (see Military Industry and Exports, this ch.).

As World War II ended and the Cold War began, relations between the United States and Argentina became more cordial. Normal diplomatic relations were restored in June 1947 after the United States government was satisfied that Argentina had complied with the provisions of the Act of Chapultepec by arresting or deporting the Axis agents reported to be in the country. In September Argentina joined other Latin American nations and the United States in signing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Despite some continuing resistance by the United States Department of State, President Harry S Truman again allowed Argentina to purchase United States-manufactured military equipment. Items purchased included submachine and Browning machine guns, howitzers, and 90mm antiaircraft guns. Also acquired,

though from various sources, were some 200 United States-built Sherman tanks, many of which remained in service in the mid-1980s.

After President Perón was deposed by the military in 1955, the size of the armed forces, which had numbered about 200,000 personnel, began to decrease. By the early 1960s the armed forces had shrunk to some 140,000 troops, of which 85,000 belonged to the army. Between 1955 and 1965 the army was reorganized twice. Shortly after Perón's ouster, five army corps—each assigned to one of the five military regions—were created, replacing the two army commands. By 1963 an army corps was abolished, and its jurisdiction collapsed into that of a contiguous military region. Brigades were also created in 1964, replacing divisions as the army's formations.

During the 1960s factionalism within the armed forces, attributed to their intense participation in politics, increased greatly. Between 1962 and 1966 two civilian presidents, Arturo Frondizi and Arturo Illia, were ousted by military coups. After each of the coups, the legalist and the conservative factions—then called the blues (*azules*) and the reds (*colorados*), respectively named for the colors used by war game participants—struggled for control of the national government. Both groups supported an eventual return to civilian rule, but a third, more hard-line group, known as the *golpistas*, favored military rule for an indefinite period. Despite their divisions, the major military factions were united in opposing Peronism and all that this movement associated with the former president represented.

Ties between the Argentine armed forces and their United States counterparts remained close throughout the 1960s. The initial attempt by the civilian Frondizi government to maintain a neutral position in the wake of the Cuban Revolution was said to have enraged the Argentine officer corps, which had already developed an antipathy toward communism. During the October 1962 cuban missile crisis—after Frondizi's ouster—Argentine search and rescue aircraft operating out of Florida joined the United States in maintaining the blockade of the island. Two Argentine naval destroyers left Buenos Aires three days after the blockade was imposed and were en route to the Caribbean when the crisis was resolved the next day, October 28. In 1964 a military assistance agreement was signed by the two governments that provided for Argentina's acquisition of modern weaponry and for trips by various United States advi-

sory missions to the country. Military equipment purchased from the United States during the second half of the decade included armored personnel carriers, light tanks, various models of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and a dock landing ship.

The National Security Doctrine

During the mid-1960s the armed forces began to interpret national security as being inextricably linked with national economic development. This premise provided the foundation for what subsequently became known as the National Security Doctrine. After the 1966 coup that brought retired general Juan Carlos Onganía to the presidency, the Act of the Argentine Revolution reorganized the military's command structure based on the precepts of the nascent National Security Doctrine. "National security" was henceforth vaguely defined as the "situation" in which Argentine "vital interests" were safe from "substantial challenges or disturbances." In turn, "national defense" became the means to achieve the goal of "national security." The effect of the reorganization law was that the security of the state became tied to that of the regime in power; national defense became dedicated to the regime's preservation.

The institutional aspects of the reorganization were embodied in the National System of Security Planning and Action, under which two councils, the National Security Council and the National Development Council, were created. The two bodies stood at the apex of the state planning structure and, according to General Benjamín Rattenbach, one of the principal architects of the plan, constituted "the national government itself, at its highest level." All policies and strategies subsequently developed by the government were to be reviewed and coordinated in terms of their "two vital aspects, development and security."

Some scholars argue that the United States promotion during the 1960s of the concept of "internal defense and development" influenced the development of the National Security Doctrine. Measures advocated by the concept included civic action and other military-sponsored economic development programs as a means to contain insurgency. According to one authority on the development of the national security state in Latin America, the concept's introduction opened a Pandora's box as the military gradually assumed increasing responsibility

for national development. This new role merged with indigenous theories, many bearing Germany's early influence, on the organic nature of the state and geopolitics and together shaped the political beliefs subsequently embodied in the National Security Doctrine. By 1969 the armed forces institution viewed itself as the trustee of the nation's destiny, and the containment of "internal warfare" was officially added to the armed forces' mission.

When extremist political violence increased during the early 1970s, the doctrine became directly associated with the elimination of left-wing subversion and, after the implementation of the National Reorganization Process by General Jorge Rafael Videla's government in 1976, was used to justify repression carried out by the armed forces against broad segments of Argentine society in which thousands were murdered or "disappeared" (see The War Against Subversion, this ch.). After Alfonsín assumed the presidency, the doctrine was no longer supported by the government, and the law that regulated national security planning was abandoned, according to the civilian administration, "by virtue of disuse" (see Operational Command, Deployment, and Equipment, this ch.).

Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations

After the March 1976 military coup, the 1853 Constitution was suspended, and a new document, the Statute for the National Reorganization Process, was promulgated to provide legitimacy for the military government (see The National Reorganization Process, 1976-83, ch. 1). Extraordinary authority was conferred upon the armed forces by the statute: a military junta, composed of the three service chiefs, became "the Supreme Organ of the Nation" and assumed power previously delegated among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government. Shortly before the inauguration of President Alfonsín in December 1983, the statute was repealed and the 1853 Constitution fully restored.

Under the provisions of the 1853 Constitution, the president serves as the supreme head of the nation and acts as commander in chief of the Argentine armed forces. In such capacity he reserves the right to determine the "organization and distribution" of the armed forces "according to the necessities of the Nation." Military officers holding the rank of colonel and above are appointed by the president with the consent

of the Senate. Such consent is not required for presidential appointments made "on the field of battle."

The executive power vested in the president includes the authority to declare war, pending the authorization and approval of Congress. The presidency also is charged with responsibility for negotiating and signing "treaties of peace, . . . of alliance, of boundaries, and of neutrality." The president is empowered to unilaterally declare a state of siege, during which constitutional guarantees are suspended, only when "internal disorders" occur while Congress is in recess. In the event of foreign attack, the president is authorized to declare a state of siege only with the consent of the Senate and for a limited period. The president also reserves the right to convoke extraordinary sessions or extend regular sessions of Congress "when some grave interest of order or progress requires it."

Congress bears the specific responsibility to "authorize the Executive Power to declare war or make peace." While in session, it is charged with declaring a state of siege in the event of internal disturbances; it also bears the right to approve or suspend any state of siege declared by the president during a recess. The size of the armed forces during both peace and war is set by Congress, which also establishes the "regulations and rules for the government of such forces." Congressional authorization is required for Argentine troops to leave national territory and for foreign forces to enter it. Congress also exercises "exclusive legislation" throughout Argentine territory over military bases and properties, which are deemed "establishments of national utility."

Argentina is a supporter of collective security in the Western Hemisphere. The Act of Chapultepec was signed by Argentina in April 1945, the week after it declared war on Germany and Japan, and stipulated that, in the event of threat of aggression across national borders, the parties to the act would consult to agree upon measures, including the possible use of military force, to prevent or repel such aggression. The act also recommended consideration of creating a permanent agency responsible for hemispheric defense and, as part of a supplementary resolution, provided for the continuation of the Inter-American Defense Board, established in early 1942.

In September 1947 Argentina signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which expanded upon the Act of Chapultepec to provide for the collective defense of Western Hemisphere nations against an armed at-

tack by nonsignatory powers. The terms of the treaty constrained signatory nations to the peaceful settlement of disputes among themselves. Argentina was a founding member of the Organization of American States (OAS), the regional organization responsible for determining when the Rio Treaty's provisions should be implemented. As a member of the OAS, Argentina was obligated first to seek redress for defense-related grievances at that forum before presenting them before the United Nations (UN).

As of mid-1985 Argentina had not signed the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Throughout the 1970s the Argentine military government maintained that the treaty's terms interfered with the acquisition and full use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by developing nations. This position appeared not to have been altered substantially under the Alfonsín administration, when in early 1985 the government reiterated its rejection of the treaty on the grounds that it discriminated in favor of nuclear-weapon states.

In spite of the rejection, the Argentine government, even while ruled by the military, repeatedly voiced support for nonproliferation and disarmament. One report in mid-1985 noted that the Alfonsín government had appointed a special ambassador for peace and disarmament who would represent the country at the September meeting in Geneva of the newly created Group of Six. There was also speculation that Alfonsín would attend the Geneva meeting, as he had the group's first meeting in New Delhi in January. At this meeting the Group of Six—composed of the heads of state of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania—made Alfonsín its president and issued the New Delhi Declaration calling for an international ban on the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons.

In 1985 Argentina continued to participate in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as it had since that body's creation in 1956. On various occasions the Argentine government sponsored conferences and supplied technical assistance to other developing countries under the organization's aegis. With respect to the IAEA's safeguards agreements, however, Argentina supported only those that pertained to the transfer of original facilities and objected to limitations the agency imposed on technology transfers as well as conditions on the subsequent use of safeguarded materials. In 1985 Argentina did not permit inspections by the IAEA of its nuclear facilities and reserved the right to conduct peaceful nuclear

explosions (see Nuclear Development and Capabilities, this ch.).

Argentina was a signatory of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty) and, at the time of the signing in 1967, had announced its intention to ratify it. By 1985, however, such ratification had not occurred. The basic provisions of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which was open only to Latin American nations, prohibited the development, acquisition, and testing of nuclear weapons by Latin American states. It also established a regional control organization, similar in scope to the IAEA, for verification of compliance with the treaty. Argentina objected to the treaty's restrictions on the development and testing of nuclear weapons, instead maintaining that the treaty must allow for the indigenous development of nuclear devices to be used for peaceful nuclear explosions. The intent of the user, Argentina argued, was the key factor in distinguishing peaceful nuclear explosions from those of weapons being tested.

The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which came into effect in 1961, also had ramifications for Argentine national security. In addition, the country's long-standing territorial dispute with Chile was settled by the Beagle Channel Treaty, which was ratified in early 1985.

The Organization of the Armed Forces

The Reorganized Command Structure

Exactly 24 hours before the elected Alfonsín administration took office in December 1983, the military junta—the fourth that had ruled the country since the March 1976 coup—surrendered control over the armed forces to their fellow officer and president, Reynaldo B. Bignone. Upon his inauguration on December 10—in accordance with the reinstated 1853 Constitution—President Alfonsín became the commander in chief of the armed forces. Under the new civilian government, responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the armed forces was turned over to Minister of Defense Raúl Borrás, a civilian and close political ally of the president. After Borrás' death in May 1985, Roque Carranza, an industrial engineer who previously had served as Alfonsín's minister of public works and services, was appointed the new minister of defense. The key positions of defense secretary—the second highest position in the ministry, held by José Horacio Jaunarena—and

defense production secretary, held by Raúl Tomas, remained unchanged after they were reappointed by the new defense minister. By August 1985 there was little indication that Carranza's appointment signaled any shift in Alfonsín's policy for the slow but steady reorganization of the armed forces begun in December 1983.

The long awaited plan for the sweeping reorganization of the Argentine armed forces was submitted to the national legislature in April 1985. In mid-August the Chamber of Deputies approved the bill after some eight hours of floor debate. The proposed reorganization was then subject to Senate debate and approval before becoming law. The proposed reorganization law superseded the statute enacted in 1966 during the presidency of Onganía (see The National Security Doctrine, this ch.). Included in it were provisions for the establishment of various new governmental bodies with defense-related responsibilities.

The new National Defense Cabinet was assigned the specific mission of advising the president on the adoption of appropriate strategies and coordinated plans of action for the resolution of pending conflicts. Members of this cabinet included the vice president and the ministers of defense, foreign relations and worship, and the economy. The Ministry of Defense was assigned to be the National Defense Cabinet's working organ (*órgano de trabajo*). The law also granted the president the right to invite others, as he deemed necessary, to join in the deliberations of the cabinet.

The new Military Committee was charged with the responsibility to advise the president in the realm of military affairs and was assigned the specific mission of assisting in the conduct of military actions. Members of the committee included the minister of defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the entity designated as the committee's working organ. In this case also, the president reserved the authority to invite the participation of others whose input to the committee might prove useful.

In terms of the armed forces' organizational structure, the minister of defense was given expanded responsibilities in decisions affecting the national defense. Even before the submission of the proposed law to Congress, the Ministry of Defense had assumed authority over decisions affecting troop deployments, officers' promotions, and the armed forces' budget. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom were presidential appointees, were subordinate to the Ministry of De-

fense. According to the law, the objective of the structural reorganization was to allow for the creation and effective coordination of strategic operational commands or territorial commands. A less publicized consideration was that of circumventing interservice rivalries, a factor that had impeded the joint operations of the Argentine armed forces during the South Atlantic War (see The South Atlantic War, this ch.). A joint military planning board was to be created to make recommendations to the president regarding the composition and size of the armed forces. The proposed law also provided for the establishment of the National Intelligence Headquarters, which would become the government's principal intelligence agency and would be responsible only to the chief of state.

Military Expenditures

The total budget established for the Argentine armed forces in 1984 was roughly the equivalent of US$2 billion. Military expenditures for 1984 were 40 percent lower than those presented in the 1983 budget, which had been prepared while the military junta ruled the country. After a four-month delay, the 1985 defense spending plans were submitted to Congress in early 1985. Although the amount of the proposed expenditures was not available, spending plans were reported not to have varied substantially from those approved in 1984.

Because of the fluctuating value of Argentine currency and the nation's extraordinarily high inflation rate, data presented on Argentine military expenditures were often tied to gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) or overall government spending. According to the Ministry of Defense, the 1985 proposed budget represented slightly over 3 percent of GDP, compared with 2.7 percent in 1984 and more than 5 percent in 1982 and 1983. At the same time, the government hoped to hold military expenditures in 1985 at approximately 14 percent of total public spending. The Alfonsín administration also hoped eventually to reduce armed forces expenditures to 2 percent of GDP.

The military budget cutbacks during the initial years of the Alfonsín administration were made more difficult by the armed forces' obligation to make payments on the large debts owed to domestic as well as foreign suppliers. One report estimated that between 1978 and 1982 the military juntas had spent some US$10 billion on foreign arms purchases. Another stated that in early 1985 the army's debt to civilian suppliers

alone stood at over US$1 billion. An April 1985 Ministry of Defense report estimated that the total foreign debt of military-related corporations—including those under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, the armed forces, and the National Antarctic Department—totaled close to US$4 billion at the end of 1984. Of this debt, it was estimated that close to US$1 billion—an amount equivalent to approximately 1 percent of GDP—would have to be paid off each year between 1986 and 1988, in accordance with agreements on the refinancing of Argentina's foreign debt. Such unprecedented foreign obligations led to a reapportionment in the distribution of budgeted funds. In 1985 the army, which since the early 1970s had received at least 40 percent of military expenditures, found its share reduced to only 30 percent because of the navy's foreign debt obligations. As a result, the navy obtained slightly over 42 percent of available funds, a 9-percent increase over its traditional share. The air force, which traditionally received one-fourth of expenditures, was scheduled to receive about 23 percent.

The officer corps of all three services warned that the budget cutbacks had damaged the armed forces' operational capabilities and morale and, if continued, would cause "irreparable damage" in terms of the armed forces' equipment, maintenance, and training programs. Nevertheless, the Alfonsín administration continued to view the defense budget as one of the few areas where major budget savings might be most easily achieved. In responding to the officer corps' criticism, a government report maintained that the 1985 defense budget was set "low enough to make military reorganization necessary, but not so low as to cause conflicts and problems capable of hampering essential and organizational tasks."

Operational Command, Deployment, and Equipment

In 1985 the armed forces were divided into three services, the Argentine Army (Ejército Argentino), the Argentine Navy (Armada Argentina), and the Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina). The air force was the youngest of the three branches of service, having been given its own command independent from the army in 1945. Included under the command of the navy were naval aviation and the marines. The army also had a small air wing. According to the proposed reorganization, two of Argentina's paramilitary forces, the National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional) and the Argentine Naval

Prefecture (Prefectura Naval Argentina), fell under the direct authority of the Ministry of Defense. The third force, the Federal Police, remained subordinate to the Ministry of Interior (see The Ministry of Interior and Internal Security, this ch.).

Each of the armed services was commanded by a chief of staff who was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In August 1985 Brigadier General Héctor Luis Ríos Ereñú was army chief of staff; Rear Admiral Ramón Antonio Arosa, the navy chief of staff; and Major General Ernesto Horacio Crespo, the air force chief of staff. For the first time in Argentine history, an air force officer—Major General Teodoro Waldner, the former air force chief of staff—was in command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (As of August 1985 Ríos Ereñú and Waldner were soon expected to be promoted to major general and lieutenant general, respectively—ranks that corresponded with their new billets.) These command appointments had been in effect since early March 1985, when new chiefs of the army, air force, and of the joint chiefs of staff were named by President Alfonsín in the second major military shake-up of his administration. The first crisis in July 1984 had led to the resignation of the army chief of staff, a command whose loyalty was critical in maintaining civilian authority over the armed forces.

For 1983, the latest year for which complete published data were available, the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* estimated the strength of the Argentine armed forces at some 153,000 full-time professional soldiers, a small percentage of a total population of about 30 million. These personnel were complemented by some 108,000 youth fulfilling their obligatory military service and another 250,000 reservists (see Conscription and the Reserves, this ch.). By 1984, however, the number of youth inducted into military service was believed to have dropped to fewer than 50,000, evidence of the drastic measures imposed to cut back the military budget. Based on efforts by the Alfonsín administration to constrain defense spending, it was unlikely that total military manpower would increase substantially, if at all, during the final half of the decade.

The Argentine Army

In 1983 the Argentine Army was composed of some 100,000 active-duty professional soldiers who were complemented by some 80,000 conscripts. By mid-1985 the number

of professional troops was believed to have dropped to some 65,000 personnel, primarily because of budget cuts. The number of conscripts completing their year of military service with the army also had been reduced to between 32,000 and 35,000. The army's traditional dual mission—that of guaranteeing national defense against foreign threats and conserving domestic peace—remained unchanged in the mid-1980s.

The commanding officer of the Argentine Army in mid-1985, Brigadier General Ríos Ereñú, was the third individual to hold that post since the inauguration of President Alfonsín. He was scheduled for promotion to major general, a rank corresponding to his post as army chief of staff. Before his appointment to that position in March 1985, Ríos Ereñú had served as the commander of the Third Army Corps. Even though he was known as a "young officer," his appointment had forced the retirement of six more senior generals, making him the highest-ranking army officer. He was reportedly associated with the legalist faction within the armed forces. Some Argentines tied his record to activities carried out during the so-called dirty war; nevertheless, he was noted as the first army general to have received in his garrison representatives of the presidential commission investigating the abuses under the previous military government (see The War Against Subversion, this ch.).

The headquarters of the Argentine Army's general staff was located at the Libertador Building, which was the site of many military ceremonies in downtown Buenos Aires. Army troops deployed throughout the country were distributed among five military regions and four army corps commands. The bulk of army troops were deployed in the vicinity of Buenos Aires, where some 40 percent of the nation's population lived. The most important army base was the Campo de Mayo, located on the western outskirts of Buenos Aires.

In October 1984 the First Army Corps, which was headquartered at the Palermo Barracks in downtown Buenos Aires, was disbanded by presidential decree, along with other smaller units of military police, "electronics operations companies," and "advance intelligence organizations" that were based in the cities of Buenos Aires, Bahía Blanca, and Fray Luis Beltrán. Command over troops deployed in the territory of the first military region was assumed by the Fifth Army Corps.

The territory, formerly under the First Army Corps' command, included the city of Buenos Aires and almost all of Buenos Aires Province. The Argentine government noted that the

corps was dissolved for budgetary reasons, yet there was some speculation that the political activities of its commanding officers might have been a factor in the government's decision. Personnel garrisoned at the Palermo Barracks traditionally played a significant role in Argentine military politics. The Fifth Army Corps, headquartered in Bahía Blanca, previously held command over troops stationed in southern Buenos Aires Province and the country's three southern provinces—Río Negro, Chubut, and Santa Cruz—as well as the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego.

Each of the military regions under the command of the three remaining army corps was much smaller in terms of territory. The Second Army Corps, headquartered in Rosario, commanded troops deployed in the second military region, encompassing the provinces of Santa Fe, Chaco, Formosa and, in the region of Mesopotamia, the provinces of Entre Ríos, Corrientes, and Misiones on the eastern bank of the Río Paraná. The Third Army Corps had its headquarters in the city of Córdoba and was responsible for troops deployed in the third military region, made up of the provinces of Córdoba, Santiago del Estero, Tucumán, Salta, Jujuy, Catamarca, La Rioja, and San Juan. The Fourth Army Corps was headquartered in Santa Rosa, La Pampa Province, and commanded all troops deployed in that province as well as those in Mendoza, San Luis, and Neuquén—territory corresponding to the fourth military region.

Brigadier generals customarily held the commands of the army corps. There was no definitive structure with respect to the kinds of military units assigned to each army corps. Infantry and cavalry brigades were the largest troop formations in the Argentine Army and were usually composed of three regiments. In the early 1980s major formations that were under the command of the First Army Corps included an armored cavalry brigade and a motorized infantry brigade, in addition to the Buenos Aires detachment at Palermo Barracks made up of the General San Martín Mounted Escort Regiment—known as the San Martín Grenadiers—and the First Infantry Regiment, known as the Patricios. Both of the units at Palermo were part of the presidential guard; their functions were largely ceremonial. It was unclear in 1985 what impact the disbanding of the First Army Corps—and subsequent incorporation of the first military region into the command of the Fifth Army Corps—might have had on the distribution of army units formerly under its command.

Other major troop formations in the Argentine Army included one mechanized infantry and two motorized infantry brigades, three mountain infantry brigades, a jungle infantry brigade, and an airborne infantry brigade. Efforts were made to organize two additional motorized infantry brigades during 1983. An airborne cavalry brigade, the first of its kind in the Argentine force structure, was expected to have been formed by 1985 but, as was the case with the motorized brigades, it remained uncertain what effect budget cutbacks had on the plan. In August 1984 the Ministry of Defense announced its intention to cut the number of army brigades to six.

Other major army units included four independent cavalry regiments—three of which were horsed, some 16 artillery battalions, at least five air defense battalions, and an aviation battalion. Field support was provided by the army's five independent engineering battalions, as well as by the various logistics battalions that were assigned to the army corps.

Major equipment in service with the Argentine Army in 1985 included some 150 TAM main Argentine battle tanks that were produced in Argentina under the supervision of the armed forces' DGFM (see Military Industry and Exports, this ch.). An undetermined additional number of TAMs were believed to be on order. In 1985 the army still counted in its inventory over 100 United States-manufactured M-4 Sherman Firefly medium tanks, some of which had been in service for nearly 40 years. The TAM medium tanks were slowly replacing the old Sherman models still in use. Also included among the army's armored vehicles were some 60 French-manufactured AMX-13 light tanks and some 300 AMX-VTP mechanized infantry combat vehicles. There was also a domestically manufactured infantry combat vehicle, the VCPT (Vehículo de Combate Transporte de Personal), modeled on the TAM, of which some 150 were in service with the army. The principal armored personnel carriers in the army's inventory included over 100 tracked M-113s and some 80 of the Swiss-manufactured wheeled MOWAG Roland.

The standard light artillery weapon used by the army in 1985 was the M-56 105mm pack howitzer, which was manufactured in Argentina under license with the Italian firm of OTO Melara. During the early 1980s Argentina was also producing two additional models of howitzers, the M-77 and the M-81 155mm towed guns, which had a top carriage similar to that of the French 155mm Mk F3 self-propelled guns—also in use by the army. Also still in use in the mid-1980s were about a

dozen M-101 105mm and M-2 155mm howitzers that were manufactured in the United States during World War II.

Antiarmor and air defense weapons used by the Argentine Army included the Bantam, Cobra, Mathogo, and Mamba antitank guided weapons and the Tigercat, Blowpipe, and Roland surface-to-air missiles. Army Aviation, as the air battalion was called, was composed primarily of helicopters and small, fixed-wing transports but also included aircraft used for observation and training missions. The total inventory of the aviation command, including items being delivered, was estimated at close to 300 aircraft in late 1983. Despite defense spending cutbacks, the Argentine government was still accepting delivery in 1985 on military equipment ordered after the 1982 South Atlantic War.

The Argentine Navy

The number of professional personnel belonging to the Argentine Navy was estimated in 1983 at some 36,000 men, including some 10,000 who belonged to the Marines (Infantería de Marina) and 3,000 who belonged to Naval Aviation. By 1985 the total number of regular naval personnel had dropped to 28,000. Although the number of conscript personnel carrying out their required two years of service with the navy was some 18,000 in 1983, their number also had dropped to only 7,000 by 1985, primarily because of budget cuts. Personnel assigned to the Argentine Naval Prefecture, a coastal patrol force, were transferred to the authority of the Ministry of Defense in October 1984.

Unlike the commanding officers of the army and air force, the navy's chief of staff in mid-1985, Rear Admiral Ramón Antonio Arosa, was the same person appointed shortly after Alfonsín assumed office. The command headquarters of the Argentine Navy was located at the Libertad Building in the city of Buenos Aires. Naval forces in mid-1985 were divided among four naval zones that corresponded to the coastal and riverine territory incorporated in the first, second, and fifth military regions. The Puerto Belgrano naval base, located in southern Buenos Aires Province near Bahía Blanca, was the Argentine Navy's most important facility. In April 1985 a new naval zone, named the Puerto Belgrano Naval Zone, was created there as part of the navy's reorganization. Other major bases of the Argentine surface fleet included installations at Dársena Norte, in the province of Buenos Aires; Río Santiago, also in

Buenos Aires Province; Comodoro Rivadavia, in Chubut Province; and Ushuaia, in the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego. The navy's submarine fleet was based in Buenos Aires Province at Mar del Plata.

Most vessels in the Argentine fleet were constructed in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, Britain, or the United States. Argentina also had an advanced shipbuilding program that during the early 1980s even included plans for the possible construction of a nuclear-powered submarine (see Nuclear Development and Capabilities, this ch.). Despite budget cutbacks and the commitment of future monies for equipment contracts already signed, it was anticipated that the Argentine Navy would continue to spend considerable amounts on procurement. According to material reportedly published in late 1984 by the United States political risk analysis and market research firm Frost and Sullivan, Argentina was expected to spend some US$500 million for the acquisition of naval vessels and another US$736 million on the purchase of new tactical missiles between 1984 and 1988.

Vessels in service with the Argentine Navy in 1985 included four submarines—two Type 209s, and two Type TR-1700s—all of West German design. The newest of these were the Type TR-1700 diesel-electric models, the *Santa Cruz* and the *San Juan*, which were delivered in late 1984 and early 1985. The Type TR-1700s were said to be the most technically advanced conventional submarines in service anywhere in the mid-1980s. Four additional Type TR-1700s were scheduled to be built in Argentina under a licensing agreement with the manufacturer, Thyssen Noordseewerke. The keel of the first of these was laid down at a Buenos Aires shipyard in October 1983.

In the mid-1980s Argentina enjoyed the distinction of being one of two Latin American naval powers that had an aircraft carrier. Argentina's sole carrier, the *25 de Mayo*, had been in service with two other countries since first being launched in the mid-1940s. This was the Argentine fleet's second aircraft carrier. The first, the *Independencia*, had been acquired in 1958 and withdrawn from service in the late 1960s when the former British Colossus-class *25 de Mayo* was transferred to Argentina from the Netherlands. The carrier was maintained in excellent repair, although it was reported to have persistent engineering problems. The carrier played no major role in the conduct of Argentine naval- or sea-based air operations against the British during the South Atlantic War.

Accounts of British Ministry of Defence documents published in 1984 noted that Britain had authorized its fleet to engage the aircraft carrier as of April 30. On May 5 the carrier was withdrawn from action and returned to port (see The South Atlantic War, this ch.).

Ten destroyers were in service with the Argentine Navy in 1985. These included four German-built MEKO-360 H2 destroyers, which were launched in the early 1980s, and two British Sheffield-class guided missile destroyers commissioned in the early 1970s. Destroyers that were previously in service with the United States Navy included one Gearing-class and three Allen M. Sumner-class vessels, all of World War II vintage, that were transferred to Argentina in the early 1970s. In 1984 they were scheduled to be replaced by the MEKO-360s.

The Argentine Navy was also in the process of acquiring additional frigates during the mid-1980s. Already in the Argentine fleet were three French-built Type A-69 vessels, two of which entered into service in 1978, and the third, in 1981. The first two ships were specifically acquired in order to augment the Argentine fleet in the face of possible war with Chile over the Beagle Channel. Six MEKO Type 140 A16-class ships were ordered in mid-1979. By 1983 four of the vessels had been launched, and the remaining two were under construction in Argentine shipyards. Most of Argentina's warships were fitted for carrying either the MM-38 or the MM-39 Exocet surface-to-surface missiles. Each carried an average of four missiles; a total of 184 were estimated to have been deployed by late 1984.

Other major vessels in service with the Argentine Navy as of early 1984 included five corvettes, all formerly in service with the United States Navy and of World War II vintage; some six fast-attack craft, acquired during the 1970s; and six minesweepers previously in service with the British navy. A new tanklanding ship, which would become second in the Argentine Navy's inventory, was ordered in 1982 and, in 1984, was under construction in the Republic of Korea. Various amphibious warfare and hydrographic ships were also in service with the Argentine Navy in the mid-1980s. The three-masted *Libertad*, built in Argentina, was said to be the world's largest active sailing ship and was used as a sail training vessel. The Argentine fleet's sole icebreaker, used for support in Antarctica, was built by Finland and entered into service in late 1978. It reportedly was used as a hospital ship during the South Atlantic War.

Naval Aviation, as the fleet's air arm was called, was founded in 1921 when the first flying boats (seaplanes) and seaplane trainers were acquired by the Argentine Navy. By the mid-1980s the air arm consisted of some 3,000 personnel and counted in its inventory over 50 fixed-wing combat aircraft and at least 10 combat helicopters. Naval air operations were organized into six naval air wings during the early 1980s. The major shore bases from which these wings operated included the Punta del Indio Naval Air Base, the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base, the Almirante Irizar Naval Air Base, and the Ezeiza International Airport in Buenos Aires. Naval air operations were also carried out from facilities located at Puerto Belgrano in Buenos Aires Province; Río Gallegos in Santa Cruz Province; and Ushuaia and Río Grande, both in the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego; as well as from the aircraft carrier, the *25 de Mayo*.

During the mid-1980s the navy's air fleet was organized into three attack squadrons—two equipped with a total of about 24 McDonnell Douglas A-4Q Skyhawks and the third, with 14 French-manufactured Dassault-Breguet Super Étendards. The Étendard aircraft were configured for firing the AM-39 Exocet air-to-surface antiship missile, the weapon that struck the British naval destroyer the *Sheffield* during the South Atlantic War. It was believed that some of the Skyhawks were being fitted in the mid-1980s with the Israeli Gabriel III missiles, which were similar to the French Exocets. The Étendard squadron was hangared at the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base. Close to 30 Exocet missiles were estimated to be in Naval Aviation's inventory in early 1985.

Two squadrons equipped for carrying out maritime reconnaissance missions were based at Comandante Espora. One of the squadrons was composed of three Grumman S-2A and six S-2E Trackers that were often assigned for operations from the aircraft carrier. The second squadron was outfitted with seven to nine Lockheed L-188E Electras. A report published in mid-1985 noted that at least two of the L-188s were being modified to carry out electronic intelligence missions.

In 1983 the naval air force's two helicopter squadrons were equipped with six Sikorsky SH-3D Sea Kings and were assigned an antisubmarine warfare role, as well as eight or nine Aérospatiale Alouette IIIs and at least two of the Westland/Aérospatiale-manufactured Sea Lynx. Another six Sea Lynx helicopters were on order at that time. The helicopters' shore command was at the Comandante Espora Naval Air Base, al-

though most were permanently assigned to ships of the surface fleet. Air transports used by the navy included approximately 15 aircraft that made up the general purpose squadrons assigned to various air bases. A special Antarctic squadron, based at Almirante Irizar, was equipped with three Pilatus PC-6 Turbo-Porters and one McDonnell Douglas C-45 transport. In early 1983 the first of some 45 Embraer EMB-325GB Xavante jets were said to have been purchased from Brazil to replace the light attack and training aircraft lost during the South Atlantic War.

Shortly after World War II the Argentine marine corps was upgraded from a shore patrol and given amphibious assault responsibilities. In 1968 its official name became the Marine Infantry Corps. By 1983 its size was estimated at some 10,000 men. Most of its personnel were stationed at or near the bases and other installations controlled by the Argentine Navy.

In addition to six marine security companies deployed at naval bases throughout the nation, the marine corps personnel were organized into two brigades (sometimes referred to as forces) composed of two or more infantry battalions. There was also a separate amphibious support force that included an amphibious vehicles battalion, a signals battalion, and an antiaircraft regiment. The marine infantry battalion deployed at Río Grande was specially equipped and trained for cold weather warfare, including service in Antarctica.

Among equipment in service with the marines during the mid-1980s were some 30 armored personnel carriers, of which a dozen were the French-built Panhard ERC-90 Lynx model and another six, the Swiss MOWAG Roland. Also counted in its arsenal were several dozen 105mm howitzers, variously sized mortars and recoilless rifles, and some 20 Bantam antitank guided weapons. In addition to 20mm to 35mm antiaircraft guns, the marine corps was reported to have an unspecified number of Blowpipe and at least seven Tigercat surface-to-air missiles.

The Argentine Air Force

In 1983 the Argentine Air Force was reportedly composed of some 17,000 regular professional troops and another 10,000 conscripts completing their 12 months of obligatory military service. By 1985, although it was believed that the number of professional personnel remained largely un-

changed, the number of conscripts serving with the air force nearly dropped by half to 5,500 young men.

In March 1985 Major General Ernesto Horacio Crespo, the former commander of Air Operations, was appointed chief of staff of the air force, the second highest-ranking officer in the service. His predecessor, Lieutenant General Teodoro Waldner, was appointed by Alfonsiín as the new head of the armed forces' Joint Chiefs of Staff and was the first air force officer to hold the position. Crespo was known as a staunch nationalist and gained considerable prestige during the South Atlantic War when he coordinated air combat operations against British forces.

The commanding headquarters of the Argentine Air Force was located at the Condor Building in northeastern Buenos Aires. In 1985 the service's operations were divided among at least five commands. The most important of these was the air operations command, which was responsible for the force's regional commands and various air bases as well as all flight operations emanating from them. The four other commands included those for personnel, logistics, air force instruction, and matériel. In 1985 these commands were held by colonels and brigadier generals.

The country's principal military air facility was El Palomar Air Base in western Buenos Aires, which also served as the headquarters of the first air brigade. Some aircraft belonging to the Argentine president's air fleet were hangared at El Palomar, as were transports belonging to the government-controlled Airlines of the State. The presidential jet, the Tango 1, was kept at the civilian Jorge Newbery Metropolitan Airport.

The regional organization of the air force was divided among nine air brigades in the mid-1980s. A tenth brigade, first reported under formation in 1983, had not been established by mid-1985. Apart from El Palomar, other principal air force bases throughout the nation include facilities at Tandil and Morón in Buenos Aires Province; Paraná in Entre Ríos; Reconquista in Santa Fe Province; Mendoza in Mendoza Province; Villa Reynolds in San Luis; and Comodoro Rivadavia in Chubut. The headquarters of the Argentine Air Force's first Antarctic squadron and the possible site of the tenth brigade was at Río Gallegos in Santa Cruz.

The Argentine Air Forces's four ground-attack/interceptor squadrons evidenced the service's preference for the French-manufactured Mirage fighter. Two of the squadrons were assigned a total of 15 Mirage III-EAs and 22 Mirage III-

CJs that were acquired from Dassault-Breguet in 1983. The remaining two squadrons were equipped with nine Mirage 5-Ps, received in 1982, and some 32 of the Israeli Aircraft Industries' Dagger, a model similar in design to the Mirage 5-P. At least six of the Daggers were purchased in 1983. By early 1984 these 78 aircraft were being equipped with aerial refueling probes, reportedly with assistance provided by Isreal. The Daggers were also being modified with what was called the Integrated Navigation and Firing System; the designer of the system was not identified.

The air force's three ground attack squadrons were reported in early 1984 to be equipped with 54 A-4P Skyhawks manufactured in the United States. Some of the Skyhawks—perhaps as many as 24—were previously in service with the Israeli air force. In early 1984 Israel sought United States permission to transfer Skyhawks then in its inventory to Argentina. A number of the jets were also reported to have been transferred "amid great secrecy" to Argentina in mid-December 1983, shortly after the United States embargo on military sales to that country was lifted. Reports were vague as to how many of these aircraft were destined for use by the air force; some were believed to be assigned to the navy.

Other major aircraft in the air force inventory included a total of eight British-manufactured Canberra B-62s and T-64s, acquired during the early 1970s, which made up the force's single bomber squadron. At least 30 IA-58 Pucarás manufactured by Argentina's state-controlled Military Aircraft Factory (Fábrica Militar de Aviones) comprised two counterinsurgency squadrons. In the mid-1970s these aircraft were employed against antigovernment guerrillas fighting in the northwestern provinces (see The War Against Subversion, this ch.). As of late 1983 an additional 100 of the twin-turboprop aircraft had been ordered by the government. By mid-1984 most of that order was believed to have been filled. A number of Morane-Saulnier MS-760 Paris IIIs, first delivered in the late 1950s and used for counterinsurgency missions and training in the mid-1980s, were being replaced by Argentina's new IA-63 Pampa jet trainer. In mid-1984 the air force had over 60 of the new models on order; deliveries were expected to begin in 1986.

The air force's single squadron of attack helicopters, which was used for counterinsurgency, was based at Morón (in Buenos Aires Province). The squadron was composed of at least 12 Hughes 500M Defenders and six Bell UH-1H armed helicopters. Most of the air force's armed helicopters were

acquired in the late 1960s and early 1970s when political violence was on the increase. A helicopter squadron used for search-and-rescue missions in mountainous regions was made up of five Aérospatiale SA-315B Lamas.

Transports, composing five squadrons, included about 12 Boeing 707s and Lockheed C-130s. Three Lockheed L-100 Hercules were added in 1983. Also included in the transport fleet were at least 12 IA-50 Guaraní IIs manufactured in Argentina in the late 1960s. Some Guaranís reportedly were also used on photoreconnaissance missions. The Gates Learjet was also used for aerial reconnaissance.

Missiles in the air force inventory included R-530 air-to-air missiles as well as AS-11, AS-12, and Kingfisher air-to-surface missiles. Some of the Mirage 5P fighters were believed to be fitted for Exocets, even though no missiles were officially reported in the service's inventory. Following the South Atlantic War, the air force also acquired a number of French-manufactured Durandal antirunway/antishelter bombs.

Paramilitary Forces

After the Alfonsín administration assumed office in 1983, plans were implemented to place the nation's two paramilitary forces, the National Gendarmerie and the Argentine Naval Prefecture, under the immediate command and authority of the Ministry of Defense. The Argentine Army commanded the gendarmerie until July 1984. The navy's authority over the prefecture remained in effect until October 1984. The combined size of the forces in the early 1980s was estimated at over 20,000.

In 1983 the size of the gendarmerie was estimated at 11,000 to 12,000. The principal mission of the force was that of a border guard, responsible for protecting and patrolling Argentina's territorial frontiers with Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. The personnel of the gendarmerie were all volunteers and were organized into *agrupaciones*, described as a level of command between a battalion and a regiment. These formations were in turn subdivided into squadrons, groups, and sections. The three regional commands of the force were headquartered at Rosario, Córdoba, and Bahía Blanca.

In the early 1980s a special unit of the gendarmerie—based at the Campo de Mayo army barracks—was prepared for deployment to the Middle East as part of the UN peacekeeping

force in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula. Although the military government decided not to participate in the force, there was speculation in early 1982 that the unit might be sent instead to flight in Central America. Before the South Atlantic War intervened, at least 20 to 30 Argentine Army advisers were training regular personnel from the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran armed forces and were providing logistical and economic support to the members of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the major counter-revolutionary army fighting against the Nicaraguan government.

The major pieces of equipment belonging to the gendarmerie were armored cars and armored personnel carriers, including the M-113s and Rolands, models that were also used by army personnel. The small air wing operated by the gendarmerie was composed of an estimated 20 light aircraft and several helicopters.

The 9,000-strong Argentine Naval Prefecture served as a coastal guard and patrol force. Its mission included interdicting contraband, protecting maritime resources within Argentina's 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and carrying out search-and-rescue missions at sea. The prefecture was also charged with the regulation of the national ports and with the maintenance of navigational aids.

The prefecture's newest equipment included five Spanish-built Halcón-class corvettes that were acquired in the early 1980s, armed with 40mm guns, and used for ocean patrols. The other four large, oceangoing patrol craft were aging vessels that were previously in service with the Argentine Navy. The principal patrol craft used by the prefecture were 17 German-built Z-28-class boats. Some were armed with 20mm guns and were used in the South Atlantic War, during which three were lost. In addition to a tug and a sail training craft, there were also several 95-foot vessels used as coast guard cutters and over a dozen more small patrol craft. The prefecture also operated a small air fleet composed of five fixed-wing transports and nine helicopters.

Conscription and the Reserves

Before the administration of Alfonsín, the law regulating the national system of obligatory military service had been changed little since its creation in 1901. According to the Ricchieri Law—named for Minister of War Pablo Ricchieri, the official responsible for its creation and promulgation—all

male citizens aged 20 to 45 were required to perform military service. An amendment to the organic statute several years later established a lottery system for selection and the terms of service as one year for those who chose to enter the army and two years for those entering the navy. Under the 1912 Sáenz Peña Law, all male citizens were required to register for service at the age of 18. The same registration list was used for the voter registration roles. After 1945 air force conscripts were obligated to carry out one year of service. Youth were also eligible to perform their service in the National Gendarmerie, the Argentine Naval Prefecture, or the Federal Police.

Most young men, by age 22, had completed their service, after which they became members of the first line of military reserves until age 29. The National Guards was the second line of reserves and consisted of men aged 30 to 39. The Territorial Guard, made up of men aged 40 to 45, composed the third and final group of reserve forces. In the early 1980s the National Guard was composed of some 200,000 men and the Territorial Guard, 50,000. No estimates of size were available with respect to the first line of reserves.

In his 1983 inaugural address, Alfonsín made clear his intention to reorganize the conscription system and stated that the elimination of compulsory military service during peacetime was his administration's long-term goal. The principal motivation behind the president's policy was said to be economic. The maintenance and administration of the conscription system was known as one of the largest expenses in the military budget. The conscription system had also come under political attack because of allegations of the poor performance of most conscripts in the South Atlantic War.

In June 1984 the government announced that it would cut the total number of conscripts—which then numbered over 100,000—by 12 percent and that it would furlough another 40 percent before the regular training cycle ended. By mid-1985 the number of conscripts had been cut by more than 50 percent, to an estimated 45,000 to 50,000. The army, which had traditionally absorbed the largest numbers of conscripts, was the service most affected by the reductions, and the air force, the least. By mid-1985 the three service commands continued to support Alfonsín's policy to reduce the number of conscripted personnel, yet other active-duty officers privately voiced their concerns regarding the severity of the cuts.

The Military Education System

The military education system, like other programs of the Argentine armed forces, was undergoing considerable change in the years immediately following the 1983 restoration of civilian government. The education system that had been built during 18 years of nearly continous military government had tended to reflect the values of the ruling elite. In 1985 the Alfonsín government was attempting to change the basic concepts of national security taught at the nation's military schools, including the belief system upon which the National Security Doctrine had been based (see The National Security Doctrine, this ch.).

The basic schools of the armed forces' education system were the three service academies. The army's Military College was located near El Palomar Air Base in Buenos Aires and was the oldest of the three, having opened its doors in 1869 (see Early Professionalization Efforts, this ch.). The Naval Military School was founded in 1872 at Río Santiago in Buenos Aires Province. The air force's academy, the School of Military Aviation, was created in 1925 and was located near the city of Córdoba.

Admission to the service academies was open to Argentine male citizens who could pass the competitive entrance examinations. Most youth accepted at the Military College were aged 16 to 21. A study conducted in the mid-1960s found that a majority of the cadets came from urban, middle-class families and had fathers who were members of the armed forces. Most had attended public—as opposed to military-operated—secondary schools and were from Greater Buenos Aires. The Military College offered a basic four-year program as well as a special one-year preparatory course. Graduation from the academy was required to become a regular line officer. Cadets graduated with the rank of second lieutenant and were usually given troop assignments outside Buenos Aires.

At a level just below that of the service academies were various military-operated secondary schools, often also referred to confusingly as military academies. These schools were operated by all three branches of the armed forces and were located throughout the country. In mid-1984 the army operated at least six schools; the navy, four; and the air force, one. Earlier reports that the schools were to be closed appeared to be unfounded when in late 1984 the Ministry of Defense proposed the institutions' jurisdictional transfer to the Ministry of Education and Justice and noted that the recom-

mendation was being studied by the armed forces' general staffs. It was unclear whether any action had been taken on the matter by mid-1985.

The second tier in the professional military education system, after the service academies, consisted of the Superior War College, the Superior Technical School, the Air Force Command and Staff School, and the Naval War College. The oldest of the general staff schools was the Superior War College, located in Buenos Aires, which was founded in the early 1900s and first staffed almost entirely by retired German military officers (see German Military Influence, this ch.). It was also the most important of the institutions with respect to its graduates, who assumed the highest commands of the nation's armed forces.

The Superior War College generally was noted as the army's general staff school. Those attending its advanced training classes usually were army captains and first lieutenants. One source noted, however, that the members of all three services were eligible to attend. Admission was gained through the recommendation of one's commanding officer and by scoring among the highest on the competitive entrance examination. The basic program lasted two years. Of those completing their third year of studies, only a select few were given the title of general staff officer.

The Superior Technical School was created in 1930 to provide advanced technical training for military engineers. The growth of the school corresponded with the increasing emphasis placed by the Argentine government on the development of a domestic military industry. The first director of the school, General Manuel N. Savio, also became the first director of the armed forces' DGFM during the early 1940s (see Military Industry and Exports, this ch.). Those completing the school's basic four-year program were recognized as military engineers. Most of its students were army first lieutenants who had a minimum of five years' military service.

Officers' Insignia of Rank and Benefits

Commissioned officers in the Argentine Army were divided among three categories. Those in the first category were known as subaltern officers and consisted of the ranks of second lieutenant (the lowest commissioned rank) through captain. Those in the second category were designated chiefs and included the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel (see fig. 8).

ARMY	Subteniente	Teniente	Teniente Primero	Capitán	Mayor	Teniente Coronel	Coronel	General de Brigada	General de División	Teniente General
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant		Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General
NAVY	Guardiamarina	Teniente de Corbeta	Teniente de Fragata	Teniente de Navío	Capitán de Corbeta	Capitán de Fragata	Capitán de Navío	Contralmirante	Vicealmirante	Almirante
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Ensign	Lieutenant Junior Grade		Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain	Commodore	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral
AIR FORCE	Alférez	Teniente	Teniente Primero	Capitán	Mayor	Vice Comodoro	Comodoro	Brigadier	Brigadier Mayor	Brigadier General
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant		Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General

Figure 8. Officers' Insignia of Rank, 1985

The highest-ranking army officers, from the rank of colonel through lieutenant general, composed the third category and were known as superior officers. Recommendations for promotions to and within the third category were submitted through the Ministry of Defense to the president who, in turn, presented them to the Senate for approval. In 1985 Senate approval was not automatic; several promotions were denied by the Senate in mid-1985 to senior officers whose records were tied directly to the repressive activities carried out during the late 1970s.

Little information was available regarding pay and other benefits available to armed forces personnel. Data regarding the salaries of army personnel in December 1984 indicated that an army sergeant—a noncommisioned officer—earned some 42,288 pesos per month; an army captain, 74,220 pesos per month; and a general, 188,000 pesos (for value of the peso—see Glossary). It was not specified whether the rank was that of brigadier, major, or lieutenant general. The percentage of salary increases granted tended to be inversely related to one's rank. An August 1984 pay raise gave sergeants an increase of close to 19 percent, and a major general, only 1.5 percent. It was unlikely that, even considering other benefits provided to the armed forces, a military officer could maintain his standard of living in the face of the high rate of inflation which, in early 1985, was running at more than 1,000 percent annually. In 1985 some maintained that officers ranking as high as lieutenant colonels were unable to get by on their salaries.

Medical benefits, special moving allowances, and housing assistance were also provided to military personnel. Housing assistance was noted as an especially appealing benefit of military service during the 1960s, given the shortage of vacant units and the scarcity of funds for the construction of new homes that had persisted for decades. When military personnel were stationed abroad, a differential pay allowance was also granted. In addition, special pay was given for hazardous duty. Time in grade required for promotion or retirement could be reduced through military service during a declared war or state of siege.

Full pension benefits were given to those who had completed a minimum of 20 years of service and who voluntarily sought retirement. Officers with a minimum of 10 years of service who retired because they failed to make promotions were also granted benefits. Those who were cashiered, regard-

less of their rank or length of service, were not eligible for retirement benefits. Their dependents, however, were entitled to apply for pension benefits. No minimum term of service was required for benefits granted to officers who sought retirement for reasons of disability. Between the 1940s and the mid-1980s, retired military officers were able to augment their benefits by employment in military industries and had played a key role in the development of those enterprises. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the highest body within the military's separate judicial system, was composed exclusively of retired officers from each of the three branches of service (see The South Atlantic War; The War Against Subversion, this ch.). Former military officials, who no longer risked dismissal, were also known for their participation in Argentine political affairs (see The Military as a Political Force, ch. 4).

Military Industry and Exports

During the mid-1980s the Alfonsín administration placed all military industry under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. The General Directorate of Military Manufactures (Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares—DGFM) was the government entity responsible for administering Argentina's substantial military-industrial complex. The directorate was created in October 1941, but the push for its creation came during the administration of President Roberto M. Ortiz in the late 1930s. The directorate expanded rapidly during the early 1940s in an effort to meet the country's military needs during World War II, when Argentina not only was cut off from its traditional suppliers in Europe but also was prohibited from receiving United States-manufactured military goods (see The Modern Armed Forces, this ch.).

During the early 1980s the DGFM was the largest firm in Argentina and one of the largest in Latin America. Its annual turnover was said to be valued at some US$2.2 billion. The huge annual financial losses it reportedly suffered, however, were not officially disclosed for reasons of national security. By 1983 the financial holdings of the DGFM included some 13 industries, which employed between 14,000 and 15,000 workers, and shares of at least 22 Argentine companies.

In April 1985 the Ministry of Defense submitted a draft bill to the executive branch proposing the creation of the General Savio State Corporation to replace the DGFM, whose

founding decree was to be repealed. All companies then under the DGFM's control, which then numbered 27, were to be administered by the new military-industrial complex. Shares held by the DGFM in 44 firms were also to be transferred to the new corporation. All military weapons and equipment purchases, as well as military exports, were to be centralized under the Ministry of Defense, which would act in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to the draft text, holdings in such areas as mining, forestry, petrochemicals, steel, and construction—initially targeted by the Alfonsín administration for return to civilian management—were to be absorbed by the new corporation. Although the Alfonsín administration cited budgetary reasons as being behind its reorganization efforts, most analysts believed that a less publicized aspect of the policy was the government's desire to restrict the military's influence in the national economy.

At least one component of the draft bill appeared to have been adopted when the executive decreed the creation of the Policy Coordinating Committee for Military Matériel Exports in June 1985. The specific charge of the committee, created under the Ministry of Defense and administered by the secretary of defense for defense production, was the mandatory review of all requests for export authorization involving "weapons or war material." In the mid-1980s Argentina stood second only to Brazil among Latin American nations exporting military goods. Many of these items were produced under foreign licensing agreements. Such foreign agreements, especially those signed with West Germany and Israel, had provided Argentina with sophisticated electronics and avionics technology that enabled it to produce advanced weapons systems. The foreign supplier's approval was often required, however, before systems built with foreign technology could be exported.

In the mid-1980s the TAM main battle tank and the IA-58 Pucará twin turboprop were Argentina's two principal military exports. The IA-63 Pampa counterinsurgency/jet trainer was expected to be added to the list soon. Foreign sales were made mostly to Third World countries. There was some speculation that agreements with Peru and Mexico were to have been signed for the coproduction of the TAM. One program supported by the DGFM included the development of an attack/interceptor aircraft that was expected to be available for export sometime in the 1990s. The program for the development of a nuclear-powered submarine had been shelved in early

1984 for financial reasons, but as of May 1985 it had not been discarded. The Alfonsín administration continued to emphasize the development of export-oriented military industries, however.

By the mid-1980s Argentina had built a substantial research and development base. Various military organizations involved in the development of Argentine technology for military application during the early 1980s were the Armed Forces' Council for Research and Experimentation, the Armed Forces' Institute for Scientific and Technical Research, and the Institute of Aeronautical and Space Research. The latter organization was primarily responsible for Argentine space research as well as the development of electronics and rockets.

Nuclear Development and Capabilities

By the mid-1980s Argentina had one of the most advanced nuclear development programs in Latin America and was believed to have within its grasp the technology that would enable it to build and detonate Latin America's first nuclear device. The first Argentine nuclear programs were established in the 1950s when the National Atomic Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica—CNEA) was set up under the control of the Argentine Navy. In 1983 control over the CNEA was removed from the navy and, for the first time since its creation, was placed under a civilian president, Alberto Costantini. Its former president, Rear Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, a physicist, was subsequently appointed as coordinator of UN-sponsored nuclear programs in Latin America. In late June 1985 Alfonsín affirmed his continuing support for Argentine nuclear development but noted the importance of maintaining national technological capabilities within the constraints of economic conditions.

The first atomic research laboratory was set up in 1949 by the Perón government in San Carlos de Bariloche in northern Patagonia under the direction of Ronald Richter, a former member of Nazi Germany's fusion project team. Richter was one of several German scientists who fled to Argentina and participated in the country's early nuclear development program during the postwar years. In 1950 the CNEA was created and, among its duties, was assigned a mission of national defense. The initial announcement in 1951 that Argentina had controlled a fusion reaction created international consterna-

tion but eventually was proved to be a hoax. Richter finally was dismissed in 1952, and the CNEA, which had not previously functioned as a serious organization, assumed a new role in national nuclear development.

Between the 1950s and 1985 the nuclear program continued with surprisingly little political interference. In fact, the development of Argentina's nuclear capabilities seemed to be a singular area in which all domestic political factions agreed. Competition with Brazilian nuclear development and the maintenance of Argentine pride and prestige served as motivating factors in the national coalescence. Argentine accomplishments in the nuclear field were a series of "firsts" for Latin America, including the construction of the first research reactor in 1957 and the first commercial power reactor, Atucha-I, which came on-line in early 1974. Two achievements that were unique to Latin America and unusual even in a global context were the design and construction of the first zircalloy fuel element fabrication plant and, perhaps more significant in terms of nuclear proliferation, the construction of the first reprocessing and uranium enrichment plants. The possession of domestically developed reprocessing and enrichment facilities, together with Argentina's own considerable reserves of uranium ore, enabled the country to control independently the nuclear fuel cycle (see Energy, ch. 3).

In the mid-1980s the Ezeiza reprocessing plant was under construction near Buenos Aires. Test runs at the industrial-scale plant were expected to begin in 1985. At full operational capacity the plant was expected to reprocess some 30 tons of spent reactor fuel a year and to have an annual output of roughly 300 kilograms of plutonium. There was some discrepancy among analysts about the capacity of the plant, however. Some reports maintained that the plant would only be able to produce some 10 kilograms of plutonium annually, enough for two nuclear bombs per year. Although the plant would not be subject to international controls, technology reportedly had been provided by Italy, West Germany, and the United States.

Argentina's plans to build an enrichment facility at Pilcaniyeu, Río Negro Province, in the Patagonian desert of southwestern Argentina, were publicly announced with much fanfare in November 1983. (The Patagonian desert was also the location of a site selected for nuclear waste storage.) When Argentina made its announcement in late 1983, it was the ninth country in the world to have mastered the technology of "enriching" the radioactive content of mined uranium ore so

that it could be used in some models of nuclear reactors. The termination of a 20-year-old enriched uranium supply agreement by the United States in the late 1970s was believed to have spurred Argentina's efforts to become self-sufficient in the enriched uranium required for its heavy-water reactors. In the early 1980s the United States government again relaxed its policy regarding the shipment of enriched uranium to Argentina.

The Pilcaniyeu plant was expected to be capable of producing weapons-grade uranium after the enrichment technology was further refined. In November 1983, when the plant's construction plans were first announced, the CNEA said that the content of the critical U-235 isotope in the enriched uranium produced by a model plant was only 20 percent, well below the 90-percent level required for weapons-grade uranium. The ability to "bridge the gap" between the two enrichment levels, however, was said to be a relatively inexpensive accomplishment that did not require great additional advances in technology.

In mid-1984 the Pilcaniyeu facility, which used the relatively obsolete and costly gas diffusion process, was described as a "medium-scale" production plant that was expected to be functioning by late 1985. By early 1985 the operational date was set back to late 1986. Funds for the completion of the Pilcaniyeu plant in the US$420 million CNEA budget for 1985 were not restricted, as were those for other projects then under construction, including a heavy-water plant at Arroyito, in Neuquén, and Atucha II, a heavy-water reactor being built near Buenos Aires.

Through the mid-1980s the Alfonsín government consistently stated its intent to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and its support for peaceful nuclear explosions (see Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations, this ch.). Some of those who tracked Argentine nuclear policy, however, expressed skepticism over whether the Alfonsín administration was truly committed to building and exploding a nuclear device. Argentine nuclear facilities that used domestically developed technology were not subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards. Its assistance in the nuclear development programs of other countries, however, was usually subject to international safeguards. Included among the countries with which Argentina cooperated or provided assistance in nuclear development programs were Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil,

Chile, China, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, India, Israel, Libya, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

In mid-1985 some press accounts cited projections that Argentina would be able to build and detonate a nuclear device within five years. Similar projections made in previous years, however, had set the date for the detonation of an Argentine nuclear bomb in the mid-1980s.

The South Atlantic War

The loss of prestige suffered by the Argentine armed forces after their defeat by Britain in the South Atlantic War was often cited as a primary reason for the restoration of civilian government in 1983. The 1982 war arose from the longstanding dispute over conflicting claims to a chain of islands lying some 600 kilometers off the southern Argentine coastline. Argentina laid claim to all the islands in the archipelago, which were administered as part of the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, under the name Islas Malvinas. Britain claimed the same territory under the name Falkland Islands (see The South Atlantic War and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

The level of tensions between Argentina and Britain varied considerably during the 150 years following the 1833 British occupation and expulsion of Argentine forces from the islands. Shortly after World War II an Argentine task force of two cruisers and six destroyers on maneuvers in the area left after British warships were dispatched. In 1965 the UN acceded to the Argentine request to set up a framework for negotiations over the sovereignty issue. By 1978, however, tensions again began to escalate after an Argentine destroyer fired warning shots at a British survey vessel searching for oil and natural gas reserves within the territorial waters claimed by Argentina. The South Atlantic War erupted on April 2, 1982, as a result of Operation Rosario, in which the Argentine joint task force seized the town of Port Stanley, the residence of the islands' British governor, and the following day moved into Darwin and Goose Green. Although several Argentine soldiers were killed during these initial occupations, there were no casualties among the island residents or the British authorities. In retrospect, Operation Rosario was recognized as the culmination of a series of Argentine warnings of the government's intent that had begun in early January.

The military phase of the war lasted from May 1 to June

14. Upon the Argentine invasion, Britain ordered the mobilization of a naval task force to traverse the 13,000 kilometers of ocean between it and the islands. On April 30 the task force reached its destination, and a 200-nautical-mile total exclusion zone was imposed around the islands. Under the British rules of engagement, any Argentine vessels found within the zone would be attacked. Throughout the war Britain relied on Chile (with which Argentina was involved in a dispute over the Beagle Channel) and the United States for the provision of logistical support and intelligence data. Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and the Soviet Union were believed to have provided some similar services to the Argentine military government.

The sinking of the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano* remained one of the more controversial British operations during the war. The cruiser was hit by two torpedoes and was sunk while some 60 kilometers outside the exclusion zone on May 2, after heading away from the British task force for the previous 11 hours. The attacking vessel was the *Conqueror*, a nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine of the Valiant class. The captain of the *Belgrano* maintained that the submarine must have employed its Tigerfish long-range guided torpedoes in the assault, because the cruiser went down quickly. The British, however, said that conventional torpedoes were used. Despite rescue operations by the Argentine Navy, 368 Argentine lives were lost out of a crew of 1,000.

Five days later Britain announced that any ship outside Argentina's 12-nautical-mile territorial limit would be attacked. The loss of the *Belgrano* and the expanded rules of engagement prompted the nearly complete withdrawal of the Argentine fleet, including the aircraft carrier *25 de Mayo*, which subsequently stayed close to port. The war was thereafter conducted almost exclusively from the air by the Argentine Air Force and Argentine Naval Aviation until a beachhead was established by the British at Port San Carlos on May 21.

The highlight of the Argentine air battle came early in the war, when on May 4 Britain's most advanced destroyer, the *Sheffield*, was damaged and abandoned after being hit by an Exocet missile fired from an Argentine Super Étendard attack aircraft. On May 25 another Exocet fired by a Super Étendard sank the container ship *Atlantic Conveyor*. In total, Argentina's air forces claimed 11 hits on British ships in the 272 missions flown. The British task force's inadequate early warning systems reportedly enabled low-flying Argentine aircraft to approach their targets and strike with little advance warning. The

Argentine forces were also plagued by the failure of many missiles to detonate.

Argentine ground forces were the most severely criticized for their performance during the war. The complement of ground personnel was composed of close to 11,000 men. The 1,000 marines among them were said to have performed best. The land war was characterized by British successes in the crucial May 21 landing at Port San Carlos, the Battle of Goose Green and Darwin a week later, and the final Battle of Port Stanley, which began June 11.

As early as two weeks before the end of the conflict, the British had indications that Argentina was preparing to accept defeat. A transmission to the mainland from the Argentine naval commander on the islands that was intercepted by the British noted not only Britain's control of the sea but also the inability of the Argentine Air Force to continue to sustain its heavy losses. According to a report written by Paul Rogers of Britain's University of Bradford, the Argentine air forces lost some 60 out of the 130 jet fighters in their inventory at the time of the war.

The British objective, the recovery of Port Stanley from the Argentines, was achieved with the surrender of the Argentine garrison on June 14. The total number of Argentine soldiers killed in the war was estimated at between 800 and 1,000; Britain lost some 250 personnel. Three civilians, residents of the islands, were killed during British bombardment in the latter days of the conflict. The defeated Argentine forces left behind an estimated 19,000 small plastic antipersonnel mines that had been distributed among some 115 mine fields and remained almost impossible to detect. Most were located around the beaches of Port Stanley and were still there three years after the end of the conflict, primarily because the Argentine troops had failed to properly map their mine fields.

The war was distinctive in that it represented not only a conventional conflict between a developing and "developed" nation but, according to some analysts, provided a "textbook example" of a limited, or "old-fashioned," war. Experience was gained in terms of defense planning and mobilization, and new military equipment and technology—never proven in combat—was put to the test. An assessment of the war published in late 1982 by British strategic analyst Lawrence Freedman noted that the sea battles of the South Atlantic War were the first major sea battles fought since 1945.

In mid-1985 a formal state of hostilities, first announced in

1982, continued to exist between the two countries because Argentina refused to issue a formal declaration of the end of hostilities. Diplomatic talks—renewed and broken off less than a day later in July 1984—remained stalemated as Britain refused to negotiate its claim to sovereignty. In asserting its right to the islands, Britain also maintained its 200-nautical-mile exclusion zone around the territory.

The performance of the Argentine armed forces during the South Atlantic War led to numerous internal reviews by the military as a whole, as well as the individual services, which sought to assign blame for its defeat. The report submitted in September 1983 by the Rattenbach Commission—more formally known as the Inter-Force Commission—following its lengthy investigation was the most comprehensive and well known of the reviews prepared. The commission, installed in December 1982, was composed of six retired senior military officers, two from each of the three services. The best known among them was General Benjamin Rattenbach, a principal architect of the armed forces' reorganization during the 1960s (see The National Security Doctrine, this ch.).

The official duty assigned to the commission was the "analysis and evaluation of the political and strategic-military responsibilities deriving from the South Atlantic conflict." The final report and recommendations of the commission were submitted to the military junta on September 30, 1983. A few weeks later—in light of the commission's findings—the junta publicly announced its decision to prosecute most of the war's former military leaders "due to their performance in the war." General Leopoldo Galtieri of the army, Vice Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya of the navy, and Lieutenant General Basilio Lami Dozo of the air force—the members of the military junta during the South Atlantic War—were prosecuted along with 11 other high-ranking officers. All were subject to trials by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the military's highest judicial body.

Less than a week later, the full text of the report submitted to the junta—still classified a "political and military secret" under the Argentine Penal Code—was leaked and published by the Argentine newsmagazine *Siete Días*. Among other criticisms made in the report, the armed forces' leadership was charged with "failure to fully assess all factors" that might have affected the battle for the islands; "hasty, incomplete, and defective planning" that led to a commitment of "ill-prepared and ill-equipped" military forces; failure to adopt "necessary pre-

cautionary diplomatic actions" that might have helped attain the political objective sought; inappropriate timing in "conducting diplomatic and military actions"; and "failure to take advantage of appropriate opportunities to secure an honorable and acceptable resolution of the conflict."

In August 1985 formal charges were presented to the Supreme Council by the military's prosecutor. Sentences of 12 years' imprisonment and dismissal from service were recommended for Galtieri and Anaya; an eight-year prison term was recommended for Lami Dozo and shorter terms for the others charged. The sentencing decision was expected to be delivered by the Supreme Council in October or November 1985.

The War Against Subversion

The decade of the 1970s, when the war against subversion was carried out by the Argentine armed forces, stood out as the darkest and most tragic period in modern Argentine history. The terror inflicted on the country's population by the dictator Rosas a century and a half earlier paled in comparison with the actions taken in the name of national security by military and police forces in the "dirty war," during which as many as 30,000 people—almost all of them Argentine citizens—were killed.

The war's origins could be traced to the first clashes between guerrilla groups and the armed forces and police during the early 1960s. By the middle of the decade the military leadership identified the university movement as being tied to subversion and initiated a policy of repression against those institutions. The level of political violence continued to increase through the decade and peaked with the 1969 popular uprising in the industrial city of Córdoba in which students joined striking workers in the streets. During the Cordobazo, as the demonstration became known, armored columns backed by air support were brought in to reimpose order on the city. Scores of students and workers were reported killed, and many more were injured. Other uprisings followed throughout the country (see The National Reorganization Process, 1976-83, ch. 1).

By the early 1970s the armed forces had adopted the use of counterinsurgency methods against what it perceived as its "internal enemies." Various guerrilla organizations, whose ideologies were as diverse as the country's more legitimate politi-

cal parties, had begun to operate in Argentina, among them the Montoneros—tied to the Peronist left until 1974—and the Trotskyist People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP). The guerrillas' kidnappings and murders of military officials, businessmen, and trade union leaders resulted in a right-wing reaction and the organization of groups, including the Iron Guard (Guardia de Hierro) and the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Alianza Argentina Anticomunista—AAA, or Triple A), to take vengeance on the left. The guerrillas obtained most of their funds from bank robberies and kidnappings. The right-wing organizations received most of theirs—with the government's blessing—from the armed forces and police as well as from sympathetic labor unions. Many of the country's security forces were also members of the right-wing organizations. In the early 1970s various organizations from across the ideological spectrum formed armed groups and battled in the streets. Violence and terror escalated to such an extent that the 1976 military coup was reportedly welcomed by many Argentines as a means to restore social order.

The most intensive phase of the war against subversion was carried out between 1976 and 1979. In 1977 the junta reported that the ERP had been eradicated. The following year the Montoneros, with its leadership in exile, had also been defeated. The principal targets and victims—apart from the decimated guerrilla forces—of the government's campaign to wipe out subversion were categorized broadly as union members, students, civilian politicians, members of all professional groups (including lawyers, psychiatrists, artists, scientists, and clergy), and the relatives and associates of the initial victims. Extralegal jailings, torture, and execution became the modus operandi of the security forces' decentralized terror network, which was assisted by the activities of paramilitary groups such as the AAA. The expression that someone "was disappeared" became the euphemism for those believed murdered by the security forces whose bodies were never recovered. Even the public discussion of "disappearances" made one a target of official retaliation. The military government's repressive apparatus remained in place until the 1983 election of Alfonsín. In April 1983 the *Final Document of the Military Junta on the War Against Subversion and Terrorism* was published by the government of Reynaldo B. Bignone, a retired army general who was president under the final military junta. The report stated that all who had disappeared during the previous years

were to be considered dead "for judicial and administrative purposes."

Before his election Alfonsín had been one of the few lawyers daring enough to challenge in court the government's policy of repression. After becoming president, his concerns for attaining justice for the war's victims continued. In December 1983 Alfonsín appointed the members of the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas—CONADEP), chaired by the distinguished Argentine intellectual Ernesto Sábato, whose job it was to document as much as possible the government's activities in the dirty war. In September 1984 some 50,000 pages of evidence were turned over to the executive in the commission's report. A summary of the commission's findings made public at that time accused the previous military government of having produced the "greatest tragedy" in Argentine history. The CONADEP report documented the "disappearance" of 8,961 individuals and stressed the members' conviction that there were many more victims than those it was able to document. Some 340 clandestine prisons operated by the military and police were also identified in the report, as were some 1,300 military and police personnel who were directly tied to the violence and whose names were not made public.

A number of other steps were taken during the first months of the new civilian government that also related to the role of the military government and the nation's security forces in the war against subversion. Executive orders were issued in December 1983 for the court martial of the nine military junta leaders who held power between March 1976 and June 1982, as well as for that of army general and former Buenos Aires Province police chief Ramón J. Camps. The Law of National Pacification—the military government's amnesty for political crimes, by which the military absolved itself of punishment for actions taken during the war—also was repealed at that time. In addition, the government ordered the prosecution of former guerrilla leaders and obtained the extradition from Brazil of Mario Eduardo Firmenich, the leader of the Montoneros during the 1970s. Torture, as well as the unreported knowledge of an act of torture during which its victim died, were made crimes automatically punishable by 25 years imprisonment, the maximum penalty allowed by federal law.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was established as the original forum in which the former military leaders

would be tried by their peers. In September 1984, however, after eight months of proceedings, the council issued a report saying that the officers could only be held "indirectly responsible" for their subordinates' actions and that there was "nothing objectionable" with respect to the decrees and orders given by the military leaders. Based on amendments made to the Military Code of Justice earlier in the year, the Supreme Council's effective refusal to reach a verdict in the proceedings allowed for jurisdiction over the cases to be transferred to a civilian court.

The public trial of the officers opened in April 1985 before the six-member Federal Court of Appeals in Buenos Aires amid much popular clamor and speculation regarding the possibility of a military coup. Some compared the proceedings with the Nuremberg Trials following World War II. Others noted the distinction that, unlike the Nuremberg proceedings, the Argentines were obliged to judge crimes committed by their own government against its citizens. Six of the nine junta members were charged with homicide, illegal detention, torture, robbery, and the use of false identification to conduct illegal searches. The seventh was charged with all five crimes but homicide, and the remaining two, only with illegal detention and the use of false documents. Camps, the former police chief, reportedly remained under "rigorous preventive detention" at the army's Campo de Mayo Garrison on the orders of the Supreme Council in mid-1985.

After some 17 weeks of public hearings, the final testimony was presented in mid-August, and the court adjourned for a three-week recess. Between April and August, federal prosecutor Julio Strassera called some 1,000 witnesses, about half the number of individuals originally scheduled to testify. No more than 30 witnesses were called on by the defense. Although the nine accused officers had been absent during this first portion of the proceedings, they were required to be present in the courtroom when the closing arguments were made in September. The verdict—which could not be appealed—was expected in late 1985.

When public testimony was concluded in August, some political observers anticipated that a guilty verdict would be handed down against at least the six members of the first two military juntas. Speculation also existed that if a guilty verdict were reached, the Alfonsín administration might pardon the guilty officers and grant an amnesty to the junior officers who were implicated in testimony presented at the trial and who

were said only to have been following the orders of their superiors. Throughout the proceedings the Alfonsín administration remained under considerable pressure from the armed forces to deal leniently with the accused officers.

The Ministry of Interior and Internal Security

In 1985 the Ministry of Interior was the principal governmental body charged with the maintenance of domestic peace. Its minister, Antonio Tróccoli, was a former congressman and a longtime member of the Radical Civic Union, the political party of Alfonsín. In keeping with the Alfonsín government's concern regarding the abuses committed by the previous military government, the post of undersecretary for human rights was created within the ministry after the submission in 1984 of the CONADEP report and the dissolution of the commission that prepared it. The ministry was also charged with handling relations between the federal government and the provinces.

Sporadic incidents of political violence—including kidnappings and bombings—continued to occur under the Alfonsín presidency but in no manner came close to the levels reached during the previous decade. Almost all the incidents were believed to have been carried out by right-wing organizations. Because they were no longer supported by the government, the perpetrators of the paramilitary actions were described by Tróccoli as "idle hands." Their targets tended to be the same kinds of people—including students; politicians; and labor, church, and political activists—who were subjected to persecution during the previous military government. The individuals who prepared the CONADEP report were regularly subjected to death threats, and some of their homes were bombed. In early 1985 the ministry's undersecretary, Raúl Galván, maintained that the actions, which attempted to establish a climate of "intimidation and fear," sought to "test the strength of democracy."

By mid-1985 a serious effort was being made by the Ministry of Interior to crack down on the political violence and illegal activities engendered by the right-wing groups. Because the groups had "lost the official support they had in the past," Minister Tróccoli maintained, they had turned to "extortions, trafficking in drugs, and smuggling weapons" in order to support themselves. By mid-1985 as many as 300 individuals believed to be members of extremist paramilitary groups had

been identified by the ministry. Many were reportedly participants in a "far-right terrorist campaign" to destabilize the government. In late May the fugitive leader of one right-wing group, Raúl Antonio Guglielminetti, was arrested by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), along with two accomplices in Spain. Press reports identified Guglielminetti as a retired army major, military intelligence officer, and presidential bodyguard for Bignone and for Alfonsín during the first three months of his administration. He was charged with the bombing of the transmitting tower of a Buenos Aires radio station, the murder of an Argentine businessman, and the kidnapping of two others for whom he received several million dollars' ransom each. It was speculated that his military intelligence contacts had enabled him to keep one step ahead of the police.

The principal law enforcement agency in Argentine was the Federal Police, which was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. In mid-1985 the chief of the force was identified as Antonio di Vietri. At that time no estimates were available on the size of the force, which maintained its headquarters in Buenos Aires, but it was believed to have decreased somewhat from the 22,000 personnel it incorporated when Alfonsín took office. The Federal Police were responsible for law enforcement in the Federal District as well as for conducting investigations related to violations of federal laws in the provinces. In addition to the Federal Police, each province maintained its own police force. The largest of the provincial forces was that of Buenos Aires, which was estimated to have as many as 18,000 personnel in 1983. Argentine cities and municipalities also maintained their own smaller police forces for traffic control and investigations of minor crimes.

In accordance with plans formed shortly before Alfonsín's election, Minister Tróccoli announced in mid-1985 that the government had organized and trained an elite antiterrorist police corps composed of elements of the Federal Police and of "important sectors of all the security forces." The force was believed to be prepared to respond to the presence of increasing right-wing terrorism and attempts to destabilize the civilian government. The broad-ranging mission assigned the new force was "the defense of the constitutional order."

* * *

Resources for information on the Argentine Armed Forces are diverse. Few comprehensive accounts of the institution had been published by the mid-1980s. The chapter on Argentina published in *The Armed Forces of Latin America* by Adrian J. English presents useful information on the military's history, organization, and matériel. The best historical accounts of the development of the modern military are the two volumes by Robert A. Potash entitled *The Army and Politics in Argentina*, which together cover the period from 1928 to 1962. Alain Rouquié's *Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina* is an excellent text on the political role of the armed forces. Potash and Rouquié are also authors of a number of other helpful works on the Argentine armed forces. The chapter on Argentina by Jack Child in *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record* is most useful in explaining events transpiring shortly before and after the transition to civilian government in 1983. Child's book, entitled *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America*, presents information on territorial disputes involving Argentina as well as some background on Argentine geopolitical thought and the origins of the National Security Doctrine. *Air War South Atlantic*, written by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, is a superb account of the South Atlantic War in 1982. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients
2 Area, Population, and Population Density by Major Administrative Subdivision, 1980
3 Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, 1983
4 Production of Selected Mineral Commodities, 1980-83
5 Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 1980-84
6 Value of Selected Export Commodities, 1980-83
7 Value of Selected Import Commodities, 1980-83

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
. . . .	1.1	short tons
. . . .	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	9 divide by 5 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Area, Population, Population Density by Major Administrative Subdivision, 1980

Administrative Subdivision	Area (in square kilometers)	Total Population	Density (per square kilometer)
Buenos Aires	307,571	10,865,408	35
Catamarca	100,967	207,717	2
Chaco	99,633	701,392	7
Chubut	224,686	263,116	1
Córdoba	168,766	2,407,754	14
Corrientes	88,199	661,454	7
Entre Ríos	78,781	908,313	12
Formosa	72,066	295,887	4
Jujuy	53,219	410,008	8
La Pampa	143,440	208,260	1
La Rioja	89,680	164,217	2
Mendoza	148,827	1,196,228	8
Misiones	29,801	588,977	20
Neuquén	94,078	243,850	3
Río Negro	203,013	383,354	2
Salta	154,775	662,870	4
San Juan	89,651	465,976	5
San Luis	76,748	214,416	3
Santa Cruz	243,943	114,941	0
Santa Fe	133,007	2,465,546	19
Santiago del Estero	135,254	595,920	4
Tierra del Fuego*	21,263	27,358	1
Tucúman	22,524	972,655	43
Federal District	200	2,922,829	14,651
TOTAL	2,780,092	27,947,446	10

* Designated a national territory. Argentina's National Institute of Statistics and Census suggests that 2,034 should be added to the population of the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego for those living in Argentina's claimed territories in Antartica and the South Atlantic.

Source: Based on information from Argentina, Ministerio de Economía, Secretaria de Hacienda, *Censo nacional de poblacíon y vivienda*, Buenos Aires, 1983, 1.

Table 3. Oil and Natural Gas Reserves, 1983

Basin Area	Oil (in millions of barrels)	Natural Gas (in millions of cubic meters)
Northwest		
Salta	154	97,706
Jujuy	5	1,088
	159	98,794
Cuyo		
Mendoza (north)	243	485
Neuquén		
Mendoza (south)	109	9,688
Neuquén	670	405,471
Río Negro	188	11,934
La Pampa	44	1,955
	1,011	429,048
San Jorge		
Chubut	425	5,218
Santa Cruz (north)	438	32,387
	862	37,605
Austral		
Santa Cruz (south)	35	40,193
Tierra del Fuego[1]	45	43,885
Marine	73	22,639
	153	106,718
TOTAL[2]	2,428	672,651

[1]Designated a national territory.
[2]Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of State, *Industrial Outlook Report, Petroleum, 1982-83: Argentina*, Washington, February 1984, 7.

Table 4. Production of Selected Mineral Commodities, 1980-83
(in tons unless otherwise specified)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982	1983
Aluminum	133,100	133,900	137,600	135,000
Boron, crude	155,849	125,617	123,492	123,900
Cement	7,133,000	6,651,000	5,580,000	5,645,000
Copper	182	80	38	235
Feldspar	32,529	26,118	15,091	18,700
Fluorite	15,468	20,755	23,727	24,325
Gold (troy ounces)	10,622	14,757	20,319	20,898
Iron	437,000	398,000	587,000	629,000
Lead	32,606	32,652	30,115	32,000
Manganese	6,146	2,706	3,900	4,200
Salt	1,004,000	938,000	595,000	551,000
Silver (troy ounces)	2,357,000	2,518,000	2,684,000	2,636,000
Steel, crude	2,685,000	2,526,000	2,913,000	2,930,000
Tin	351	413	304	338
Uranium (kilograms)	284,900	221,000	470,462	504,000
Vermiculite	9,907	3,277	3,354	3,400
Zinc	33,409	35,150	36,381	37,000

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *Preprint from The Mineral Industry of Argentina*, Washington, 1984, 3.

Table 5. Production of Selected Agricultural Commodities, 1980-84
(in thousands of tons)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Cereals					
Wheat	7,780	8,300	15,000	12,300	13,200
Corn	12,900	9,600	9,000	9,200	11,000
Sorghum	7,100	8,000	7,600	7,200	6,800
Oats	433	339	637	593	610
Other[1]	796	665	718	741	813
Total cereals	29,009	26,904	32,955	30,034	32,423
Oilseeds					
Soybeans	3,500	4,150	4,000	6,600	6,600
Sunflower seed	1,260	1,980	2,300	2,200	3,300
Flaxseed	610	600	765	703	500
Other[2]	413	560	470	640	556
Total oilseeds	5,783	7,290	7,535	10,143	10,956

[1]Includes barley, rye, millet, and milled rice.
[2]Includes in-shell peanuts and cottonseed.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, *Annual Agricultural Situation Report*, Washington, 1985, 10-11.

Table 6. Value of Selected Export Commodities, 1980-83
(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982	1983
Agricultural products				
Cereals and by-products	1,750	2,929	1,913	2,993
Meat, hides, and animal products	1,380	1,359	1,118	888
Oilseeds and by-products	1,431	1,271	1,210	1,421
Wool	234	287	185	145
Sugar	311	282	55	179
Fruits and products	247	222	231	185
Pulses	91	66	59	54
Vegetables	52	50	63	42
Cotton	123	29	69	9
Dairy products	28	32	57	51
Tobacco	27	28	59	50
Other	220	202	208	178
Total agricultural products	5,894	6,757	5,227	6,195
Mineral products				
Fuel and lubricants	280	622	551	349
Other	35	36	29	23
Total mineral products	315	658	580	372
Chemical and plastic products	348	352	334	323
Textiles*	105	73	80	64
Metals and products	217	414	514	318
Mechanical and electrical machinery	339	297	296	181
Transport material	174	126	216	92
Other	629	466	378	290
TOTAL	8,021	9,143	7,625	7,835

* Excluding wool.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, *Annual Agricultural Situation Report*, Washington, 1985, 17-18.

Table 7. Value of Selected Import Commodities, 1980-83 (in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982	1983
Agricultural products				
Fruit	110	100	44	21
Coffee	106	79	80	59
Live animals	7	6	8	17
Dairy products and eggs	47	32	5	4
Vegetables	68	26	6	5
Spices	9	10	6	6
Prepared foods	17	30	11	5
Alcoholic beverages	45	34	10	7
Tobacco	12	12	2	2
Cotton	18	41	11	14
Meats	51	29	4	2
Other	340	241	138	137
Total agricultural products	830	640	325	279
Fuels and lubricants	1,075	1,011	672	460
Minerals	182	162	144	130
Chemicals	1,055	936	870	850
Paper	305	288	175	160
Textiles	253	248	123	120
Metals and products	886	611	497	460
Machinery and equipment	1,077	1,228	755	630
Transport	237	263	154	150
Capital goods	2,392	2,059	950	810
Other	2,249	1,984	672	455
TOTAL	10,541	9,430	5,337	4,504

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, *Annual Agricultural Situation Report*, Washington, 1985, 20-21.

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Glossary

austral (pl., australes; symbol is A)—In June 1985 a new currency, the austral, was introduced, replacing the former currency, the Argentine peso. An austral was worth 1,000 Argentine pesos at a parity of 0.80 australes to the United States dollar.

exchange rate—The exchange rate of the "new peso" depreciated from 3.8 to the United States dollar in 1970 to 36.6 in 1975. Between 1976 and 1978 the value of the peso depreciated from 140 to 795.8 per United States dollar. From December 1978 through May 1981 a sliding peg regime of preannounced daily exchange rate adjustments caused the value of the peso to fall from 1,007 to 3,284 per United States dollar. A dual exchange rate system consisting of a commercial and a financial rate was in effect from June through December 1981. During that period the respective rates averaged 5,083 and 5,748 pesos to the United States dollar. Between January and June 1982 the dual exchange market was unified. From July through October a dual exchange rate regime was reintroduced, and in November it was unified into a single exchange rate system. In 1982, during the period of the single exchange rate, it averaged 21,709 pesos per United States dollar. During the dual exchange rate regime interim, the commercial rate averaged 23,916 pesos per United States dollar, and the financial rate averaged 26,123 pesos. Between January and July 1983 the value of the peso depreciated from 51,433 to 94,489 per United States dollar. In August the "Argentine peso" was revalued upward against the "new peso." Between August and December the peso continued to depreciate from 10.53 to 21.36 per United States dollar. In 1984 a managed floating regime was implemented by the administration of Raúl Alfonsín that was targeted to the rate of inflation. In 1984 the United States dollar was equivalent to 67.65 pesos. In June 1985 the government introduced the austral as the country's new currency. The increased worth of the austral against the Argentine peso readjusted the value of the new currency in comparison to the United States dollar.

fiscal year (FY)—In the United States the fiscal year runs from October 1 of the previous calendar year to September 30

of the corresponding calendar year. The Argentine fiscal year is identical to the calendar year.

GOU—Grupo Obra de Unificación (Unification Task Force). This acronym has long been expanded incorrectly into Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (Group of United Officers).

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure on the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and investment are included because the values of primary and intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown in market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word *gross* indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. *See also* gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (GDP—*q.v.*) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. For Argentina, GNP is usually less than GDP because of factor payments abroad. GNP is the broadest measure of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

leagues—A measure of distance that varies among different countries and at different periods of time. For the purpose of this text, one league was calculated to equal 4.5 kilometers.

Peronism—An informal belief system relating to the ideas and influence of former president Juan Domingo Perón.

peso—Owing to endemic inflation, a "new peso" worth 100 old pesos was introduced in January 1970 at a parity of 3.8

to the United States dollar. In mid-1983 the "Argentine peso" was introduced, which was worth 10,000 "new pesos" at a parity of 10.53 to the United States dollar. *See also* exchange rate.

porteño—Resident of the port city of Buenos Aires; of or relating to Buenos Aires.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The primary purpose of the IBRD, established in 1945, is to provide loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was created in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designated specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

Index

academies (*see also* universities and colleges): 33, 34; Buenos Aires, 33, Catamarca, 33; Mendoza, 33; Montserrat, 30, Salta, 33, San Juan, 33, Tucumán, 33
Act of the Argentine Revolution: 60, 206
Afghanistan: 155
Agosti, Orlando Ramón: 67
agriculture (*see also* crops, dairy industry, *estancias*, fishing industry, livestock): xxi, 5, 17, 24, 37, 38, 45, 49, 60, 70, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, 137, 153–66, 188; fertilizers and herbicides, 158, 160, 161
agrupaciones: 312
Aguirre, Atanasio: 33
Aguirre, Francisco de: 9
air service: 53, 153; Aeroparque, 153; Air Chaco, 153; Argentine Airlines, 153; Austral Airlines, 153; State Airlines, 73, 153, 310
Alberdi, Juan Bautista: 27, 30; *Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic*, 30
Alcorta, José Figueroa: xii, 39, 42
Alem, Leandro N.: 40, 41, 218
Alemann, Roberto T.: 130, 131, 248
Alende, Oscar: 228, 232
Alfonsín, Raúl: xiii, xxvi, xxix–xxxii *passim*, 5, 76, 77, 83, 84, 95, 113, 114, 121, 127, 132, 140, 158, 182, 204, 209, 222, 229–31 *passim*, 240, 250, 251, 254–59 *passim*, 261, 264, 267, 330–32 *passim*; and armed forces, 277, 278, 294, 296–99 *passim*, 301, 302, 305, 310, 313, 314, 319–21 *passim*; military controls, 252, 253; nuclear development, 323
Algeria: 323
Allied factions: 50, 51, 291
Almirante Storni: 263
Alonso, José: 238
Alsina, Valentín: 29, 31, 35
Alsogaray, Álvaro: 226
altiplano: 83, 85, 95, 127
Álvarez Jonte, Antonio: 18
Alvear, Marcelo T. de: xii, 18, 19, 46; *alvearistas*, 46
Anaya, Jorge Isaac: 327, 328
Andean Altiplano: 83, 127
Andes (mountains): xx, 5, 20, 88, 89, 92, 93, 95, 100, 145, 146, 280
Angelelli, Enrique: 119
Angola: 172
Antarctica: 72, 85, 94, 262, 269, 307, 309, 310; Antarctic Treaty, 262, 297
anticommunism: 46, 65–67 *passim*, 329
antipersonalists: 48
"Antiterrorist Law": 76
antiverticalists (Río Hondo faction): 229, 230, 258
Aquinas, Saint Thomas: 11
Aramburu, Pedro E.: xii, 58, 62, 206, 241
Arent, Alfred: 288
Arganaraz, Francisco de: 9
Argentine Air Force (Fuerza Aérea Argentina): xxii, xxviii, 58, 243, 249, 291, 300, 301, 309–12, 325; brigades, 310; Condor Building (headquarters), 310; matériel, 310–11; personnel, 309–10
Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Alianza Argentine Anticomunista—AAA, or Triple A): xvi, 65–67 *passim*, 329
Argentine Army (Ejército Argentino): xxii, xxviii, 27–29, 36, 48, 51, 243, 249, 278–80, 283, 290–305, 312, 314, 316; army corps, 302–03; Army of Buenos Aires, 284; Army of the Andes, 20, 280; Army of the Confederation, 284; Artillerymen of the Fatherland, 279; Blandengues (Mounted Volunteers of the Fatherland), 278–80; Dragoons of the Fatherland, 279; Libertador Building (headquarters), 302; matériel, 304–05; Military Aviation Service, 291; Palermo Barracks, 302–03; People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—ERP): xvi, 63, 66, 224,

319; personnel, 301; Royal Artillery Corps, 279; Unification Task Force (Grupo Obra de Unificación—GOU), 51, 290, 382
Argentine Association of Regional Experimental Consortia: 162
Argentine Chamber of Commerce (Cámara Argentina de Comercio—CAC): xvi, 235
Argentine Industrial Movement (Movimiento Industrial Argentino—MIA), xvii, 235
Argentine Industrial Union (Unión Industrial Argentina—UIA): xvii, 98, 217, 221, 234-36, 247, 256
Argentine Navy (Armada Argentine): xxii, xxviii, 58, 243, 249, 287, 292, 300, 301, 305-10, 321, 325; air bases, 308; Libertad Building (headquarters), 305; Marine Infantry Corps, 309; matériel, 306; Naval Aviation, 308, Naval Prefecture, 305; personnel, 305; squadrons, 308; vessels, 306-07, 309, 325
Argentine Penal Code, 327
Argentine Republic (República Argentina): 30, 31
Argentine Rural Confederation (Confederación Rural Argentina—CRA): xvi, 235
Argentine Rural Society (Sociedad Rural Argentina—SRA): xvii, 39, 98, 217, 234, 235, 247, 256
Argentine Trade Promotion Institute (Instituto Argentino de Promoción del Intercambio—IAPI): xvii, 53, 54
Argentine Youth for National Emancipation (Juventud Argentina por la Emancipación Nacional—JAEN): xvi, 234
armed forces (*see also* Argentine Air Force, Argentine Army, Argentine Navy, military education): xxii, xxix, xxx, 4, 44, 45, 47, 50, 203, 207, 217, 240-43, 245, 250, 253, 259, 277-334; Council for Research and Experimentation, 321; *destinados*, 285; *enganchados*, 285; housing, 218; Institute for Scientific and Technical Research, 321; Institute of Aeronautical and Space Research, 321; Joint Chiefs of Staff, xxx, 298, 301, 310, 320; Legislative Advisory Committee, 207; matériel, 287, 289, 291-93 *passim*, 299, 304-06 *passim*, 325; medical benefits, 218; Military Committee, 298; National Guard, xxii, 285; personnel, 290, 292, 301, 326; Revolutionary Armed Forces, 63; salary and allowances, 218; Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 253, 254, 277, 278, 319, 327, 328, 330, 331
Arosa, Ramón Antonio: 301, 305
Artigas, José Gervasio: 19, 22, 23, 281
Association of the Young Argentine Generation: 27
Astrada, Berón de: 28
Asunción: 8, 12, 17
Atheneum (Ateneo) of the Republic: 220
Atlantic Ocean: 85, 88, 92-95 *passim*, 152, 170, 270
audiencia: 13
Australia: 73
Austria: 287
Avellaneda, Marco de: 28
Avellaneda, Nicolás de: xii, 34-36, 38
Axis factions: 50, 289, 291
azules (*also* legalists or *bandos*): 242, 292

bachillerato: 111
Bahía Blanca: 83, 95, 150, 152, 153, 173, 302, 303, 305, 312
Bajo la Alumbrera: 145
balance of payments (*see also* exports, imports): 61, 129, 130, 132, 133, 192-94
Balbín, Ricardo: xxix, 55, 228, 230, 231, 247
Balcarce, Juan Ramón: 25
Banda Oriental (now Uruguay): 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 281
banks and banking: 48, 174-79; Bank of the Argentine Nation, 174, 175; Bank of the City of Buenos Aires, 175
Barrio Norte: 98
battles: Caseros, 29, 284; Chacabuco, 281; Curupayty, 286; Goose Green, 326; Ituzaingó, 282; Juncal, 282;

Maipú, 287; Port Stanley, 326; Rancagua, 20; Trafalgar, 16
Beagle Channel: 5, 69, 88, 93, 94, 261, 268, 269, 270, 325; Treaty, 297
Belgium: 30, 289
Belgrano, Manuel: 16–18 *passim*, 20
Beltrán, Fray Luis: 302
Berdina, Hebe S. de: 119
Bignone, Reynaldo B.: xiii, 75, 76, 109, 131, 214, 226, 249, 250, 253, 254, 297, 329
birth rate: 106
Bittel, Deolindo: 228
"Blue and White Book": 53
Bolivia: xxi, 3, 8, 13, 18, 30, 85, 88, 90, 91, 95, 100, 104, 105, 142, 145, 261, 280, 312, 323; Upper Peru, 8, 9, 15, 18, 280
Bonaparte, Napoleon: 16, 18
bonarense: 119
Borrás, Raúl: 297
Braden, Spruille: 53
Bragado: 31
Brazil: xxi, 3, 7, 12, 22, 29, 30, 33, 34, 73, 85, 90–92 *passim*, 104, 105, 142, 143, 145, 172, 180, 187, 260, 261, 265, 269, 330; armed forces, 281, 282, 284, 285, 309, 312, 320, 325; nuclear development, 322–23
Britain: xxii, xxvii, xxviii, 12, 21, 29, 30, 73, 74, 85, 94, 136, 249, 259, 260, 262, 263, 265, 287, 306, 307; Agreed Position, 262; and the Falklands, 262; sanctions against, 264; *Shackleton*, 263; South Atlantic War, 324–27; victory, 277
British influence: 9, 13, 15, 16, 25, 26, 47, 69, 72, 220, 279, 280
Britos, Oraldo: 230
Brown, Guillermo: 282
Buenos Aires (city) (*see also* Federal District): xx, xxvii, xxix, xxxii, 3, 8, 12, 13, 15–21 *passim*, 43, 45, 48, 51, 74, 98, 142, 213, 219, 235, 245, 262, 267, 278; armed forces, 278, 279, 283, 284, 288, 292, 302, 305, 306, 310, 315, 316; automobile production, 62; banking, 175; Buenos Aires Declaration, 263; Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, 91; civil war, 242; colonial life, 22–37 *passim*, 39–41 *passim*; Federal Court of Appeals, 331; Greater Buenos Aires, 83, 91, 92, 96, 103, 105, 106, 114, 315; health care, 114; immigrants, 100–01; industrialization, 104, 322; internal migration, 103–04; media, 244; military control, 58; and Perón, 223, 224; politics, 229; port, 93, 282; protests, 72, 76; religion, 117, 121; transportation, 150, 152, 153; unemployment, 135
Buenos Aires (province): 6, 24, 36, 51, 83, 91, 205, 229, 232, 251, 283, 302, 303, 305, 306, 308, 310, 311, 315; crops, 163, 164
business associations: 203, 234–36

cabecitas negras: 83
cabildo: 10, 16, 20, 21
cabildo abierto: 16
cabinet. *See* ministries
Cabot, Sebastian: 8
Cabrera, Jerónimo Luis de: 9
Cafiero, Antonio: 229
Camino de los Andes: 89
Campana: 152
Camp David Agreements: 267
Campo de Mayo: 302, 312, 331
Campo Durán: 142
Cámpora, Héctor J.: xii, 64, 65
Camps, Ramón J.: 330
Canada: 73, 172
Cane, Miguel: 27
Canitrot, Adolfo: 257
Cape Horn: 85
Cape Verde Islands: 7
Caribbean: 10, 73, 260
Carranza, Roque: 297, 298
Cartagena: 267
Cartagena Consensus: 268
Casa Rosada: 51, 58, 249
Castillo, Pedro del: 9
Castillo, Ramón S.: xii, 50, 51, 221
Castro Madero, Carlos: 321
Catamarca: 5, 9, 20, 28, 88, 104, 145, 303
Catholics. *See* religion, Roman Catholic Church
caudillos: 22–26 *passim*, 33, 34, 283–85 *passim*
Cavendish, Thomas: 9
Caviedes, César: 98, 103; *The Southern*

Cone: Realities of the Authoritarian State in South America, 124
Caxias: 34
Celman, Miguel Juárez: xii, 39, 40
censorship: 3, 68, 109, 122, 244
census: 94
Center for Legal and Social Studies: 253
Center-West: 142, 193
Central America: 260, 261, 267, 269, 313
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic: 31, 48, 53, 174–80 *passim*, 185, 257
centralism: 30
Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía—CELADEC: 124
Cepeda: 31
Cerro Aconcagua: 89
Cerro Castile: 146
Cerro Corá: 34
Cerro Dos Conos: 89
Cerro-Labrado: 145
Cerro Llullaillaco: 89
Chaco: 5, 37, 90, 103, 104, 164, 303
chaco: 88, 90, 110
Chagas' disease: 100, 115
Chiclana, Feliciano: 18
Chile: 5, 9, 20, 26, 30, 31, 52, 69, 85, 88, 89, 100, 104, 105, 142, 143, 145, 229, 260, 261, 267–70, 280, 281, 287, 288, 297, 312, 324, 325
China: xxi, 155, 191, 324
Chivilcoy: 31
Chubut: 63, 94, 146, 303, 306, 310
church. *See* Roman Catholic Church
Cisplatine Province: 22
Cisplatine War: 22
civilian rule, return to: 245–51
civil service: 107
civil war: 205, 242, 245
clergy. *See* Roman Catholic Church
climate: xx, 5, 156
"Coalition of the North": 28
coalitions: 203, 204
Cold War: 55, 291
Colombia: 63, 143, 187, 267, 324
Colônia del Monte: 24, 27
Colônia do Sacramento: 12, 13, 22
colorados: 60, 242, 292
Columbus, Christopher (Cristóbal Colón-Sp., Cristoforo Colombo-It.): 7
Committee of 20: 238
Committee of 25: 239
Commonwealth of Nations: 73, 263
communism (*see also* political parties): xxviii, 58
Comodoro Rivadavia (city): 152, 306, 310
Comodoro Rivadavia (oilfield): 142
Concepción del Bermejo: 8
Concordancia: 49, 50
Concordia: 83, 95
"Conqueror of the Desert". *See* de Rosas, Juan Manuel
conquistadores 5, 10, 99
Conservatives: xxvii, 39–42 *passim*, 44, 48, 49, 58, 65, 66, 216–18, 225, 226
Constantinople: 7
Constitution of 1819: 20
Constitution of 1853: xxi, 3, 17, 29–31 *passim*, 51, 55, 118, 135, 203, 205–15 *passim*, 284, 294, 297
consulado: 13
Contadora Group: 269
Contín, Carlos R.: 231
continuistas: 241
Coordinating Action of Free Business Institutions (Acción Coordinadora de Instituciones de Empresa Libre—ACIEL): xvi, 235
cordilleras: 89
Córdoba (city): 5, 6, 12, 19, 20, 30, 35, 42, 58, 95, 303, 312, 315, 328; Córdoba League (Liga de Córdoba), 36, 41; Cordobazo, 62, 224, 328; health care, 114; higher education, 112; religion, 119; revolution, 61–63 *passim*; transportation, 152
Córdoba (province): 6, 90, 92, 95, 303; crops, 163, 164; industrialization, 104, 223; migration, 103; ore reserves, 144
Corpus Christi: 58
Corpus dam: 143
Corrientes: 6, 8, 19, 21, 25, 28, 29, 34, 35, 37, 91, 103, 104, 110, 285, 303
Costa Méndez, Nicanor: 73
Costa Rica: 172
coup d'état: 48, 60, 66, 221, 222, 226, 230, 232, 257, 278, 290, 292, 297
courts. *See* judicial system
Crespo, Ernesto Horacio: 301, 310

criollos (*see also* upper class): 4, 12, 15–17 *passim*, 24, 27, 35, 38, 40, 42, 279, 280
crops (*see also* agriculture): 5, 37, 38, 93, 94, 137; cereals, 83, 93, 102, 127, 153–60 *passim*, 189, 341; fruits, 154–56 *passim*, 159, 166, 189; industrial crops, 154, 156, 157, 159, 165–66, 189, 190, 340; oilseeds, 127, 154–60 *passim*, 162, 164, 165, 189, 190, 341; vegetables, 155–57 *passim*, 159–61 *passim*, 163, 189
Cuba: 106, 265, 269; Revolution, 292
currency: xxi, xxxi, 18, 96, 106, 129–31 *passim*, 133, 137, 138, 140, 154, 156–58 *passim*, 176, 177, 179, 190, 192, 270, 299, 382; the austral, 258, 381
Cuyo: 19, 20, 89, 105

Dagnino Pastore, José María: 131
dairy industry (*see also* livestock): 93, 168–70 *passim*
Dársena Norte: 305
Darwin: 324, 326
Davis, John: 9, 262
death rate: xx, 106, 115
debt, foreign: xxii, xxxii, 5, 31, 61, 76, 127–29 *passim*, 132, 138, 158, 171, 185–88, 250, 256, 258, 267, 268, 300
debt, public: 134, 138
"Declaration of Peace and Friendship": 270
de Imaz, José Luis: 96; *Los que mandan*, 124
de la Plaza, Victorino: xii, 42
de la Rua, Fernando: 231
democratic rule: 40. 77, 83, 204
dentists. *See* health and welfare
de Rosas, Juan Manuel: 3, 4, 24–29, 99, 204, 283, 284; Restorer of the Laws, 283
Derqui, Santiago: 33
desaparecidos: 83, 252
descamisados: 52
Desert Campaign: 25, 27
Díaz de Solís, Juan: 8
diet and nutrition (*see also* health and welfare): 5, 23, 84, 96
"dirty war": 67–69 *passim*, 75, 76, 104, 119, 121, 243, 250, 252, 254, 277, 302, 328–32
discrimination: 11
doctors. *see* health and welfare
Document in Defense of Democracy: 258
Dominican Republic: 265
Duarte de Perón, Eva: xxvii, 52, 55, 56, 80, 84, 222, 223
Dumez of France: 142

Eady-Mirando Treaty: 54
East Germany. *See* German Democratic Republic
Echagüe, Pascual: 28
Echeverría, Esteban: 27
Economic Nationalists: 221, 242
economic sanctions: 73
economy: xxvi, xxviii, xxxi, 4, 11–13 *passim*, 36–38 *passim*, 40, 43, 45, 47, 49, 56, 57, 61, 64, 65, 70, 71, 84, 95, 127–99, 154, 246, 256, 258
Ecuador: 143, 324
education (*see also* academies, higher education, military education, primary education, secondary education, technical and vocational education, universities and colleges): xx, 18, 35, 36, 38, 56, 84, 109–14, 218
Egypt: 172, 313
elections: xxxiii, 48, 64, 76, 213–16, 218, 249, 251, 259
elite. *See* upper class
elitism: 47
El Pachón: 145
El Palomar Air Base: 310, 315
El Salvador: 261, 268
El Turbio: 88
employment: 96, 103, 135, 137
encomendero: 10, 11
encomienda: 10–12 *passim*
energy: 139–44, 150, 339; Agua y Energía, 150; Gas del Estado, 150
Enlightenment: 100
Entel: 150
Entre Ríos: 6, 19, 21, 25, 28–30 *passim*, 37, 42, 83, 91, 95 104, 163, 164, 303, 310
Esperanza: 30
Esquivel, Adolfo Pérez: 69, 109, 119
estancias (*see also* livestock): 15, 23,

24, 92, 93, 101, 102; *estanciero*, 27, 97, 98; *estanciero-saladerista*, 29
ethnic groups (*see also* tribes): 11, 101, 102; blacks, 11, 12; Indians, 11, 99, 117; mestizos, 11; peninsulares, 15
Europe: xxvii, 3, 7, 36–38 *passim*, 43, 50, 100–02 *passim*, 259, 289
European Economic Community (EEC): 73, 74, 155, 167, 172, 190, 191, 263
Eva Perón Foundation: 55
Evita. *See* Duarte de Perón
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): 313
executive branch: xxi–xxii, 205, 207–09, 294
expenditures, government: 183–85
exports (*see also* imports, trade): xxi, 37, 127, 129, 131, 137, 147, 148, 150, 154, 156, 157, 166, 171, 188–90 *passim*, 260, 342; military materiel, 320, 321
Ezeiza International Airport: 64, 153

Falkland, Viscount: 9
Falkland/Malvinas Islands: xxix, 9, 13, 25, 72–75 *passim*, 85, 131, 171, 233, 262, 324; Britain's role, 249, 262; invasion and occupation, 249, 263, 267; reaction to invasion, 249; United States' role, 267
Farrell, Edelmiro J.: xii, 51, 52
Federal Court Against Subversion: 63
Federal District (Captial Federal) (*see also* Buenos Aires): xxi, 91, 94, 104, 110, 115, 208, 209, 212, 333
The Federalist Papers: 30
Federalists: xxvi, 17, 20–22 *passim*, 24, 26, 204
federalization: 31, 34, 36, 39
Federal Pact of 1831: 29, 204
Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany): xxi, 69, 143, 172, 306, 320, 322
Federal Territory of Tierra del Fuego: 85, 94
"Federation or Death": 26
Ferdinand VII (king of Spain): 17
Fifth Militia Regiment: 24
finance, public: 180–85
financial system: 173–80
Finland: 307
Firmenich, Mario Eduardo: 330
fishing industry: 170–73
flag: xx, 73
Flores, Venancio: 33
Fluor Corporation: 146
foreign policy and relations: 55, 259
Formosa: 5, 90, 104, 108, 110, 303
France: 12, 16, 28, 29, 50, 69, 101, 172, 289, 306
Franco, Francisco: 220
Freedman, Lawrence: 326
French influence: 9, 13, 18, 27
Frigerio, Rogelio: 244
Frondizi, Arturo: xii, 59, 206, 219–24 *passim*, 228, 230, 242, 257, 292
fuero: 21
Fuerte Esperanza: 31

Gabon: 172
Galicia: 101
Gallo, Vicente C.: 46
Galtieri, Leopoldo: xiii, xxviii, 71, 73, 74, 247–49 *passim*, 267, 268, 327, 328
Gamboa, Sarmiento de: 9
Garabi dam: 143
Garay, Juan de: 8, 12
Gaspar de Francia, José: 18
gauchos: 15, 22–24 *passim*, 33, 35, 279, 283
General Confederation of Professionals (Confederación General de Profesionales—CGP): xvi
General Directorate of Military Manufactures (Dirección General de Fabricaciones Militares—DGFM): xvii, 55, 182, 184, 252, 291, 304, 316, 319, 320
General Economic Confederation (Confederación General Económica—CGE): xvi, 55, 57
General Savio State Corporation: 319
General University Confederation (Confederación General Universitaria—CGU): xvi
Geneva: 263, 296
geography: 85–94
Geotéchnica: 146
German Democratic Republic (East Germany): 172
Germani, Gino: 109; "Mass Immigration and Modernization in Argentina", 124

Germany: 48, 101, 260, 291, 295; military advisers, 288–89, 294
Golfo San Jorge: 172
golpistas: 292
Gómez, Esteban: 9
Goose Green: 324, 326
government. *See* executive branch, judicial system, legislative branch
government, local: 212–13
Granada: 7
Gran Chaco: 5, 6, 83, 88, 90, 100, 102–05 *passim*
Great Depression: xxvii, 4, 47
"Great National Agreement": 63
Greece: 266, 296
Grinspun, Bernardo: 133, 257
gross domestic product (GDP): xx, xxxi, 70, 128–30 *passim*, 132–34 *passim*, 138, 144, 146, 154, 180–86 *passim*, 256, 299, 300, 382
gross national product (GNP): 150, 252, 382
Group of 19: 238
Group of Six: 296; New Delhi Declaration, 296
Group of 20: 239, 240
Group of 25: 240
Guaíra: 12
Guatemala: 324
guerrillas: xxvii, 63,66, 224, 243, 245, 252, 268, 328–30 *passim*
Guglieminetti, Raúl Antonio: 332
Guido, José M.: xii, 59, 242
Gutiérrez, Juan María: 27

hacendados: 23
Haig, Alexander: 267
Haiti: 15
Hamilton, Alexander (*see also The Fedaralist Papers*): 30
Hawkins, Richard: 9
health and welfare (*see also* diet and nutrition): xx, 84, 114–17, 218; dentists, 116; medical facilities, 116; nurses, 116; *obras sociales*, 114, 116, 117; physicians, 114–16
Hernandez, Jośe: 35; *Martín Fierro*, 34, 35
Hidalgo de Cisneros, Baltasar: 16
higher education: 43, 84, 109, 110, 112–14 *passim*; University Reform, 113
Hitler: 50
H.M.S. *Clio*: 25
hospitals and clinics. *See* health and welfare
housing: 155, 218
Houssay, Bernardo A.: 109
Houston: 140
Huaqui: 18
human rights: 68, 83, 84, 119, 244, 245, 253, 258, 266

Iberian Peninsula: 7, 16, 18
Iglesias, Herminio: 229, 230
Iguazú Falls: 85, 88
Illia, Arturo: xii, 60, 206, 219, 223, 224, 230, 231, 242, 292
immigration: 3, 35–37 *passim*, 101–05 *passim*; illegal aliens, 83
imports (*see also* exports, trade): xxi, 73, 129–31 *passim*, 137, 138, 148, 154, 156, 157, 191, 343
Impregilo of Italy: 142
impugnación de profesores: 113
income: 95–97 *passim*, 106, 130, 132–36 *passim*; military, 318
independence: 3, 19, 20
Independents: 238, 240
India: 265, 296, 324
Indians (*see also* ethnic groups, tribes): 8, 10, 22, 15, 17, 22, 24, 25, 83, 95, 102, 283, 287; attack, 8; Aztecs, 5; Incas, 5; Mayas, 5
Indies: 9
industry: 17, 45, 56, 127, 132, 133, 136–39 *passim*
inflation: 128–30 *passim*, 132, 133, 136, 139, 147, 154–56 *passim*, 158, 245, 250, 256, 299
Inter-American Defense Board: 260, 295
Inter-American System: 260, 261
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty): xxii, 260, 261, 264, 267, 291, 295, 296
interest rates and loans: 129, 132, 156, 167, 174, 183, 256, 266, 268
internal migration: 103, 105
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 265, 266, 296, 297
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol): 333
International Institute for Strategic

Studies: 301; *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, 301
International Monetary Fund (IMF): xxxii, 76, 127, 128, 132, 133, 179, 185-88 *passim*, 228, 236, 250, 256, 257, 268, 382, 383
investment: 138, 148
Iran: xxi, 172, 191
Iraq: 155, 172
Iron Guard (Guardia de Hierro): 329
Isabel de Perón. *See* Martínez de Perón
Isla de los Estados: 85
Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego: 6, 37, 85, 88, 94, 100, 102
Islas Malvinas (Isles Malouines): 9, 324
Israel: 320, 324
Itaibaté (*also* Lomas Valentinas): 286
Italy: xxi, 48, 52, 101, 172, 236, 261, 289, 322
Ivory Coast: 172

Japan: xxi, 172, 191, 192, 291, 295
Jaunarena, José Horacio: 297-98
Jay, John (*see also The Federalist Papers*): 30
Jewish Theological Seminary: 121; Centennial Medal for Religious Freedom, 121
judicial system: xxi, xxii, 205, 210-12, 294; Commission of Jurists, 63; Supreme Court, xxii, 33, 207, 210-12 *passim*, 253, 254
Jufré, Juan de: 9
Jufré, Luis: 9
Jujuy: 5, 9, 12, 28, 83, 88, 104, 115, 145, 146, 303
Junta of Observation: 20
Justo, Agustín P.: xii, 41, 48-50, 241

Korean war: 56, 57

labor force: 12, 38, 52, 61, 127, 134, 137
labor organizations: xv-xvi, 4, 19, 43, 58, 59, 136, 203, 233, 236-40, 254, 255; Argentine Regional Federation of Workers (Federación Obrera Regional Argentina—FORA): xvi, 41, 236, 237; Argentine Syndicalist Union (Unión Sindical Argentina—USA): xvi, 236, 237; Argentine Workers' Confederation (Confederación Obrera Argentina—COA): xvi, 236, 237; Buenos Aires Printers' Society (Sociedad Tipográfica Bonaerense): 236; General Confederation of Labor (Confederación General de Trabajo—CGT): xv, xxxi, 51, 54, 57, 58, 62, 66, 223, 225, 237-40 *passim*, 255-59 *passim*; General Confederation of Labor of the Argentine Republic (Confederación General del Trabajo de la República Argentina—CGT-RA): xvi, 240; General Confederation of Labor of the Argentines (Confederación General del Trabajo de los Argentinos—CGTA): xv, 61; General Confederation of Professionals (Confederación General de Professionales—CGP): 223; General Economic Confederation (Confederación General Económica—CGE): 223, 235, 236; General University Confederation (Confederación General Universitaria—CGU): 223; General Workers' Union (Unión General de Trabajadores—UGT): xvi, 223; Labor Action Committee (Comité Gestión Trabajo—CGYT): xv, 239, 240; Movement of Labor Unity and Coordination (Movimiento de Unidad y Coordinación Sindical—MUCS): xvi, 238; National Labor Commission (Comisión Nacional de Trabajo—CNT): xv, 239, 240; Only Vehicle of the Argentine Workers (Conducción Unica de los Trabajadores Argentinos—CUTA): xv, 239, 240; Regional Confederation of Argentine Workers (Confederación Obrera Regional Argentina—CORA): xvi, 237; Union of Secondary Students (Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios—UES) 223
Lami Dozo, Basilio: 327, 328
landownership (*see also hacendados*): 4, 25
language: xx, 99; Araucano-Mapuche, 100; Chiriguan, 99; Choroti, 100; Guaraní, 100; Mataco, 100; Mocovi, 100; Ona, 100; Quechua, 99;

Shelknam, 100; Tehuelche, 100; Toba, 100; Yamana, 100
Lanusse, Alejandro Agustín: xii, 60, 62–64 *passim*, 206
La Pampa: 6, 89, 103, 104, 163, 164, 303
Laplane, Numa: 66
La Plata: 51, 92, 104, 152,153
La Rioja: 5, 9, 23, 28, 88, 103, 108, 119, 303
las Casas, Bartolomé de ("Protector of the Indians"): 11
Las Flores: 31
las Heras, Juan Gregorio de: 21
Lastiri, Raúl A.: 65
Latin America: xx, xxv, 38, 73, 84, 85, 109, 112, 114, 127, 143, 150, 151, 187, 221, 257, 259–61 *passim*, 267–70 *passim*; and armed forces, 287, 291, 293, 297, 319–22 *passim*
Latin American Bishops' Conference: 63
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA): 190, 191
Lattes, Alfredo: 103
Lattes, Zulma Recchini de: 103
Lavalle, Juan: 28
Law of Civil Registration: 40
Law of National Pacification: 76, 330
Law of Professional Associations: 237
Law of Public Education: 40
Law of Residence: 42
legislative branch: xxi–xxii, 205, 209–10, 294; amending conventions, 205; Chamber of Deputies, xxi, xxix, xxxi–xxxiii, 53, 207, 209, 210, 214, 229, 233, 255, 298; Congress (Congreso Nacional), xxi, 26, 30, 36, 41, 42, 60, 118, 205, 206, 208–12 *passim*, 215, 220, 253, 257, 295; Legislative Advisory Committee, 67; Senate, xxi, 207–10 *passim*, 213, 229, 255, 295, 298, 318
Leloir, Luis Federico: 109
León, Luis: 231
Lerma, Hernando de: 9
Levingston, Roberto Marcelo: xii, 62, 63
liberals: 40
"Liberating Revolution": 58
Libya: 324
líder: xxvii
Liebman, Seymour B.: 121
life expectancy: xx
Liga Patriótica (Patriotic League): 45
Lima: 9, 12, 13, 88, 100, 263, 281
Lima e Silva, Luis Alves de: 34
Liniers, Santiago: 24
literacy: xx, 109, 110
Literary Society of Buenos Aires: 18
Littoral (El Litoral): 6, 83, 92, 105, 106, 219
livestock (*see also estancias*): 102, 133, 163, 166–70, 189; cattle raising, 12, 15, 23, 83, 94, 154–56, 158, 159; cattle ranchers, 217; sheep raising, 102, 159
Lobos: 51
Lomas: 31
Lonardi, Eduardo: xii, 58, 220
López, Vicente Fidel: 27
López Rega, José: 65, 66
López y Planes, Vicente: 29
lower classes: 11, 55, 84, 108, 245
Luder, Italo: xxix, 228, 229, 233, 251, 267

Madison, James (*see also The Federalist Papers*): 30
Magellan, Ferdinand: 8, 94
Mann, Arthur J.: 97
manufacturing: xxi, 6, 49, 129, 130, 132, 146–50; Acindar Company, 148; Chrysler, 147; Citroën-Argentina, 147; Dalmine Company, 148; Deutz, 148; Fiat-Peugeot, 147; Gurmendi Company, 148; John Deere, 148; Massey-Ferguson, 148; Papel del Tucumán, 149; Propulsora, 148; Santa Rosa Company, 148; Sevel, 147; Somisa, 148; Volkswagen, 147; Zanello, 147
Mar del Plata: 19, 173, 244, 268, 306
Mar Dulce (Sweet Sea): 8
Margues de Olinda: 34
Martínez, Enrique: 48
Martínez, Víctor: 231, 257
Martínez de Hoz, José: 69, 70, 129, 243, 245, 247, 248
Martńez de Perón María Estela (Isabel): xii, xxviii, 65, 66, 71, 84, 224, 228–30 *passim*, 245
Marxism: 221

Massera, Emilio: 67, 69, 243
Matera, Raúl: 228
Mato Grosso: 12, 34, 90
May Association: 27, 28
May Revolution. *See* Revolution of 1810
Maza, Ramón: 28
Mazorca: 28, 283
meat processing: 24, 49, 166
Medellín: 63
media, mass (*see also* newspapers and new magazines): 243–44; communications, 35; freedom of the press, 18–19; Noticias Argentinas (Argentine News), 244; Radiodifusión Argentina al Exterior (RAE), 244; Radio Nacional, 244, Telam news agency, 244
medical facilities. *See* health and welfare
Melstein, César: 109
Mendoza: 6, 9, 20, 72, 89, 90, 95, 103, 104, 114, 132, 144, 244, 303, 310
Mendoza, Pedro de; 8, 19
Menéndez, Luciano Benjamín: 69, 249
Menéndez, Mario Benjamín: 74
Mesopotamia: 6,90, 100, 105, 303
mesos: 91
mestizos (*see also* ethnic groups): xxv, 11, 12, 22
Mexico: 5, 69, 155, 189, 266, 296, 320
Mexico City: 9
middle class (*see also porteños): 4, 42, 43, 46, 48, 99, 102, 106, 108, 217–19 passim*, 223, 224, 227, 245
Middle East: 312
Miguel, Lorenzo: 228–30 *passim*
Miguel de Cervantes Prize: 109
military budget: 299–300
Military Code of Justice: 331
military conscription: 314
military education: 315–16; Air Force Command and Staff School, 316; Military College, 51, 286, 288, 315; Naval Mechanics School, 287; Naval Military School, 286, 315; Naval War College, 316; School of Military Aviation, 315; Superior Technical School, 316, Superior War College, 48, 52, 288, 289, 316
military rule (junta)(*see also* armed forces): 3, 58, 60, 67, 69, 76, 77, 83, 112, 127, 147, 204, 206, 226, 240–43, 249, 250, 252, 253, 255, 257, 261, 277–79, *passim*, 292, 294, 297, 329; *Final Document of the Military Junta on the War Against Subversion and Terrorism*, 76; Supreme Organ of the Nation, 294
minerals: 124, 144–146 *passim*
Ministry of Defense: xxii, 180, 209, 252, 298–310 *passim*, 304, 305, 315, 316, 319, 320; Argentine Naval Prefecture (Prefecture Naval Argentina), 300–01, 312–14 *passim*; National Gendarmerie (Gendarmería Nacional), xxiii, 300, 312–14 *passim*
Ministry of Economy: xxxi, 69, 70, 209, 257
Ministry of Education and Justice (formerly, Ministry of Education): 66, 110, 209, 315
Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship (formerly, Ministry of Foreign Relations): 73, 209, 259
Ministry of Interior: xxiii, 209, 214, 332; Federal Police, 301, 314, 333
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (formerly Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare): 52, 54, 55, 136, 209
Ministry of Public Health and Social Actions: 209
Ministry of Public Works and Services: 209
ministries, duties: 208–09
Misiones: 6, 37, 88, 91, 102–05 *passim*, 145, 303
Mitre, Bartolomé: xii, 28, 29, 31, 33, 35, 38, 79, 205, 218, 284–86 *passim*
Montevideo: 17, 19, 27–29 *passim*, 142
Montoneros: 63, 66, 224, 329, 330
Moreno, Mariano: 16, 17
Morón: 310, 311
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo: 69, 84, 253
Movement of Priests: 63, 118
Multipartidaria (Multiparty Commission): 71, 74–76 *passim*, 120, 231, 248–50 *passim*
Mussolini, Benito: 48

Naples: 30
Napoleonic Wars: 3, 16
National Antarctic Department: 300
National Atomic Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica—CNEA): xvii, 143, 144, 182, 321–23 *passim*
National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas—CONADEP): xvii, 330, 332
National Defense Cabinet (*see also* Ministry of Defense): 298
National Development Bank: 158, 175
National Development Council: 293
National Election Code of 1983: 214
National Energy Plan: 143
National Highway Administration: 182
National Industrial Movement (Movimiento Industrial Nacional—MIN): xvii, 236
National Institute of Agricultural Technology (Institutioi Nacional Technología Agropecuaria—INTA): 162
National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos): 95, 104, 124
National Intelligence Headquarters: 299
Nationalism: 4, 220–21
Nationalists: 47, 232, 242, 250
National Literary Commission: 110
National Mortgage Bank: 175
National Petroleum Company: 219
National Plan of Functional Literacy and Continuing Education: 110
National Reorganization Process: 67, 70, 71, 75, 83, 109, 118, 206, 294; Act for the National Reorganization Process, 206, 207; "National Emergency Program", 75; Statute for the National Reorganization Process, 67, 206, 207, 294
National Security Council: 62, 293
National Security Doctrine: xxviii, 293, 294, 315
National System of Security Planning and Action: 293
National Territory of Tierra del Fuego: 88, 104, 110, 213, 303, 306, 308, 324
natural resources: 47, 54
Nazi Germany: 321
Nazi influence: 53
Neri, Aldo: 114–16 *passim*; *Salud y política social*, 124
Netherlands: xxi, 306
Neuquén: 93, 104, 142, 303
Jorge Newberry Metropoltian Airport: 310
New Delhi: 296
New Laws of 1542–43: 11
newspapers and news magazines (*see also* media, mass): 244–45; *Buenos Aires Herald*, 244; *Clarín*, 244; *Crónica*, 244; *La Nación*, 244; *La Prensa*, 244, 245; *La Voz*, 244; *Siete Díaz*, 327
New World: 5–11 *passim*, 13, 15, 16
New York: 263
Nicaragua: 261, 268, 313; Nicaraguan Democratic Forces: 313
Nobel prizes: 69, 109, 119
nonalignment (Third Position): 55, 260; Nonaligned Movement, 261
Northwest: 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 83, 88, 96, 104, 105
Norway: 73
nuclear research and development: 143, 265, 266, 270, 306, 322, 323; Atucha nuclear plants, 143; Embalse nuclear plant, 143; Ezeiza reprocessing plant, 322; Pilcaniyeu plant, 323
Nuestra Señora de Santa María del Buen Aire: 8
nullius prelatures: 117
Nuremberg trials: 331
nurses. *See* health and welfare

Obligado, Pastor: 31
Odeón faction. *See* verticalists
O'Donnell, Guillermo A.: xxv; *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, xxv
O'Gorman, Carlos: 28
O'Higgins, Bernardo: 20
oligarchy: 41, 42
Onganía, Juan Carlos: xii, 60–62 *passim*, 206, 217, 220, 224, 230, 232, 239, 242, 257, 293, 298
Ongaro, Raimundo: 239
Onslow, J.J.: 25

Organic Law of the Political Parties of 1982: 214, 215, 226
Organization of American States (OAS): xxii, 68, 74, 260, 264, 266, 296
Orsatti, Álvaro: 97
Ortiz, Roberto M.: xii, 50, 319
Ottoman Empire: 7

Pacific Ocean: 88
Palermo: 29: Palace, 26
pampas: 6, 22–25 *passim*, 37, 83, 88, 92, 93, 97, 99–105, 159; *pampa humeda*, 92; *pampa seca*, 92
Panama: 8, 9, 12, 13
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO): 115
Pan American Union: 260
Paraguay: 8, 13, 18, 29, 30, 33, 34, 85, 90–92 *passim*, 100, 104, 105, 142, 153, 180, 280, 284–86 *passim*, 312, 324
Paraguayan War (War of the Triple Alliance): 33–34, 284, 287
Paraná: 91, 310; Paraná, 149
partidos: 91
Paso, Juan J.: 18
Patagonia: 6, 8, 13, 21, 36, 37, 57, 83, 88, 93, 94, 100, 102, 104, 105, 287, 321, 322
Pavón: 33
Pearl Harbor: 50
Pellegrini, Carlos: xii, 39, 40
Penal Code: 65
peninsulares (*see also* ethnic groups): 15, 17
Perdriel, Julián: 18
Pérez de Cuellar, Javier: 264
Pérez de Zorita, Juan: 9
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights: 253
Perón, Juan Domingo: xii, xxvii, 4, 51–57 *passim*, 58–60 *passim*, 62–66 *passim*, 80, 84, 103, 104, 206, 217, 219, 221–25, 228, 230, 232, 237–39 *passim*, 241–43 *passim*, 290, 292; anti-Peronism, 222; Justicialismo (Peronist Movement), 4, 54, 228, 229; Peronism, 56, 59, 62, 221–25, 241, 292, 382; Peronist Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas—FAP), 63, 224; Peronists, xxvii, xxix, 57–60 *passim*, 69, 71, 225, 228, 230, 233, 245, 250, 251; Peronist Youth (Juventud Peronista—JP), xvii, 224, 228
Peru (*see also* Viceroyalty of Peru): 8, 9, 143, 145, 264, 278, 280, 320, 324, 325; United Liberating Army of Peru, 281
Philip V (king of Spain): 12
physicians. *See* health and welfare
Pironio, Eduardo: 119
"Plan Barrido": 172
Plaza de Mayo: 52, 58, 76, 246, 258
Poland: 101, 172
police (*see also* Ministry of Interior): xxiii
Policy Coordinating Committee for Military Matériel Exports: 320
political parties: xiv–xv, 60, 64, 203, 220, 225–34; Antipersonalist Radical Civic Union, 46; Argentine Communist Party (Partido Comunista Argentina—PCA), xiv, 232, 233, 249; Autonomist Party, 35, 226, 234; Christian Democratic Federal Union (Unión Federal Demócrata Cristiana—UFDC), xv, 71, 220, 248; Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC), xiv, 227, 231, 232, 248, 251; Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC), xv, 232; Christian Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cristiano—PRC), xv, 232; Civic Union (Unión Cívica): 40, 41, 218; Democratic Concentration, 226; Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata—PD), xiv, 226; Democratic Socialist Alliance (Alianza Demócrata Socialista—ADS), xiv, 227, 228; Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Democrática—PSD), xv, 227; Democratic Union (Unión Democrática—UD), xv, 53; Federal Alliance (Alianza Federal—AF), xiv, 226, 227; Federalist Party of the Center (Partido Federalista del Centro—PFC), xiv, 226; Federal Party of Francisco Manrique, 226; Federal Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Federalista—APF), 227; Indepen-

dent Socialist Party, 46; Intransigence and Mobilization Movement (Movimiento de Intrasigencia y Movilización—MIM), xiv, 221; Intransigent Party (Partido Intransigente—PI), xiv, 71, 219, 221, 228, 232, 248, 249, 251; Intransigent Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente—UCRI), xv, 59, 223, 228, 230, 232; Justicialist Party (Partido Justicialista—PJ), xiv, xxii, xxxii, xxxiii, 64, 221, 225–29 *passim*, 233, 245, 248, 249, 251, 255, 257, 258, 267; Labor Party, 53; Movement for Intergration and Development (Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo—MID), xiv, 71, 219, 221, 227, 228, 244, 246, 248, 249, 251; Movement of Renovation and Change (Movimiento de Renovación y Cambio—MRC), xiv, 231; Movement to Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS), xiv, 258; National Autonomist Party: 35–36, 231; National Civic Union (Unión Cívica Nacional), 41; National Line (Línea Nacional—LN), xiv, 251; National Party, 35; People's Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo—UCRP), xv, 59, 60, 223, 228, 230; Peronist Party, 53; Popular Federalist Force, 226; Popular Left Front (Frente de Izquierda Popular—FIP), xiv, 233; Popular Line: 226; Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP), xv, 232, 233, 249; Progressive Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Progresista—PDP), xiv, 227; Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical—UCR), xv, xxii, xxvii, xxix, xxxii, xxxiii, 41, 42, 46, 47, 55, 71, 76, 218, 219, 221–23 *passim*, 225–28 *passim*, 230, 231, 245, 247–49 *passim*, 251, 252; Radical Youth (Juventud Radicalista), 231; Republican Union (Unión Republicana—UR), xv, 226; Revolutionary Popular Alliance (Alianza Revolucionaria Popular—ARP), xiv, 230, 232; Socialist Party (Partido Socialista—PS), xv, 41, 227, 233; UCR Renovating Junta, 53; Unified Party of the National Revolution, 53; Union of the Democratic Center (Unión del Centro Democrático—UCD), xv, 217, 226, 227; Women's Peronist Party, 55; Workers' Party (Partido Obrero—PO) xiv, 234; Yrigoyenist Affirmation Movement (Movimiento de Afirmación Yrigoyenista—MAY), 231
political prisoners: 63, 64, 68
Pope Alexander VI: 7; *Inter Caetera*, 7
Popular Restoration Society: 25
population,: xx, xxv; Population Reference Bureau, 106
Port Egmont: 13
porteños (*see also* middle class): 3, 17, 18, 22, 31, 34, 36, 83, 103, 279; Plan of Operations, 17
Port Louis: 13
Port San Carlos: 325, 326
Port Stanley: 324, 326
Portugal: 7, 12, 261, 281
Portuguese influence: 13, 16, 279
Posadas, Gervasio A.: 19
potamos: 91
presidents, list of: xii–xiii
prices: 95
priests. *See* Roman Catholic Church
primary education: 110, 111
Primatesta, Raúl Francisco: 119, 120
"Protector of the Indians". *See* Las Casas, Bartolomé de
Provisional Revolutionary Junta (*see also* military rule): 16
Prussia: 30
Puerto Belgrano: 287, 308; Naval Zone, 205
Puerto Deseado: 173
Puerto Madryn: 173
Puerto Viejo: 145
Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de: 20
Pugliese, Juan Carlos: 231
Puna: 89
Punta del Indio Naval Air Base: 308

Quadrilateral Campaign: 285
quebracho: 90
quedantistas: 241
Quequén: 152, 153, 173

Quintana, Manuel: xii, 39, 42
Quiroga, Juan Facundo: 23

Radicalism: 47, 217-20
Radicals: xxix, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 58, 224, 228, 245, 250
railroads: 30, 31, 35, 38, 49, 54; Argentine Railways (Ferrocarriles Argentinos—FA), 150
Ramírez, Pedro Pablo: xii, 51, 221, 222
Ramírez, de Velazco, Juan: 9
Rattenbach, Benjamín: 293, 327; Rattenbach Commission (Inter-Force Commission), 327; Rattenbach Report, 277
Rawson: 63
Rawson, Arthur J.: xii, 50, 51, 221, 222
Rawson Prison: 63
Reagan, Ronald: 267
Reconquista: 279, 310
religion (*see also* Roman Catholic Church): xx, 117-21; Atheists, 117; Catholics, 30, 40, 60, 65, 117; Jews, 117, 121; Muslims, 117; Protestants, xx, 117, 120, 121; Spiritualists, 117
Reorganization of the Institutionalized Financial System: 179
Republic of Korea: 307
Revolutionary Assembly of 1813: 18-20 *passim*
Revolution of 1810 (May Revolution): 17, 18, 27, 279
Ricchieri, Pablo: 313; Ricchieri Law, 289, 313
Richter, Ronald: 321, 322
Río Alto Paraná: 88, 90, 91
Río Atuel: 89
Río Bermejo: 90
Río Chico: 93
Río Chubut: 93, 94
Río Cincel: 146
Río Colorado: 93
Río Cuarto: 95
Río de la Plata: 3, 6, 8, 12, 13, 15-17 *passim*, 24, 25, 28, 30, 85, 90-92 *passim*, 100, 152, 153, 279, 282
Río Desaguadero: 89
Río Deseado: 93
Río Diament: 89
Río Gallegos: 88, 93, 308, 310
Río Grande: 12, 308
Río Hondo faction. *See* antiverticalists
Río Iguazú: 85, 91
Río Jachal: 89
Río Jacuy: 12
Río Limay: 93
Río Mendoza: 89
Río Negro: 93, 94, 145, 146, 303
Río Negro Province: 322
Río Neuquén: 6, 93
Río Paraguay: 8, 88, 90, 153
Río Paraná: 6, 8, 91-93 *passim*, 143, 152, 153, 303
Río Pepiri Guazú: 85
Río Pilcomayo: 8, 88, 90
Río Erenũ, Héctor Luis: 301, 302
Río Salado: 24, 90
Río San Antonio: 85
Río Santa Cruz: 93
Río Santiago: 305, 315
Rio Treaty. *See* Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
Río Tunuyan: 89
Río Turbio: 144
Río Uruguay: 8, 12, 85, 91, 153
Rivadavia, Bernardino: 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 282
Rivadavia, Martín: 288
Rivera, Fructuoso: 28
Rivera, Miguel Primo de: 48
Robledo, Federico: 228
Roca, Julio Argentino: xii, 35, 36, 39, 41, 42, 99, 218, 287, 288
Roca-Runciman Trade Agreement of 1933: 49
Roché, Antonio de la: 9
Rodríguez, Martín: 21
Rodríguez Peña, Nicolás: 18
Roman Catholic Church: xx, 10, 17, 18, 27, 45, 53, 57, 58, 63, 74, 117-20, 208, 217, 220, 232, 242, 245, 256; Dominicans, 10; Families and Friends of Those Murdered by the Subversion, 119; Franciscans, 10; Jesuits, 10; John Paul II, 74; Peace and Justice Service in Latin America, 119; "The Path to Reconciliation", 74
Rome: 263
Roncador dam: 143
Rosario: 8, 30, 31, 35, 93, 104, 114, 150, 152, 153, 223, 303, 312
Rosas. *See* de Rosas

rosismo: 26
rosistas: 25–27 *passim*
Russia: 101
Russian-Jewish community: 44

Saadi, Vicente Leonidas: 221, 228, 230
Saavedra, Cornelio: 17
Saavedra Lamas, Carlos de: 109
Sábato, Ernesto: 109, 330; Sábato Commission, 253
Sáenz Peña, Luis: xii, 41
Sáenz Peña, Roque: xii, 42, 213
Sáenz Peña Law: 42, 50, 213, 216, 218, 314
Saint Jean Ibérico: 69
St. Malo:9
saladeros: 15, 24
salaries and wages. *See* income
Salta: 5, 9, 12, 19, 20, 28, 48, 83, 88, 104, 142, 145, 303
Salta Jujeña: 89
Salto Grande dam: 143
San Blas: 145
San Carlos de Bariloche: 321
Sánchez, Carlos E.: 97
Sancti Spíritus: 8
San José de Flores: 31
San Juan: 19, 89, 145, 303
San Lorenzo: 92, 152, 153
San Luis: 9, 19, 41, 89, 103, 142, 163, 303, 310
San Martín: 31
San Martín, José de: 18, 20, 280, 281
San Martin's Lodge: 48
San Nicolás: 152, 153
San Nicolás de los Arroyos: 29
San Pedro dam: 143
San Sebastián-Cerro Redondo: 142
Santa Barbara: 145
Santa Catarina: 12
Santa Cruz: 94, 303, 308
Santa Fe: 5, 6, 8, 12, 21, 25, 29, 30, 41, 42, 46, 90, 93, 103, 104, 111, 150, 152, 163, 164, 303, 310
Santa Rosa: 303
Santiago: 28, 142
Santiago del Estero: 5, 9, 20, 90, 103, 104, 164, 303
Santos Lugares del Morón: 26, 31
São Paulo: 142
Sardinia: 30
Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino: xii, 30, 34–36 *passim*, 38, 79, 111, 286; *Facundo: Civilization and Barbarism 1845*, 34
Sarratea, Manuel de: 18
Sastre, Marcos: 27
Savio, Manuel N.: 316
sawmills: 94, 102
secondary education: 33, 110–112
Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare: 51, 52
security (*see also* armed forces): xxii, xxiii, 332–33
Segba electric company: 149
Semana Tragica (Tragic Week): 44
Serbín, Andrés: 99
Seven Years' War: 12
Seville: 10
shipping: 93
Siemens Kraftwerk Union: 143
Sierra de Córdoba: 92
Sierra Grande: 145
Sierra Pintada: 144
Sierra Subandinas: 89
Sigaut, Lorenzo: 130
Sinai: 267, 313
62 Organizations: 229, 238
slaves, emancipation of: 18
socialists: 43, 48, 53, 58, 225
social reforms: 37, 84
social security: 155, 206
social stratification: 95, 101
Solano López, Fancisco: 33, 34, 285, 286
Somisa: 145
Sourrouille, Juan: xxxi, 133, 257
South Africa: 261
South America: 3, 8, 20, 85, 90–92 *passim*, 260
South Atlantic: xxii, 9, 10, 13, 73, 85, 94, 261, 262
South Atlantic Treaty Organization: 261, 269
South Atlantic War: xxii, xxx, 5, 83, 131, 132, 138, 171, 186, 188, 194, 250, 264, 268, 269, 277–79 *passim*, 306, 307, 309, 312–14 *passim*, 324–27; naval vessels, 325; Operation Rosario, 324
Southern Cone: 91, 261
South Georgia/Georgia del Sur Island: 73, 85, 262, 263

South Orkney/Orcadas del Sur Islands: 85, 262
South Sandwich/Sandwich del Sur Islands: 85, 262, 263
South Shetland/Shetland del Sur Islands: 85, 262
Soviet Union: xxi, xxii, 143, 155, 172, 190, 191, 249, 261, 266, 268, 270, 325
Spain: xxvii, 3, 7, 16–18 *passim*, 20, 22, 24, 48, 51, 72, 172, 261; Council of the Indies, 9; discovery and influence, 3, 6 , 6, 8–13 *passim*, 16, 18, 20, 89, 95, 100, 111, 236, 259, 262, 278, 280; House of Trade, 9
Spanish America: 10, 13, 15, 16
"Spice Islands": 7
Standard Oil Company of California: 57
State Oil Company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales—YPF): 139, 140, 185
steel: 55
Strait of Magellan: 9, 88, 94, 287
Strassera, Julio: 331
strikes: 44, 45, 76, 239, 255–58 *passim*
Strong, John: 9
student protests: 61, 62, 112
Suárez Masón, Carlos: 69
Suárez Masón, Guillermo: xxxiii
subversion. *See* "dirty war"
Sweden: 69, 265, 296
Swiss settlers: 30
Switzerland: 143, 265

Tacuru: 145
Taiwan: 172
Tandil: 310
Tanzania: 266, 296,
taxes: 49, 61, 130, 131, 134, 137, 157, 158; value-added tax (VAT), 155, 157, 158, 182, 183
technical and vocational education: 111, 112
technology: 38
Tejedor, Carlos: 36
tenientes: 287
Terrera, Guillermo Alfredo: 106
Territorial Guard: xxii, 314
terrorism (*see also* "dirty war"): xxiii, xxviii, xxx, xxxiii, 4–5, 26, 58, 258, 283
Terry, Fernando Belaúnde: 264
Texas: 140
Thatcher, Margaret: 267
Third Position. *See* nonalignment
Third World: 63
Thirty-Three Immortals (*also* Thirty-Three Easterners or Orientals): 281
32 Democratic Unions: 238
Thompson, James: 120
Togo: 172
Tomas, Raúl: 298
topography: xx
Torres de Vera y Aragón, Juan: 8
trade, foreign (*see also* exports, imports): xxi, 12, 15, 17, 18 31, 38, 43, 56, 188–92, 246, 270
transportation (*see also* air service, railroads): 49, 150–53; merchant fleet, 151; subway, 151
treasury: 13, 24
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty): 265, 266, 297
Treaty of Paris: 12, 13
Treaty of Santo Idelfonso: 12
Treaty of the Triple Alliance (*see also* Paraguayan War): 34, 285
Treaty of Tordesillas: 7
Treaty of Utrecht: 12
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): 265, 266, 296
tribes (*see also* ethnic groups, Indians): Agaces, 6; Araucanians, 6; Caingúas, 6; Charrúas, 6; Chiriguanos, 5; Chorotes, 5; Diaguitas (Calchaquians), 5, 6; Guaranis, 8, 12; Guaycurúes, 5; Matacos-Mataguayos, 5; Mocoretas, 6; Patagonians, 6; Pulcheans, 6; Querandies, 6; Shelknam Indians, 94; Timbúes, 5
Trinidad and Tobago: 172
Triumvirate: 18
Tróccoli, Antonio: 332–33
Tropic of Capricorn: 85, 88
Truman, Harry S: 291
Tucumán: 5, 9, 18–20 *passim*, 28, 35, 41, 88, 103, 114, 303; Congress, 280

Ubaldini, Saúl: 228, 258
Unchime: 145

underemployment: 84, 135
unemployment: 84, 135, 249
unicato: 39, 40
Unitarians: xxvi, 17, 21, 22, 24, 28 31, 204
United Nations (UN): xxii, 71, 72, 266, 268, 296; Commission for Refugees, 95; Commission on Human Rights, 71; General Assembly, 262–64 *passim*; International Court of Justice, 269; Latin American Intergration Association, xxii; Resolution 502, 73, 263, 264; Security Council, 73, 249, 263
United Provinces of South America: 19, 20, 22, 280
United States: xxi, xxvii, 38, 46, 53, 55, 56, 73, 94, 121, 172, 187, 249, 261, 270, 292, 293, 306, 323; anti-United States sentiments, 53, 221, 260; banks, 187; Bureau of the Census, 94; Department of State, 266, 291; Department of the Treasury, 268; economic interests, 45, 47, 57, 59, 60; *Harriet*, 262; Lend-Lease Aid, 291; loan, 257, relations with, 265, 266; sanctions, 69, 266, 269; technological developments, 38, 136; U.S.S. *Lexington*, 262
universities and colleges (*see also* academies, education, higher education, military education): 84; University of Buenos Aires, 21, 60, 66, 113; University of Córdoba, 30, 112
upper class (*see also criollos*): 11, 17, 24, 41, 45, 46, 55, 59, 68, 97, 98, 100, 101, 216, 245; landed elite, 84
Upper Peru. *See* Bolivia
urbanization: 4, 8
Uriburu, José Evaristo: xii
Uriburu, José F.: xii, 41, 48, 241
Urquiza, Justo José de: 28–30, 31, 33, 284; Great Liberating Army, 284
Uruguay: 13, 17, 19, 28, 29, 33, 34, 85, 91, 95, 105, 106, 142, 143, 153, 172, 280–85 *passim*, 312, 324
Ushuaia: 88, 94, 173, 306, 308
Uspallata Pass: 89
utilities: 49

Vandor, Augusto: 238, 239
Vatican: 40, 58, 117, 270; Pontifical Commission for Lay People, 117; Second Vatican Council, 63
Venezuela: 143, 187, 324, 325
verticalists (Odeón faction): 229, 230, 258
Vértiz y Calcedo, Juan José: 13
Vespucci, Amerigo: 9, 262
Viamonte, Juan José: 25
Viceroyalty of New Spain: 9
Viceroyalty of Peru: 9, 89, 100
Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata: 13, 19, 100, 278
Videla, Jorge Rafael: xii, xxviii, 66–71 *passim*, 97, 106, 112, 119, 206, 217, 243, 245–48 *passim*, 294
Vietri, Antonio di: 333
Villar, Juan Manuel: 105
Villa Reynolds: 310
villas miseria: 84, 109, 115, 119
Viola, Roberto: xiii, 67, 69–71 *passim*, 130, 217, 243, 247, 248
violence, political: 204, 242, 328–32 *passim*
volunteer militia: 280

Waldner, Teodoro: xxx, 301, 310
Wall Street: 47; crash of October 1929, 47
The War Against Subversion (*see also* "dirty war"): xxviii
War of the Spanish Succession: 12
War with Brazil: 22
Wars of Reconquest: 7
Weert, Sebald de: 9
welfare. *See* health and welfare
Western Europe: 261, 268, 270
Western Hemisphere: 88, 109, 260, 262, 284, 285, 295
West Germany. *See* Federal Republic of Germany
white-collar workers: 223
wool (*see also* livestock): 91, 102
Workers' Politics (Política Obrera): 234
workers' rights: 206
working class, urban (*see also* lower classes): 46, 47, 61, 64, 108, 222, 223
World Bank: 96, 146, 268, 383; *World Development Report*, 96
World Cup soccer match: 68
World War I: 4, 37, 43, 259, 260, 289

World War II: 4, 54, 57, 136, 223, 235, 260, 289, 291, 319, 324, 331

Yacyretá-Apipe 142, 143
youth movement: 64
Yrigoyen, Bernardo de: 40
Yrigoyen, Hipólito: xii, xxvii, 41–48 *passim*, 79, 216, 218, 219, 290
yrigoyenistas: 46

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